

MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR ARMS

Symposium speakers:

James B. Strenski,
Organizer and Chairman

"Moral Imperatives,"
Most Reverend John R. Roach, D.D.

"Communications Imperatives,"
Leslie H. Gelb

"Political/Military Imperatives,"
Richard L. Garwin
IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598

(914) 945-2555

(also
Adjunct Professor of Physics,
Columbia University;

Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large,
Cornell University;

Adjunct Research Fellow,
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University)

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"Beyond 1984: Surviving or Thriving?"
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J.B. Strenski: Our next speaker is Dr. Richard Garwin. Dr. Garwin is an IBM Fellow with the Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, NY. Dr. Garwin was born in Cleveland, Ohio. He holds an undergraduate degree in Physics from the Case Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Chicago. He has faculty appointments at Columbia, Cornell, and Harvard Universities. He has made significant contributions in the design of nuclear weapons and in a wide variety of high tech research. He is a prolific author of books and papers on nuclear arms and energy. He is a consultant to agencies of the U.S. Government and a frequent witness at Congressional hearings. Dr. Garwin will share his thoughts on the political and military realities of the nuclear age. Dr. Garwin.

RLG: First I'm going to discuss the question of nuclear weapons-- the need for nuclear weapons, the problems that they give, and then I'm going to talk about what we should do about nuclear weapons. And finally, how to go about doing something about it. In this I speak for myself alone, not for IBM or anybody else.

The question really is how to live securely in a world of nuclear weapons or how to get rid of them without diminishing overall security. Sometimes measures taken to improve security actually impair security. If you bar the windows and lock the doors of the house against burglars, you increase the risk of perishing in a house fire. Nuclear weapons have this dual role as well. By nature, a nuclear weapon is extremely destructive. Each one can destroy a city. A megaton nuclear weapon would kill half a million people immediately. The other part of the problem is that there are so many nuclear weapons-- 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world-- almost exactly half and half in Soviet and U.S. inventories. What are these nuclear weapons for? How do they come about?

It seems a long time ago, but they were developed during World War II in the fear that Nazi Germany might get them first; and after the end of the war in Europe they were used by the United States to bring the war with Japan to a close. The two nuclear weapons dropped on Japan almost certainly saved Japanese lives and they very surely saved American lives. They did not destroy Japan's capacity to wage war. Rather they made emphatically clear to Japan that she would be destroyed if she didn't surrender. We had demonstrated the capability for that destruction and the will to use the capability. Then followed a period of U.S. nuclear monopoly brought gradually to an end beginning in 1949 as the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon. About the same time I entered the picture (in 1950) and helped build the hydrogen bomb and was involved with a lot of air defense and strategic offense and defensive systems from that day to the present.

In the 1950s our forces consisted of bomber-delivered strategic weapons-- that is, city-destroying weapons. The accuracy of delivery wasn't good enough to do anything else, and we didn't have enough nuclear weapons to give them a real military role. There were also some strictly defensive weapons: surface-to-air missiles against penetrating bombers with nuclear warheads; air-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads; anti-submarine torpedoes, and so on. And toward the end of the 1950s there emerged tactical nuclear weapons for countering military forces on land. In the same period, radar and other technologies were applied to air defense, but the problem was that we could never imagine a defensive system which would destroy more than 30% of the Soviet bombers delivering their versions of nuclear weapons. Those few Soviet bombs in the beginning of the 50s grew to hundreds on bombers-- turboprop bombers of the 1950s which still constitute the backbone of the Soviet Strategic Air Force today. The vast majority of Soviet nuclear warheads, now hydrogen bombs, are on their land-based missiles-- their ICBMs.

What kind of tactical nuclear weapons, which have a strictly military role, could handle 40,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact tanks in Europe? Not the destruction of these tanks as they sit in marshalling yards-- because in the face of a nuclear threat they will be individual targets or could be destroyed only a few at a time. Nuclear weapons really don't do a very good job against tanks on the battlefield. Yet a 10-kiloton weapon, about the size that was used against Hiroshima or Nagasaki, could destroy a tank or a few tanks in combat or alternatively it could kill 50,000 people in a city. So these weapons are too powerful; their peripheral damage is too great for the military utility that they convey.

In the 1950s we had an era of vast overkill, and in 1962 Secretary McNamara in his famous speech in Ann Arbor explicitly stated a use for these excess nuclear weapons. He said our primary need for nuclear weapons was to be able to retaliate against the Soviet Union after receiving a first nuclear strike, and we must have enough to destroy the Soviet Union in return. This was not vengeance, but so that the attack

would never come in the first place-- deterrence by threat of retaliation. But he said the vast number of weapons (beyond the 400 equivalent megatons required for assured destruction for deterrence through threat of retaliation) could be used after war broke out for purposes of damage limitation. In short, they could be used to destroy the Soviet nuclear weapons while they sat in their silos or on their bomber bases. So this became the criterion for building our forces-- the capability for assured destruction after accepting a first strike-- but because the second role had been mentioned and was always of interest in any case to the military, our forces have been built since then, primarily not to ensure deterrence by threat of retaliation but for the more difficult job of countermilitary and counterforce capability.

In a remarkable book of 1968, America Is In Danger, the retired head of the Strategic Air Command, General Curtis LeMay, said explicitly that he had built a Strategic Air Command with missiles and bombers with the capability and the intention of a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. That is, the Strategic Air Command paid a lot of attention to what was going on in the Soviet Union day by day, and Curt LeMay was convinced that he would have warning to carry out this preemptive strike before the Soviet bombers and missiles could get off the ground. Of course, he added he had no authority to do so and he hoped that the order would be forthcoming from the President if the occasion arose.

And now we have 50,000 nuclear weapons and 10,000 megatons of explosive yield. In World War II about 3 million tons-- 3 megatons-- of high explosive was used; we have now 1700 times as much, and as Carl Sagan characterizes it, enough to have a World War II every 5 seconds for the length of a lazy Sunday afternoon. No one can argue with these facts that I have presented-- that we have nuclear weapons for deterrence, but because of the mixed role given them, our forces are much larger than necessary; and they play a role in damage limitation and even further in the termination of war on terms favorable to the United States-- and so that the United States can "prevail", whatever that means. In addition, I haven't mentioned previously the few hundred nuclear weapons in the French, British, and Chinese forces and the one nuclear explosion of India in 1974.

Deterrence by threat of retaliation is not the only way of persuading the other side not to attack. You might have deterrence because they would recognize they could not accomplish their goal-- we had a perfect shield-- or that it would cost them too much to penetrate the shield. Nevertheless, threat of retaliation is the only way we have found thus far, and it is the only way even in response to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative speech of March 1983 that we can have for the future.

Does deterrence by threat of retaliation suffice? Are we secure? No, we are not secure against nuclear accidents; we are not secure against nuclear threats from third parties, especially terrorists who have no base for us to attack; we're not secure against crazy people who have nuclear weapons or who don't care for their own lives and the lives of their citizens. We worry that this capability to destroy in return does not do everything we would like. It does not eliminate the threat of all war in the world, and it does not reassure our allies to the extent that we would like. Nevertheless, it is the best we have, and we ought to enhance this deterrence instead of denigrating it.

A few days ago Bill Safire published in the New York Times argument that we had to buy the Star Wars system-- a space defense against ICBMs-- not because it would work against a Soviet threat, but because if Libya put a nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile which they could buy from the Germans, and held a U.S. city hostage by threatening to attack it, we would have no way to avert such an attack. In fact, we could perfectly well destroy such weapons before launch, either on the ground or through a preemptive strike. And in the case of a naked ICBM attack like that with a few warheads, even our own ICBMs could be used as defensive missiles in space-- which they could not against a full scale Soviet attack with tens of thousands of reentry vehicles and decoys.

Does deterrence suffice? Let me quote Curt LeMay again who said in a passage in his book that if the Soviet Union were convinced that we had the capability to absorb a first strike and to retaliate, then they would surely be deterred and he would be satisfied. The only problem is to ensure that our forces could survive, that they would be able to penetrate to their targets, and that they would be able to destroy their targets. Over the years various scares have emerged and been accommodated-- the threat of Minuteman vulnerability, the threat of ballistic missile defense on the other side. In 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union signed and put into force the ABM Treaty, which banned the defense of the Soviet Union or of the United States against strategic ballistic missiles; that is still the law of the land. We managed some of these problems by arms control; some of them we have managed by unilateral decisions. Our

10,000 strategic nuclear weapons are totally irrelevant to any limited use. I don't deny that there might be a use for one or two nuclear weapons sometime. After all, what if the Soviet Union used one or two? I can't tell you exactly what we would do with them, but we don't need to have 10,000 to use one or two. A thousand would be fine.

I want to make, as you will see, a major reduction from 25,000 nuclear weapons all together on our side, to 1000. It still sounds like a lot of nuclear weapons, but it is a 96% reduction. How should this reduction be made? Consider ICBMs only on both sides of the most modern kind-- multiple warheads which can attack independent targets. Opposing forces of 10-warhead ICBMs, perhaps 100 of them, would be mutually vulnerable. One-tenth of the force on each side could destroy the entire force on the other, so that is not the way to go.

We have too many weapons for deterrence now and no use for them. This trivializes nuclear weapons. It does not provide a stance for a big effort to bar proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries, which would increase the hazard to both the United States and the Soviet Union and to these other countries as well.

The solution would be found by having a robust, near-minimum deterrent-- 1000 strategic nuclear warheads and no others. No ballistic missile defense on either side as is provided in the ABM Treaty of 1972, which we should reinforce rather than seek to eliminate. We should have a ban on space weapons and on antisatellite weapon tests, which I have studied for a long time and I believe is verifiable. This would prevent one from fearing that one side or the other could eliminate the deterrent of the other side by an effective space defense. And we should not build our weapons to have a counterforce capability against the Soviet strategic offensive force. At the same time we should emphasize the efforts to bar the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations and to keep them out of the hands of terrorist groups.

I would build forces containing my 1000 nuclear weapons as follows: I would put 400 of them in small missiles with single warheads each in small silos. We now have 1000 ICBMs, some of which have 3 warheads, some of which have 1 warhead; and the Soviets have some 1400 ICBMs with 4 to 10 warheads each. My 400 submarine-launched ballistic missiles would be on 50 small submarines-- 8 warheads each. Right now we have 200 warheads on an individual Poseidon or Trident submarine. My 200 air-launched cruise missiles would be on 100 aircraft; right now we have 20 on a single aircraft.

Now, would this be adequate to continue deterrence? In my opinion, yes. Why do people oppose arms limitation? In 1979 Paul Nitze opposed the ratification of SALT II, which would enforce a very modest limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. He argued with all kinds of numbers which were, in fact, accurate, that in 1985 the Soviet Union could have a much better silo-killing capability than the United States if we continued with all our existing programs. But I persuaded him and others that we could, in fact, if we wanted, enhance our silo-killing capability at very little cost; but Paul Nitze still opposed the ratification of SALT II. Very frankly, he said, because he thought it would lull the American people into a false sense of security.

Curt LeMay in his 1968 book decries the idea of accepting deterrence, even if it would work, because the forces would stagnate. Our offensive and defensive forces would remain stationary in technology and size, and he thought that did not benefit America's mission in the world. He says "WE MUST RACE!" I believe that we ought to try real arms control and arms reduction, and in this I quote Edward Teller who says "The only way to guarantee not to succeed is not to try." Of course, Edward Teller says that about technology, not about arms control, but it works either way.

Myth has it that it is the recent loss of clear strategic superiority which is at the root of our troubles. What troubles? The bombing of the hotel in Brighton, of the embassy in Lebanon? What really made a difference in our power in the world was when the Soviet Union acquired a substantial stock of deliverable nuclear weapons. Nuclear monopoly is strategic superiority, but we lost that in the 1950s and we must now survive with the Soviet Union or perish with them. It is the loss of nuclear monopoly and the infeasibility of a preemptive disarming strike which have eliminated the military utility of nuclear weapons.

Well, if the United States, including the President, were convinced of the program which I've outlined to you, how could we proceed? We would have to determine whether the Soviet Union would prefer such a 1000 warhead force to their present 25,000. And in the process we should not portray the negotiation

as a victory by the U.S. or a concession by the Soviet Union, but as a joint victory over insanity. The Soviet Union would show its preference by words, yes, but more importantly, by deed. How could we achieve that? I suggest three phases. We ought to bury half of our ICBMs. Just get out the bulldozers and pile earth to a depth of 50 feet over the silos. We should send half our submarines to cruise in the southern oceans out of range of their targets. And if the Soviet Union follows suit in 6 weeks, then we put into operation the second phase of the program-- a two-pronged phase-- first to make permanent the 50% reduction which we achieved in the beginning, although perhaps substituting other weapons for destruction than the ones which were buried or sent to cruise in the Antarctic. And we should put into effect a demilitarization of 50% of our weapons as proposed by Admiral Noel Gayler. In short, we would bring our weapons to a place where they would have their fissile material extracted and returned to us under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Authority while the weapons themselves-- the nonnuclear components-- were crushed. We should negotiate at that time a full treaty which freezes nuclear weapons and schedules a reduction to 1000 warheads total on each side in 5 years.

Initially, we could remove all but one reentry vehicles from each MIRVed missile, and all but one cruise missile from each strategic bomber. The resulting force is easy to achieve, no technology required. It can be verified cooperatively and it costs less to operate than the present one. On the other hand it costs more to operate and is probably not so stable as an optimized force with 1000 warheads. So over the succeeding 5 years-- that is 5-10 years from now-- we should allow the replacement one-for-one of these old warheads by the small Midgetman missile in new silos, by our new small submarines, and by an air-launched cruise missile. On the Soviet side we should allow them to replace with whatever they want. So we would have not nuclear monopoly again, but a posture with which we and the Soviets could live.

How would we go about putting this process in motion? The President must lead. He has the responsibility and the authority to carry out studies and exploration. Such a program will not emerge spontaneously from the bureaucracy even if it is truly desirable-- not because of any lack of patriotism, but a lack of vision in the fragmented system that we have. And some truly prefer a campaign for destroying the Soviet Union economically to an easing of the threat of nuclear weapons to ourselves. The President must have a staff for this most important problem of choosing the strategic direction and gaining cooperation of the Soviet Union. That staff exists in principle in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but it should be used quite differently.

At present, the process of negotiating a treaty is bureaucratically burdensome, takes many years; and the process of gaining support from powerful groups with other interests is so burdensome that the treaties that result arouse no enthusiasm from anyone. A better approach would be for the ACDA staff to gain the encouragement of the President, to be aware of the interests in all parts of government and society, and to negotiate a treaty which it believes would maximize the benefit to the United States-- not the advantage to the United States or the edge over the Soviet Union-- but our benefit. After signature by the President, the treaty would be presented to the Senate to advise ratification by a two-thirds majority, and at this time the question would arise as to whether the agreement is in the interests of the United States or whether we'd be better off without the treaty. That's the sole question: Are we better off putting this treaty into operation, or better off without it? The Joint Chiefs of Staff would give their view. Everybody would have an idea how the treaty might be improved, but that would not happen. It is "take it or leave it." There is no shame associated with negotiating and signing a treaty, which discussion shows is not acceptable. I think this would be a great improvement.

Let me leave you with an analogy. I'm asking for evaluation and approval of a defined treaty-- one which has been already negotiated, however that has happened. It sometimes happens that an author writes a book which is esteemed and enjoyed by a million people. It would never happen that such a book could be produced if the million people were involved in writing it. But our present national security process is like that-- everybody involved, and the result pleases no one. So let them reject or approve, but let us have informed and responsible Presidential leadership in choosing a national security posture and in putting it into effect.

Thank you.

Mr. Strenski: Thank you Dr. Garwin for a balanced, concerned, and certainly illuminating presentation. I for one hope that you share your plan with the aspirants to the Presidency before the election, or after, as the case may be, if you haven't done so already. It seems to make a lot of sense.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
R.L. Garwin (only)

Male voice: ... from San Antonio. I have not been to Russia to recently, and in fact, I've had no contact with the Russians since they released me from prison camp in Germany in World War II. And I hate people who get up and make a statement rather than ask a question, but I want you to know where I'm coming from. I have friends who have recently visited Russia, and they tell me that the God-believers are getting fewer in number in that nation. I agree there exists a great moral and religious imperative to reduce nuclear arms. I agree that we will survive or perish with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I also agree that we know the strength of the U.S.S.R. armed forces in terms of hardware. My question is "How do you know their moral and religious ability to accept the 1000 small warhead missiles," and I'll address that to any or all of the three learned doctors.

Mr. Strenski: Dr. Garwin, do you want to take a crack at that? Speak right into those little microphones or you won't be heard.

RLG: Well, the Soviet Union does manage its country-- the leadership not very well-- and they would do a lot better if they would accept some of the precepts of freedom-- economic freedom. They don't want to do that; they don't want to decentralize economic power because with that would go political power. But the leadership wants to survive, and they try to run their country as best they can consistent with their ideology, which really gets in the way of having a modern, efficient, prosperous country. So, I think if they are not afraid, they will (accept the massive reductions); and if they don't see that their power will decline, they will accept a lessening of their force in order to reduce a lessening of the threat to them. I've been there a couple of times a year for the last few years, but of course you don't see everything in the Soviet Union. You don't even see everything in the United States. And the only way to tell, as Edward Teller says, is to try. So, if there's no peril to our security, and we can help to persuade them that there's no peril to their security, perhaps we can move in that direction.

There's some experience in 1967. Kosygin said, you know (roughly), "You're out of your mind to talk about limiting defense. Defense is a natural thing; defenses don't hurt anybody; defenses save lives." By 1972, the Soviets had come around to the view that they should abolish their capability for defending their country against strategic ballistic missiles. And they have done that. And with a minor exception-- this radar they're building, which, if they finish it, will be a violation of the treaty, although not a military threat, and they should stop doing it-- they have, in my opinion, obeyed the treaty very well. So, let's try.

Male voice: My name is Paul Forbes, of Forbes and Associates in Washington, DC. My question is for Dr. Garwin. But before I ask, just a moment of background. I think most of know that the Soviet Union, Russia, has had a history of rather justifiable paranoia for a couple hundred years. They were invaded during the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, World War I, World War II-- sort of the equivalent of being invaded by Mexico and Canada; and I think if we had been invaded that often, we probably would be paranoid too. In World War II, they lost 20 million people. Now the current gerontocracy-- the elderly people who run the Soviet Union-- vividly remember World War II, and are probably seared as they ought to be by the experience, while most of our leadership, of course, was not in power at that time, (except Ronald Reagan, I guess, he was in the Army). Of course, now we're seeing a power struggle-- a rather quiet one-- put a power struggle of a bunch of old men shuffling chairs and resisting turning anything over to the next generation. And my question is, in your judgment-- you're obviously well-informed-- do you see the new generation coming on as being perhaps more open-minded, more responsible because they're more modern, even though they still are rather close-minded because of their society? Or, on the other hand, since they were not seared by the experience of World War II, are they more likely to be adventurous?

RLG: I'm no expert on the Soviet Union. I'm a scientist and a technologist, but I have looked into these matters. There are no real experts on the Soviet Union, even in the Soviet Union, in my opinion. Your question is a very good one. The answer is: You're right. There will be changes. The new generation knows much more about the world outside the Soviet Union than does the present generation of leaders. They have a better comparison; they know we are not devils. They know what's in Curt LeMay's book, but they know that is not universally accepted in the United States. But unless we propose to them the

things that only we can think about because we have a much better political system-- we have a much better way of analyzing these things-- and then the opportunity of saying "yes" or "no", we will not take advantage of whatever is the improvement in the situation over there.

I'd like to say one more thing. There is the question that Les Gelb raised of newspapers and how one learns about these things. Well, you can subscribe to a specialized news service for stock quotes, or for financial analysis, and there exist similar things on nuclear issues. So, a small noncommercial message-- this week I'm turning over to the Committee for National Security (of which I'm member of the Board) any fees I get for public speaking, and I have a number of folders here for anybody who's interested in finding out more about the organization.

John Donovan: Mr. Strenski, I'm John Donovan from the New York chapter, and I have a question also for Dr. Garwin, which I think relates to what you just mentioned about your newsletter. You drew an analogy between the formation of public policy and writing a book-- saying in effect that a million people can benefit from writing a book, but a million people can't write it. Now, Archbishop Roach and Leslie Gelb seem to be advancing arguments about public opinion and its usefulness in exactly the opposite direction. The Archbishop said that it's a sign of hope, that public opinion has intensified in this issue, and Dr. Gelb said that we've been jerked around by the nose for 20 years or more by those in power. Do I understand from your viewpoint that the recent intensification of public opinion on the nuclear issue is endangering the public policy deliberations?

RLG: No, that's not my position at all. I think interest is essential. I think that the people must demand responsibility in government-- they must demand that their representatives are knowledgeable. They may in fact have initiatives of their own. It's just very hard, and I know that, I think, as well as anybody, to have a public initiative which is very specific and in which everybody focuses on the same thing. Too often you get "splinter groups", some of which demand this thing; some demand something which is not compatible with it.

Everybody must understand that there is going to be one future for us all. It may not be the future that they want most, but it has to be one that they can accept. Together with this great interest, there has to be a faith in the democratic process-- not "perfect democracy" where everybody has a vote on every question, the questions are too complicated for that-- but representative democracy, which has fallen very much into disrepair, in my opinion.

Male voice: I'm David... and I am Chair of Communications at California State University. I have a question for Dr. Garwin, and also for Dr. Gelb. I was fascinated by Dr. Garwin's Alice in Wonderland scenario. But at the bottom of that scenario we come to the thing which concerns all PR practitioners-- and that is the question of credibility of individuals. And I would like to ask you whether you feel that if we were to come to such negotiation, the credibility of the President would be a significant issue. And, I mean, we're really down to "hard rock" here now, and that is the question of whether President Reagan, if reelected, has established over his previous period, a credibility which the Soviets would buy?

RLG: Well, the President has not shown any great expertise in strategic matters, and he would have to learn. On the other hand, he is the Chief Executive Officer, and he could turn this job over to a special assistant for this purpose, somebody who has credibility, and he really should turn it over to him. The President would still have the judgment; he would talk to this person for a long time every day, particularly when the proposal was made. The Soviets have to believe in our system-- we exist; the Soviets exist. We're the only people they can negotiate with. I think more interesting, really, is whether the President understands that we have a very serious problem, which is not going to be solved by building more weapons which are irrelevant to the goals for which they're building built.

Dr. Gelb: I'm afraid I find myself in disagreement with my friend Dick Garwin. I don't think there's any such thing as a "substitute President", particularly on an issue like nuclear weapons or arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. It won't work. There's no way people with different perspectives-- and there are people in this Administration as in every Administration-- with different perspectives on the problem would allow a substitute President to make final decisions. They'd always, whenever you're lost, you'd want to bring it to the attention of the boss. So, it's either Ronald Reagan, or it doesn't work. He's President; he has this responsibility.

Now it also won't work despite the best of intentions. I take the stories-- the reporting I've done about Mr. Reagan's seriousness about arms control, beginning about a year and a half ago-- I take it at face value. I think that he is in that office and he wants to do something for peace and for posterity. It's hard to believe that he would feel otherwise. But it takes much more than good intentions to bring about arms control agreements. It does take knowledge-- a considerable amount of knowledge-- otherwise you're not willing to make decisions. Presidents are no different from your bosses in this respect; if they don't know, they're not going to decide. You'll dally; you'll put things off, and you'll never get it done.

Secondly, it requires a commitment on the part of the President's principal subordinates because it's very easy in Government (having been in Government three times myself, I can attest to it personally) it's very easy in Government for somebody who doesn't want to get something done to block it. So, you start with Ronald Reagan; you're not electing a substitute President; you're electing him or not. But if you want to get something done, perhaps there will have to be many things changed in a second Reagan Administration.

Male voice: First of all, I'd like to compliment Dr. Gelb for what I heard him say and for the thoughtfulness and soul-searching that he would express or go through before writing those kinds of stories. I think that's far different than the Woodward and Bernstein mentality that is so prevalent in the media today.

Dale Z: My name is Dale Z..., I'm from Salt Lake City.

If indeed the government leaders of the Western democracies are responsive to public opinion, and if indeed the Communist leaders, if responsive at all are so to a far lesser degree, is there not danger in the nuclear freeze bringing about unilateral action on the part of the democracies that would indeed be dangerous for whomever?

RLG: Well, we should only do those things that are in our own interest. It's absolutely true that public opinion in the Soviet Union plays a very small role. Public opinion is manipulated there for show. Here it's manipulated in seriousness because unless you deceive the public, or at least gain their support one way or another, you cannot go forward with these programs. There is a hazard that the public may focus on simplistic solutions, but the Congress makes the law, and the Executive executes them. What is important is that the Congress do a good job, and they don't.

The Congress does not do its work efficiently; it doesn't look at the whole spectrum; it temporizes; it hates to make decisions. You may remember the term "mugwump". "Mugwump" is a member of Congress with his "mug" on one side of the fence and his "wump" on the other side; and sometimes it's just better to be on one side or the other. So, I don't fear public opinion and that the President will be too compliant with public opinion. I think it is a strength of democracy.

Mr. Strenksi: Anybody else on the panel that wants to respond to that question?

Dr. Gelb: Let me respond to the nuclear freeze part of it just to get some disagreement going here on the panel. It probably would surprise you to know that as a journalist I have opinions about some of these things, and I happen not to be an enthusiast of the nuclear freeze proposal. I know there are fifty different versions of it, so it's hard to say I'm against all fifty. But to me this seems much more than is realistically accomplishable in the near term. And quite frankly, I've had it with proposals for what are called "real arms control." Let's get rid of all of these weapons and cut down by 50% next year and 75% the year after because they just don't work; they don't work. They have never worked. We have had Presidents try to propose such things; the Russians propose general and complete disarmament. It's mostly a lot of malarkey because the two basic ingredients for agreement, compromise, just aren't there. First, it requires some symmetry of forces, because each leadership group has got to make decisions of trading off one thing for another, which is very difficult to do when our strengths are in certain categories and theirs in very other kinds of categories. It's difficult to make those compromises intellectually, politically,

Secondly, there's just hardly any trust. Now, even though we can say-- our logical calculation, this business, the nuclear war fighting is a lot of stuff-and-nonsense-- the fact is no political leader will

take a big risk without basic ingredients of trust. So to me, the way you get at this problem is to take small steps. But let's take them and get on with the job and get to the point, sooner rather than later, of being able to take substantial steps to really block the further development of weapons that don't do any of us any good. But you've got to get to that point, and you've got to get there by doing things like SALT I and SALT II-- things that we tend to get dissatisfied with because they aren't enough, when in fact they're all that can be reasonably done.

I'm... and I'm with a large corporation that has a stake in this issue, at least from an implementation standpoint. My question is, it was brought up earlier, and very well, that the Soviet mentality is an interesting part of this communications problem that we're dealing with here in getting this particular issue across them. In some respects we're dealing with a very specialized type of target audience, and I hope nobody has any problem with that term. We do have a lot of suspicion there. I just wonder if any of the three panelists would care to comment on some communication strategies that we might be able to use to, say, communicate this new cooperative spirit and this new moment to the Soviet people and the Soviet leadership.

RLG: I think words are probably the best way for us to communicate, once we decide what it is we want to communicate. We've tried in the past by going on different stages of alert or letting out hints, and the problem is that this is a very blunt instrument. It is observed at the wrong time; people take it with the wrong sign. If we have something to say, we ought to say it. We ought to say it at the Presidential level; we ought to say it at the lower levels. And I think Les Gelb is right: If we're going to move forward in arms control and rational security policy, there have to be changes in personnel in the Administration, even if Mr. Reagan is reelected.

Mr. Strenski: We have exhausted the time that is available to us. I was given the task to wrap up what these three men said in two minutes, and I'm not up to it. I simply want to acknowledge my thanks, and I'm sure yours, to three very stimulating, concerned, and imaginative speakers who have contributed a great deal to this convention.