Letter to the Editor of THE NEW YORK TIMES (as sent)
Richard L. Garwin
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218
(914) 945-2555
FAX: (914) 945-4419
INTERNET: RLG2 at watson.ibm.com
March 4, 1997
(Via Email to letters at nytimes.com)
The Editor, Editorial Page
The New York Times
___ ___ ____ _____
229 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036
Dear Editor:
** About 361 words **
"IN ERA OF SATELLITES, ARMY PLOTS WAYS TO DESTROY THEM" (03/04/97) sketches the
U.S. Army Kinetic Energy Anti-satellite Program but misses the key point:
antisatellite weapons in the hands of others are a mind-boggling problem for the
United States, and our own ani-satellite weapons are no solution.
>From long involvement in U.S. military satellite and anti-satellite (ASAT)
programs, I judge a world of all-too-feasible ASAT capability as one in which
the U.S. stands to lose far more than it gains, in view of our fragile, billion
dollar satellites in low Earth orbit. Our national security depends on these
satellites, which cruise the whole world and are vulnerable to weapons that
could be fielded by many nations. We are the country deriving most value from
satellites; our interests lie in leading the world in banning anti-satellite
weapons, not in building them.
One of the great achievements of Presidents beginning with Eisenhower is the de
facto acceptance of the satellite observation that has been absolutely vital to
U.S. security, beginning, paradoxically, with the Soviet Sputnik in 1957, and
practiced by the 145 Top Secret CORONA photographic satellites operated by the
U.S. from 1960 to 1972. The millions of feet of photographs and the system
details of CORONA were released by the Government in 1995.
We have means of countering unfriendly satellites other than their destruction,
but the contest of ASAT vs. valuable satellite is inherently unequal and greatly
to the disadvantage of the satellite. In 1983 I presented to the U.S. Congress
a draft Treaty Limiting Anti-Satellite Weapons. This Treaty would ban space
weapons and antisatellite tests, recognizing the difficulty of verifying the
absence of ASAT development.
Admiral Noel Gayler (ret.) testified with me in support of the Treaty,
after initially favoring an ASAT capability in order to protect a naval task
force against observation and targeting by Soviet ocean reconnaissance
satellites. Rather than moving ahead with space weaponry and ASAT, the U.S.
should urgently initiate negotiations for a modern treaty banning space weapons
and anti-satellite tests in space. Such a treaty would provide protection for
satellites and a basis for actions taken in response to destruction of one of
our vital assets.
Sincerely yours,
Richard L. Garwin
The author received the 1996 R.V. Jones
Intelligence Award of the U.S. Government
National Foreign Intelligence Community.
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