

SMK and Doty Group.doc 12/09/2012

Dick Garwin's comments for Spurgeon Keeny Memorial session of 12/09/2012.

I was first introduced to Spurgeon Keeny by W.K.H. (Pief) Panofsky in the White House Office of Science and Technology (OST) where Pief and I were working probably on the Strategic Military Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee--PSAC. Pief's assessment: "That young man has more power than any three-star general in Washington."

I observed Spurgeon close-up in OST, especially beginning in 1961 with the advent of the Kennedy Administration and Jerome Wiesner's service as President Kennedy's Science Advisor. Spurgeon was Wiesner's right-hand man. I recall particularly the urgent introduction of the so-called "permissive action links" (PALs) on the 7000 U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe by the direct intervention of Wiesner and Keeny with the President, followed by the realization that at \$20K per PAL, we had just committed to a \$140 M expenditure over the next year.

Following Spurgeon's long and influential service with OST in support of the President's Science Advisor, and simultaneously on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, he became Assistant Director (S&T) of ACDA. With the advent of the Nixon Administration in 1969, and Henry A. Kissinger as national security advisor (and later as Secretary of State), it became clear that Henry needed help. His Harvard colleague and friend, Paul Doty, Professor of Biochemistry and a long-time member of PSAC and its predecessor, persuaded Henry to work confidentially with a small group of PSAC members and one or two others—Doty, Sidney D. Drell, Dick Garwin, George Kistiakowsky, Pief Panofsky, George Rathjens, and Jack Ruina. We would meet with Henry in the evening in the White House Situation Room before or after a monthly PSAC session, report on the problem we had studied for him in the previous weeks, provide a SECRET or TOP SECRET report that we had prepared and agreed (together with the requisite program options A through E). We would meet with him in the situation room for breakfast the next morning to answer his questions about the report, and agree on a new work topic.

Adding to the difficulty of the work itself was the necessity to maintain clearances and access to sensitive program and policy information, to be able to draft, redraft, and type actual reports and to classify them properly, and even to pay travel expenses where not already covered by PSAC/OST, all without revealing to anyone that Henry was working with people whom he was at the same time denigrating to his staff. Spurgeon Keeny at ACDA took up the challenge, at substantial risk to himself. Thus we prepared technical analyses and option papers on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), national and hard-site missile defense, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV), and in general provided technical and scientific knowledge for which Kissinger himself had no feel.

We had wished that Henry would have drawn on PSAC and Nixon's Science Advisor (initially Lee DuBridge), but he would have none of it. In truth, our informal group was probably a better approach, which could not have been conducted responsibly without the participation of Spurgeon Keeny.

In addition to the written reports there was a sometimes frank exchange of views that led to Kistiakowsky's early departure from the group, and after the bombing of Cambodia 1969-70, to George Rathjen's separation.

I close here by quoting a letter of Paul Doty to Kissinger of May 1, 1973, one day after the resignation of H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman over the Watergate Affair,

*HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY*

*12 Oxford Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
U.S.A.*

May 1, 1973

*Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.*

Dear Henry,

I enclose two copies of-a letter that my colleagues and I have prepared after further reflection on the problem we addressed in our earlier papers. It is more specifically tailored to your present trip to Moscow and presents the arguments (not so much for you as for the other side) for a small package built around a MIRV moratorium. So, do have a look at it before you land, if you can.

Millionshchikov and his friends are supposed to come here for a visit and bilateral discussion of future arms control problems in late June or July. However, we do not have a firm date. While the meeting is not particularly important in the short run, I think it is still important to keep this connection for the long run and that can only be done if we do meet annually. Hence, if you are so inclined and have a chance to speak favorably to Brezhnev or Gromyko about the long term usefulness of this it would be most helpful.

I am sorry I was so numb at the breakfast we had last Monday. The eerie quiet of the White House and my worry of how much the scandal would interfere with your work had their effect. But your New York speech was first rate (except for the unnecessary Watergate diversion) and it should get the Europeans into a little larger frame of mind.

When you have time on your trip I hope you will reflect on the possibility that the changes at the White House will probably make it possible for you to reestablish the practice of having more than one critical input into your problems, at least in the technical aspects of defense and SALT. It seems to me that this is what your former colleagues denied themselves and recently succeeded in denying you. We are more convinced than ever that this is essential if you are to appreciate your options and avoid risking long term mistakes for short term gains. It is not only a plug for us (although we would like to work on a more predictable and regularly scheduled basis) but for bringing in a few others to work similarly in other areas. When you return you should have the chance to act on this. Furthermore it might provide a bonus by helping create a new climate in which science and technology could again be directly useful.

I must stop before this becomes a sermon. Bon voyage and the best of good wishes. Keep a weather eye cocked for the proverbial Russian blonde.

Sincerely,



Paul Doty

PD:gp

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Spurgeon Keeny was a key person in this enterprise, ensuring that our papers went beyond discussion, to actionable options. He was a pleasure to work with; he was a superb colleague and friend.