Back issues of BCAS publications published on this site are intended for non-commercial use only. Photographs and other graphics that appear in articles are expressly not to be reproduced other than for personal use. All rights reserved.

CONTENTS

Vol. 5, No. 3: November 1973

• Frank Baldwin - The Jason Project: Academic Freedom and Moral Responsibility
• Herbert Bix - Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America’s Asian Policy
• John Comer - The Assassination of Ngo Dihn Diem and the Front/Poetry
• Mark Selden - Imperialism and Asia: A Brief Introduction to the Literature
CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.

Passed, 28–30 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts
Contents

Frank Baldwin 2 The Jason Project: Academic Freedom and Moral Responsibility
Herbert P. Bix 14 Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America’s Asian Policy
Jon Halliday 36 What Happened in Korea? Rethinking Korean History 1945-1953 review article
John Comer 45 “The Assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem” and “The Front” poetry
Mark Selden 46 Imperialism and Asia: A Brief Introduction to the Literature bibliography
48 Contributors

Editors: Steve Andors / Nina Adams Managing Editor: Jon Livingston Book Review Editors: Felicia Oldfather / Moss Roberts Staff for this issue: Betsey Cobb / Mary-Ellen Quintana


General Correspondence: Bay Area Institute, 604 Mission Street, Room 1001, San Francisco, California 94105 Manuscripts: Steve Andors, P.O. Box 24, Minetto, N.Y. 13115, in three copies if possible Book Reviews: Felicia Oldfather, Box 579, Trinidad, Ca. 95570 Typesetting: Archetype, Berkeley Printing: Up Press, Redwood City.

BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, November 1973, Volume 5, Number 3. Published quarterly in spring, summer, fall, and winter. $6.00; student rate $4.00; library rate $10.00; foreign rates: $7.00. Jon Livingston, Publisher, Bay Area Institute, 604 Mission St., San Francisco, California 94105. Second class postage paid at San Francisco, California.


© BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
You don’t have to be German to be a good German.”
(Graffiti on the wall of Pupin Hall, Columbia University, April, 1972.)

On April 24, 1972, a group of 40 faculty members from Columbia University and other schools in the New York area assembled in a light drizzle in front of Columbia’s Low Library, the university’s administrative center. They tied identifying white arm bands on each other, and a spokesman announced the start of a nonviolent protest against the activities of five Columbia physics professors.

As the group walked toward Pupin Hall, home of the physics department and other scientific research, university President William J. McGill attempted to dissuade them. Failing that, he obtained assurances (which were honored) that the protest would be peaceful and that valuable equipment in the building would be safeguarded. The faculty members entered Pupin to protest academic responsibility for a U.S. air war pouring death on Indochina; President McGill went back to his command post in Low Library to plan their arrest and the restoration of order to his troubled campus.

The Pupin protest, in the words of one leaflet, “was not directed against students, faculty, workers or President McGill. There was no demand that anyone be fired.” The anti-war protesters’ demand was that Professors Henry J. Foley, Leon Ruderman, Norman Christ, Richard Garwin and Malvin Ruderman resign from the Jason Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). The Jason members were charged with participation in the scientific research that had led to the electronic battlefield, the air war and the use of heinous weapons in Indochina. The civil disobedience sought “by dramatic moral witness, to call the university community’s attention to the war research of the Jason Division, and to appeal directly to the individual consciences of the Jason members.”

By noon the New York Regional Anti-War Faculty (NYRAWF), which included professors from 20 colleges and universities, members of Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action (SESPA) and a few Columbia students had seized control of Pupin. Persons in the building were allowed to leave, but no one was permitted to enter. The protesters used “coercive picketing” to deny access to the building; they linked arms at all entrances and refused to move aside.

Inside the building physics professors were confronted with the products and implications of their research in an emotional teach-in on the air war in Vietnam. Physics students, overwhelmingly hostile to the protest, watched in angry amazement as some of their professors were hectored with charges of genocide and war crime.

The protesters expected swift arrest and removal from the building. Each had brought bail money and made arrangements for legal aid. However, the general protest at Columbia against the reopening of the air war spread, and the administration took no action the first day. (The use of police to clear a student-occupied building the next day caused a near riot and led to a decision by McGill not to employ the police to remove the Pupin protesters). The Pupin group now blocked all doors with chains, bedded down on borrowed sleeping bags and awaited arrest. The unexpected grace period, although often interrupted by false alarms of imminent police arrival, was used to print leaflets explaining the protest, to speak with other campus groups and to distribute information on classified research and the electronic battlefield.

Three days later, on April 27, conservative students and faculty members burst into Pupin with fists flying; they beat
and dragged the protesters from the building, and announced to watching university administrators that Pupin was cleared. The anti-war faculty regrouped that evening and reentered the building for a nightlong sit-in that included intensive confrontation and dialogue with physics students now "guarding" Pupin. The following morning the protesters marched out singing "Solidarity Forever" and pledged to continue the demonstration in the weeks ahead.

The Pupin protest was one of the most unusual and significant in almost a decade of campus turmoil. Unusual because the protesters were not students but faculty—some taking direct action against a part of their own university, all apparently engaged in a protest against academic freedom, a cherished value and their own shield against political retaliation and oppression. Significant because it raised for public review the tangled questions of moral responsibility for scientific research, the iron links between academia and the Pentagon, and the complicity of professors in developing weapons and warfare techniques widely regarded as criminal under Nuremberg precedents.

"The flechette or nail bombs contain several hundred 1-inch barbed nails in each 3-inch bomblet. The flechette is designed to enter the body, shredding muscles and body organs as it passes through the body, by the path of least resistance, i.e., the ricochet effect . . . ."

IDA was a by-word on the Columbia campus as the target of anti-war protest during the 1968 student strike. However, the Jason Division, its role in the Vietnam War, and the continued affiliation of Columbia faculty with it was little known. A peaceful informational picket begun by SESPA in 1971 had attracted little attention or support.

IDA is a "private, non-profit" research institute for the Department of Defense (DOD). It began in 1955 with a $500,000 capital fund grant from the Ford Foundation, the cold-war patron saint of hard-to-fund intelligence and quasi-intelligence enterprises. IDA was housed in the Pentagon for years and did classified research exclusively for the DOD. Organized initially by a consortium of universities with Ivy League presidents prominent on its board, IDA was a premier government weapons and counterinsurgency think tank until engulfed in the 1968 student protest. When the propriety of universities maintaining ties with an organization whose sole raison d'etre was weapons and warfare was forcibly protested at Columbia and other schools, the sponsoring universities withdrew from the embarrassing arrangement and the direct institutional relationship was terminated. Individual faculty members quietly retained their affiliation with Jason, however, unnoticed by the protesters and unmoved by the increasing criticism of academic involvement with the war machine.

The Jason Division was formed in 1958 to bring a new generation of university scientists into government weapons research. IDA recognized that to university-based scholars, full-time work in a government laboratory was unattractive. Its objective was not to lure the scientists away but to inject IDA into the campuses in a shared-time concept. The scientists would retain the prestige and privileges of their academic appointments, but they would be available to IDA for a significant portion of their free—and creative—time.

The IDA Annual Report for 1966 explains the symbiosis:
The Jason group of scientists, which through the years has consisted of about 40 members, normally meets as a group in the summer months, when emphasis is placed on attacking a significant web of problems they could not otherwise deal with because of isolation or lack of time. At the conclusion of each summer study, the Jason members return to their campuses where they devote as much time as possible on an individual basis to the solution of various problems. Besides the long summer meeting the group meets as a whole two or three times a year for week-end sessions to be brought up to date on findings of research undertaken in the interim.

Jason evolved over the years into a group of "outstanding university scientists who devote as much of their available time as possible to studies in the vanguard of the scientific aspects of defense problems." The problems centered around ionospheres, anti-submarine warfare, sonar, missile detection, weapons effects and reentry physics. Theoretical physicists constituted a majority of the group, with a sprinkling of experimentalists and other specialists.

Until the Vietnam War, Jason was a second-generation model of academy-government cooperation and served a national need. In the precarious post-Sputnik world of long range missiles, nuclear weapons and USA-USSR competition, where national security depended upon scientific discovery and technology, university cooperation with the DOD was inevitable. Many American scientists and others saw weapons superiority over the Soviet Union in unambiguous terms of national survival. Jason's structural relationship seemed natural and proper: university scientists serving the Government in the interests of national security. Wasn't cooperation with the Government a form of public service, even a duty of citizenship?

Of course, there had been the early warning of MIT's Norbert Wiener, who wrote in 1946 "that to provide scientific information is not necessarily an innocent act. I do not expect to publish any future work of mine which may do damage in the hands of irresponsible militarists." One wonders if the Jason scientists gave any pause to such concern as U.S. military advisers trickled into Vietnam during the early 1960's.

"This development [the electronic battlefield] is one of the greatest steps forward in warfare since gunpowder." Senator Barry Goldwater, Nov. 23, 1970.

The role of the Jason scientists in the Vietnam War, particularly in the electronic battlefield and the air war, thrust the complex issue of science and national security into public scrutiny and resulted in the Pupin protest.

Public documents date the mobilization of Jason scientists for the Vietnam War from 1964. The 1966 Annual Report states that:

In 1964 a new excursion was made. Increased government attention to such problems as counterinsurgency, insurrection and infiltration led to the suggestion that Jason members might be able to provide fresh insights into problems that are not entirely in the realm of physical science,. . . Present indications are that . . . the undertaking is worthwhile and will broaden.

Broaden it did into a massive effort, similar to the Manhattanville Project, to devise new weapons systems to win the war in Indochina. The Pentagon Papers (Senator Gravel Edition, Vol. IV, pp. 114-23) provide a detailed account of the Jason Division's responsibility for the electronic battlefield and the air war. (The following quotes are all from that source.)

In the spring of 1966 an "offer was made by four distinguished scientific advisors--Dr. George Kistiakowsky and Dr. Karl Kaysen of Harvard; Dr. Jerome Weisner and Dr. Jerrold Zacharias of MIT--to the Government to form a summer working group to study technical aspects of the war in Vietnam." Secretary of Defense McNamara was intrigued with the idea of a barrier system, an anti-infiltration strategy to isolate the Viet Cong in southern Vietnam. The scientists' offer was unmistakable, perfectly with DOD thinking.

On April 26 McNamara directed that the scientists work on "a 'fence' across the infiltration trails, warning systems, reconnaissance (especially night) methods, night vision devices, defoliation techniques and area-denial weapons." A contract was let to the Jason Division, and a group of 67 scientists, "representing the cream of the scholarly community in technical fields, finally met in Wellesley on June 13 for ten days of briefings by high-level officials from the Pentagon, CIA, State Department and the White House on all facets of the War." Armed with the best information available and blessed by the White House and the Pentagon, the scientists went to work in "four sub-groups to study the different aspects of the problem from a technical (not a political) point of view."

It would be difficult to overstate the importance accorded the Jason project by the Pentagon. The scientists presented their conclusions to McNamara personally in Washington on August 30, 1966. "Apparently strongly and favorably impressed," McNamara flew to Massachusetts a week later to get more details on their findings and recommendations. The author of The Pentagon Papers study states the reports were "regarded as particularly sensitive and were extremely closely held" and that "they apparently had a dramatic impact on the Secretary of Defense and provided much of the direction for future policy."

What were those directions? First, the Jason scientists rejected the then current bombing campaign against North Vietnam. They did so on the basis of a brilliant cost-benefit analysis. They found that "North Vietnam has basically a subsistence agricultural economy that presents a difficult and unrewarding target system for air attack." After calculating the deaths inflicted on the Vietnamese by the air attacks compared to the costs to the U.S. in lost planes and pilots, they reached their conclusions: "We have not discovered any basis for concluding that the indirect punitive effects of the bombing will prove decisive" in destroying the North Vietnamese will to resist.

Having rejected bombing as ineffective, the study group was obligated to "offer constructive alternatives" to win the war. The Pentagon Papers comment that the scientists "not surprisingly" turned their attention to McNamara's anti-infiltration barrier, and "the product of their summer's work was a reasonably detailed proposal for a multisystem barrier across the DMZ and the Laotian panhandle that would make extensive use of recently innovated mines and sensors."

The Jason system was an ingenious combination of weapons, technology and electronics: gravel mines, button bomblets, SADEBLUE/BLU-26B clusters, acoustic detectors and P-2V patrol aircraft that were equipped for acoustic sensor
monitoring, gravel mine dispensing, vectoring strike aircraft, and infrared detection of campfires in bivouac areas. The plan called for mining a vast area of Indochina; each month 20 million gravel mines, 25 million button bomblets and 10,000 SADEYE/BLU-26B clusters were to be dropped.

McNamara lost no time in converting the proposal into lethal reality. As soon as he received the report he formed the Defense Communication Planning Group (DCPG) within the DOD under his personal supervision. The DCPG was given "unique and unprecedented management tools in terms of authority, organizational arrangements and resources." Its mission was to manage, develop and support sensor-aided combat surveillance systems for Vietnam. With the highest priority and backing, and ample funds—DCPG spent $1.68 billion from 1967 to 1971—Director Maj. Gen. John R. Deane was able to rush the new system to the battlefield in 15 to 21 months rather than the "normal 5 to 7 year defense development cycle."

The rest is history—"the direction for future policy." It is a record of increasingly automated warfare as U.S. planes replaced ground troops and casualties, a record of new generations of sensors and weapons, a record of breakthroughs to a new generation of drone planes to be directed from Thailand, thus reducing the cost of the air war and the loss of U.S. pilots still more. Of course, not all the technical advances and innovations, i.e., the savageries of the electronic battlefield can be attributed to Jason scientists. The air war is a bastard whose paternity must be shared by the U.S. military, DOD scientists, the corporate scientific elite and the university-based "cream of the scholarly community in technical fields."

Secrecy precludes precise "credit" for the newest features of the air war on display in recent months: the laser-directed and TV-camera guidance bombs. It is known, however, that in 1967 Jason "continued work on technical problems of counterinsurgency warfare and system studies with relevance to Vietnam." Unfortunately, The Pentagon Papers end in 1968. Also, after the 1968 protests, IDA reports became cryptic and uninformative. Nevertheless, the war was a major concern of Jason for at least four years, probably longer, and perhaps to this day.

"In the civilian hospital at Can Tho, I saw a man who had a piece of white phosphorus in his flesh. It was still burning."

In the course of the campus debate on Jason two principal arguments emerged in defense of the physicists. Jasonites Foley and Malvin Ruderman took a full-page advertisement in the Columbia Spectator (April 28) to explain that as insiders they were better informed about controversial public policy questions. Since "they were completely free to speak out publicly, as individuals, against Government policy," Jason members had testified against the anti-ABM system and the SST. Foley and Ruderman, a bit plaintively, asked the university community

to imagine our position if no outside groups like Jason existed. Clearly military research would go on, but in a much more closed society than exists now. Technical input, for example, in arms control negotiations would come almost wholly from professional military scientists free from external criticism.

Things could be worse.

Not for the Vietnamese, one suspects. The freedom to speak out apparently did not extend to the electronic battlefield. Foley and Ruderman could recall no Jason members who had differed with the Administration on that policy. Although Jason members devised an anti-infiltration system that killed indiscriminately in Indochina, Ruderman and Foley thought it "unjust that those who took part in this study should be condemned and shunned."

The Foley-Ruderman thesis is a familiar one: it is preferable to work within an organization to influence policy. That may work for some questions, the SST perhaps, but the requirements of team membership also include silence on the really critical problems such as the war. The argument has been heard so many times over the last eight years from tired, embarrassed liberals retreating from their vineyards of death at the Pentagon and the State Department that few take it seriously any more. "The public bleatings of a liberal who wants to be in on things and still think of himself as an independent scholar," remarked one famous Columbia faculty member—an outsider—after hearing the Jason professors defend themselves publicly.

Occasional meritorious testimony by Jason members may be granted, although it is not certain that the Jason affiliation is necessary for either the data or the prestige/credibility of the scientists. After all, they are among the country's leading university scientists and could testify convincingly without the Jason connection. The real question is the social cost of this secret scientific service for the Government. An accounting of the social utility of Jason—the costs and benefits to American society, the scientific community and Columbia University—requires more than the facile claim that some Jason activities are benign. Evaluation must be based on the total record. If the SST testimony is a merit, surely Vietnam War weapons research is a demerit. If arms control testimony is a merit, surely their counter-guerrilla work is a demerit.

The secrecy of IDA and the attempt to minimize Jason's role in Vietnam, including repeated fallacious public statements during the Columbia protest, indicates a fear of public scrutiny. Candid testimony on the SST does not justify secret research on air-sown mines. Those Jason members who argue that it does should be made to present their case to a jury of maimed amputees in Indochina.

Although academic traditionalists were traditionally silent during the protest, they too, at Columbia and other schools, have been deeply troubled by university involvement in weapons research. The questions raised in recent years include the following:

What happens to a university department where the senior men spend most of their research time on classified work for the Pentagon? What values imbue the faculty after a decade of the collaboration? What models are suggested to students in their research and career decisions? Do such professors speak on public issues as independent scientists or as semi-covert surrogates for the Secretary of Defense?

In an excellent study, The University and Military Research: Moral Politics at MIT (Cornell University Press, 1972), Dorothy Nelkin has listed some of the consequences of excessive ties to the Government: "the military has undue influence on the character of the research,... [and] this influence leads to overspecialization in those technical fields of interest to the military and to the neglect of other fields,... emphasis on research at the expense of teaching,... weakening the institutional commitment of faculty"; and military support erodes the "independence of the university
and inhibits criticism of Government policy" (p. 33).

These are classic issues related to the value of the autonomous university as a force for social balance. Whether autonomy is a liberal myth or a viable ideal, there is little argument that university autonomy nearly expired from cold-war frostbite in the 1950's and '60s.

Senator Fulbright described that shift in 1967:

> Universities might have formed an effective counterweight to the military industrial complex by strengthening their emphasis on traditional values of our democracy, but many of our leading universities have instead joined the monolith, adding greatly to its power and influence.

"Gravel mines ... are camouflaged to blend in with the land, and are dropped by the thousands every month. They are designed to blow the foot off the person who steps on it, or the hand off anyone who picks it up ... ."

The significant crunch over Jason is found in the second defense by President McGill. In a student publication last spring he invoked the liberal pantheon of academia:

> I believe very strongly in the libertarian concepts that underlie traditional definitions of academic freedom. The university has no business in attempting to dictate the political or private activities of any of its professors. The same arguments that are being used to embarrass and ostracize (sic) the Jason physicists from Columbia were used again by the American Legion against Herbert Marcuse in California. Are they wrong for the American Legion and right for students here? It seems to me that once you establish a principle you have to live by it ... but I believe it is fundamentally improper to hold any standard other than personal integrity and intellectual competence up for a professor ... .

The lines are clearly drawn by the McGill formulation. Two sets of rights are in direct conflict. On the one hand, there is the right of academic freedom. On the other hand, there is the right of the Vietnamese to settle their own affairs free from the wonders of American science—lasers, smart bombs and gravel bombs.

According to President McGill, academic freedom is an absolute right not to be challenged merely because American science has set fire storms on the ground in Indochina, seeded the skies to trigger rain and floods, and assiduously helped DOD find new ways of killing Vietnamese cheaply and from a distance. By classifying the Jason affiliation as a private activity, a very doubtful categorization, and exempting the researchers from the DOD-get the service, and the powerless—the poor, the radicals, the peasants of Vietnam—get surveyed, researched and manipulated. To understand the notorious imbalance in the interests served by the university one need only ask how much research has been done on the financial interests and power of the Columbia trustees, or, for example, on the role of American liberals in the Vietnam War.

Secondly, a generation of anti-war academics knows from personal experience that senior, conservative faculty members do not live by a code of academic freedom when political differences arise: ideological conformity comes first. The entrenched cold-war professors fight very hard and very roughly to silence dissent and keep their Pentagon consultant fees. University presidents may honestly oppose political tests, but academic departments routinely impose them.

But above all there is the daily slaughter in Vietnam and the German connection. Both sides in the Pupin controversy cited German precedents. To defenders of Jason and civil libertarians the protesters were storm troopers crushing the university and academic freedom underfoot. To the anti-war faculty the Jason members were the Nazi scientists who made Hitler's war machine, and the campus defenders of Jason were the "good German" intellectuals whose silence allowed the Holocaust.

Would any sane person insist that German anti-war protesters in 1941 should not have disrupted the research of German scientists? The Pupin protesters found the historical analogy precise and the resultant obligation obvious: to demonstrate (peacefully), disrupt (nonviolently), publicize the affiliation and secret activities of Jason members and insist that they terminate their alliance with IDA and the Pentagon. The Pupin protesters rejected President McGill's laissez-faire libertarian concept in favor of an explicit restriction on the "private activities" of the Jason men: they shall not use their academic freedom as a sanctuary for killing another million people in Indochina.
If this be treason to the Academy, then God help the American university.

Last April a group of faculty members from Columbia University and other colleges in the metropolitan area entered and closed down Columbia's Pupin Hall—home of the university's Physics Department—in order to protest the activities of five physics professors who are members of the Jason Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, a research institute for the Department of Defense. In an article in our September 18 issue, "The Pupin Protest: Academic Freedom and Moral Responsibility," Frank Baldwin, a Contributing Editor and one of the Columbia faculty who participated in the sit-in, described the causes and purpose of the protest.

The purpose of the sit-in, according to Mr. Baldwin, was multifold: the protesters wanted to call to the attention of the Columbia community the facts of faculty complicity in and moral responsibility for Vietnam War research and the relationship between that work and academic freedom. They did not seek to have the Jason members fired from the university. Rather, he wrote, the protesters sought to "appeal directly to [their] individual consciences" and to press them to resign from Jason.

Mr. Baldwin maintained that in 1966 Jason laid the groundwork and presented "reasonable detailed proposals" for the electronic battlefield and the automated air war, that in 1967 Jason "continued work on technical problems of counterinsurgency warfare and system studies" for Vietnam, and that Jason's present activities are not open to public scrutiny. He then argued that the weapons and warfare techniques of the electronic battlefield are "widely regarded as criminal under Nuremberg precedents." Therefore, he concluded, some members of Jason were directly involved in helping to develop criminal warfare techniques in 1966 and that even now Jason members are doing research within an institution, the Department of Defense, that is involved in developing and executing such techniques.

William J. McGill, President of Columbia University, in response to the protest stated that he believed "very strongly in the libertarian concepts that underlie traditional definitions of academic freedom. The university has no business in attempting to dictate the political or private activities of any of its professors." Mr. Baldwin challenged this formulation of the issue: "By classifying the Jason affiliation as a private activity, a very doubtful categorisation, and exempting the actions of Jason members from criticism, it becomes improper to challenge the behavior of faculty members who helped devise a system of indiscriminate killing—even when that role is documented by indisputable Government records and the technology is viewable on the nightly news."

Upon publication we sent Mr. Baldwin's article to President McGill and the five Columbia physicists who are members of Jason: Malvin Ruderman, Henry J. Foley, Richard L. Garwin, Leon Lederman and Norman Christ. In response we received letters from President McGill, and Professors Ruderman and Garwin, which we are printing here together with Mr. Baldwin's response.

WILLIAM J. McGUIll

Thank you for your letter of September 20, and for the article "The Pupin Protest: Academic Freedom and Moral Responsibility" written by Frank Baldwin.

I have read it with great interest because I was a participant, knowledgeable about the events cited. Unfortunately, Mr. Baldwin's presentation is not a literal account of the protest at Pupin Hall during April, 1972. It is rather sad to see a professional historian so controlled by the imperatives of what he absolutely believes to be true that he neglects to relate a number of essential facts.

I am getting accustomed to moral (or is it moralistic?) criticism of Columbia University. But I insist that moral responsibility be a complete ethic and not one limited to the arguments of an advocate. Mr. Baldwin does not tell your readers, although it is true, that the occupiers of Pupin Hall did more than conduct a moral dialogue with the Columbia physics faculty. In fact, at least one of the occupiers rifled the files of the Physics Department in order, I think, to collect a dossier that would damn the Jason physicists. Is stealing an example of moral responsibility?

The dossier does not seem to have been pursued by the Pupin protesters, although many documents belonging to the department were copied by the protesters and duplicated presumably for subsequent use. The reason may be that very little was found to substantiate the evidence that was sought, but I ask again whether this kind of paranoid act is deemed to be an example of new moral forms of responsibility.

Mr. Baldwin does not advise his readers that at 7:30 a.m. on April 27 I received an anguished phone call from a Nobel Laureate in physics who told me that he feared for his safety and for that of his colleagues in the building. The best evidence that I have indicates that something beyond a moral dialogue was going on in the building at that time.

I am impelled to ask what kind of society Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues were attempting to create in Pupin if this could happen, and I wonder why Mr. Baldwin does not report it to his readers.

Certainly, occupied Pupin Hall bore no resemblance to an academic community built in the Western tradition of respect for the rights and opinions of others. We have labored
for more than 500 years to build that tradition knowing full well the dangers of runaway moralism. One does not need to be an extremist on behalf of academic freedom (and I am not) to ask that a decent respect be paid to the rights of others by anyone who calls himself a university faculty member. Mr. Baldwin asks us to remember the rights of the Vietnamese, and I am impelled to reply that an evil in Vietnam is not corrected by another evil at Columbia.

Mr. Baldwin should recall that Joan of Arc was burned at the stake by people who knew in their hearts they were saving her soul.

MALVIN RUDERMAN

Mr. Baldwin's polemic on Jason and the war says so much that is untrue that a short letter of correction is insufficient. Perhaps equally significant are some of his omissions. It is true, but unmentioned, that many of us in Jason have indeed strongly opposed tactics used in the Vietnam War and the entire United States involvement in it, that there has been no involvement with Vietnam War problems by any member for over four years and that, whatever their motives, only a minority in Jason was ever involved.

Mr. Baldwin and other Pupin occupiers demand my resignation. To what purpose? Not so that I cease working in support of the Vietnam War, since I do not and never have done such war research. Not to influence any of my Jason colleagues to stop such research, since the entire Jason involvement ceased years ago. Rather, Jason war involvement has been distorted so that it can be used as a better symbol to focus antiwar outrage. But against the essentially symbolic antwar value of a resignation—as worthwhile as this might be—I must balance what I judge to be the value of my own activities and the current ones of my colleagues. (Mr. Baldwin did not find it useful to inquire of me what these are.)

During the past year an important additional factor has been added. Very personal attacks have used underhanded innuendo and entirely false accusations that dwarf the excesses of the McCarthyism of two decades ago. Any resignation from Jason would certainly be viewed as a concession to such despicable attacks. (A spokesman for the Pupin sit-in group, while privately conceding the irresponsibility of these attacks, was unwilling publicly to dissociate his group from them.) To allow to succeed a campaign that has used the vilest McCarthyite tactics is not a choice I will willingly make. And in the end its success would be a loss to all of us.

RICHARD L. GARWIN

Does it make any difference that in the correspondence between Mr. Baldwin and me, which I have supplied to the Editor, he gives no indication that, in addition to being a disinterested (or interested) writer, he was one of those who sat in at Pupin Hall and for days denied to students, faculty and workers there the pursuit of their individual goals? I think so. I stated to Mr. Baldwin in my letter of August 4, 1972:

Frankly, I have bad enough experience with distortions and inadequacies in reporting that I would like to assure myself that such an interview would be a worthwhile investment of my time.

His letter of reply August 20, more than 300 words, made no mention of his having participated in the illegal occupation of Pupin. We learn this fact not from his article but from the appended description of the author.

Mr. Baldwin attacks "academic freedom": "This has become the crucial question for many younger faculty members who will not accept an abstraction called academic freedom as more ethically compelling than the life of a single Vietnamese." But it is freedom itself that is under fire. Academic freedom might be involved if Jason members chose to do research with university equipment, computers, personnel and students on problems provided by the Institute for Defense Analyses. We do not.

What is under attack is the right of an individual, in his own time, away from his regular job, to engage in a legal activity to which some individuals are opposed. Make no mistake—this is precisely the same right that allows some of us to be Democrats, some to be Republicans, some to be Christians, some to be Jews, some to be agnostics, some to favor the liberalization of abortion, some to do research on brain disease, and some to attempt to forbid it as invading the seat of the soul.

The techniques used by these protesters are those of blackmail and coercion. Having failed with words and arguments, even lies, they attempt to deny to completely uninvolved individuals access to work or education until these individuals in some way force the Jason members to resign or until the Jason members, for the sake of these uninvolved individuals, accede to the blackmail. This is a powerful tactic, extortion, which would be no more tolerable in good cause than in bad.

That is the issue.

At the risk of diluting the issue as I have defined it above, I would like to correct some of the misimpressions left by Mr. Baldwin:

—Manhattan Project, instead of "Manhattanville Project"?
—Henry M. Foley instead of Henry "J." Foley?
—both Leon Ruderman and Malvin Ruderman?

But these are small mistakes and only a few of those in the article. How about the quotation on white phosphorus? It has nothing to do with Jason.

What and why are Jason anyhow? I stated essentially as follows at a public meeting at Columbia last May:

Many accusations and demands have been circulated on the Columbia University campus against five of the Physics Department faculty who are also members of the Jason group of consultants to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). As Adjunct Professor of Physics, I am one of those five. For more than 20 years, I have worked part-time to help the United States Government make wiser choices in many fields, including education, health, transportation and defense. Since 1967 some small fraction of my government-associated time has been spent toward these same ends as a member of Jason. I hoped also that my long experience might help to educate and render more effective some of the Jason group who are not so...
experienced in government matters.

Reflecting on my involvement over these two decades, I am proud, on balance, of what I and my various colleagues have been able to accomplish. On the other hand, much that should have been accomplished remains undone, and much has happened that I opposed in vain.

But my work with the Government, with Jason and with the International Annual Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs has been the involvement of an individual, not of the university. In 1968, when Columbia University was institutionally a member of the Governing Board of IDA, the university did have a legitimate concern as to the structure and function of IDA. Accordingly, I spoke at public meetings and on the Columbia University radio to give information about IDA and my involvement with it. Under the present circumstances, I believe that the university community has no more legitimate interest in my Jason activities than in my political party, home life investments, or my off-campus activities in helping to legalize abortion.

A demand by 49 faculty members that Jason members "dissociate themselves either from Jason or from the university" is quite out of order. Remember the State of California Oath of 1950 and the long and degrading history of political tests for membership in a university. Which faculty member is sure that, ten years hence, 50 faculty members could not be found to demand either his own recantation or his dismissal?

I long for an end to the Vietnam War. But lies and violence here at home and the attempted denial of legal rights of individuals (by antiwar activists or by others) will only injure further our society, which sorely needs all our energies turned toward improvement of its mechanisms and substance. Both the nation and the university have institutions for investigating, judging and controlling the behavior of individuals. To abandon these institutions rather than to improve them is to prejudice the future of the 200 million people of this nation and of the billions who are affected by our actions. Extremists of both ends of the spectrum vilify individuals (I have been attacked by syndicated columnists of the right as well as by antiwar activists), but it is the quality and responsiveness of our institutions that should be criticized and improved. Much of my own effort has been devoted to this task, but in this particularly more support is necessary.

The accusations and demands of the Columbia demonstrators are irresponsible—additional lies are published (usually anonymously) more rapidly than answers can be given. . . . Furthermore, I see no benefit in arguing with those at Columbia (even less those not from Columbia) who have made charges that they must have known to be false. However, I have long lectured and written on questions of military technology and its import; and in an atmosphere of education, not confrontation, I would be glad to lecture and to discuss military-technical questions with a large audience of bona fide members of the Columbia staff and student body.

The product of Jason is signed reports by the individuals who have done the work. A typical Jason member may attend the two briefings in Washington, spring and fall, of two or three days each (mostly on weekends) and work some four-to-six weeks during the summer on a sustained study of a problem he selects from among those made available either on Jason initiative and with the concurrence of the sponsoring agency (Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, etc.) or suggested by the agency. In no case is one required to work on a problem not of his choosing.

It is quite misleading of Mr. Baldwin to bring in The University and Military Research: Moral Politics at MIT, quoting "the military has undue influence on the character of the research . . . overspecialization in those technical fields of interest to the military and to the neglect of other fields . . . " etc. These are the questions valid for research activities on campus, which involve university facilities and other university personnel. They are no more relevant to the Jason affiliation than is a similar fear that private participation in organized religion (off campus) will have similar deleterious effects.

In 1966 there was heavy U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, which was, incidentally, militarily ineffective and helped destroy the credibility of our political and military leadership. Continued escalation did not prevent North Vietnam from increasing the number and capabilities of its forces in the South (where North Vietnam claimed it had no forces). It seemed quite reasonable to consider whether "good fences make good neighbors" in Indochina as well as elsewhere.

No one is hurt crossing an unarmed, unfortified boundary. Also, no one would be hurt if the boundary were so strongly fenced, monitored and observed that there would be no chance of crossing it in safety. One would be deterred from crossing. In between these two extremes, the porous barrier exacts the greatest toll. It was wondered whether a fence could be built so effective that infiltration would cease. Some Jason members worked on this problem; others had nothing to do with it. Had the barrier been effectively implemented and worked well, far fewer Vietnamese, either North or South, would have died than had been the case previously or since.

In 1963 my suggested solution to the Vietnam problem was to give a rifle to each South Vietnamese and to let them vote in this fashion. This proposal was not looked upon with favor—the reader might consider it in the light of history.

War between nations is not illegal. Indeed, in recent weeks a major speech in the United Nations by China has supported "just wars." Governments may do what individuals cannot. The Pupin protesters would do far better to help perfect democracy than to destroy it.

FRANK BALDWIN REPLIES

Messrs. Garwin, McGill and Ruderman share a certain propensity toward personal attacks and undocumented dicta. Otherwise, they have raised very different objections to my account of the Pupin protest. I shall respond to each separately, with special attention to Mr. Garwin, who has entered the lists in unreconstructed scientist-as-paladin style.

Mr. Ruderman and Mr. McGill differ in their objections but seem mainly troubled by the "omissions." Mr. Ruderman asserts that much of the article is "untrue" but gives no examples. Mr. McGill is saddened because my article is not a "liberal account," whatever that may be, of the protest. (It would be even sadder to see a professional historian confuse historiography with stenography; fortunately, my Columbia training was such that even though I was "controlled by imperatives," I tried to balance facts and interpretations.) That Mr. McGill does not dispute the article I take as a high
compliment, to be balanced against Mr. Ruderman's unsubstantiated assertions. First a response to the "omissions" and then a comment on the main points of both replies.

Mr. McGill is trouble by two "omissions." The first is that I did not mention a private telephone conversation he had with a faculty member on April 27. I have no way of knowing about Mr. McGill's private telephone conversations; I do know that the threats of physical harm and use of force I witnessed were against the Pupin protesters, first by campus guards and later by conservative students and faculty members who violently evicted the demonstrators. The protesters could have been removed from the building at any time by being placed under arrest. They intended no violence and committed none.

The second "omission," the removal of some documents from the Physics Department, was intentional but not for the reasons Mr. McGill implies, and certainly not to mislead the reader. The incident struck me, then and now, as insignificant compared to the role of Jason in the Vietnam War, the issue of moral responsibility and academic freedom. Nothing came of the documents and, as far as I know, the university took no action.

To leave the issue there, however, would be to beg Mr. McGill's question: Is stealing an example of moral responsibility? If the documents relate to Government policies in Vietnam—the systematic murder of Vietnamese, first by proxy French forces in the early 1950's, then covertly by U.S. clandestine operations in the late fifties and early sixties, then massively by American soldiers and bombers—my answer is yes.

What is being stolen? What is in those heavily classified Department of Defense (DOD) papers? They are not secrets that will enable some enemy to destroy the U.S. They are our history, the truth about what the American Government—the Truman, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon Administrations—has been doing to the people of Indochina and America.

Yes, "stealing" the Pentagon Papers was an example of moral responsibility. That Ellsberg, Russo et al., revealed the facts about Government actions in Vietnam is not a "paranoid act," as Mr. McGill apparently believes. It was the act of men brought to their senses by sustained contact with the depravity of U.S. policies in Indochina. I cannot help but wonder if Mr. McGill is being serious on this point. Does he really believe it would have been better to conceal the Pentagon Papers and the truth about the war? Or does Mr. McGill believe that the DOD-related papers in Pupin are somehow different, protected by academic freedom perhaps?

Yes, "new moral forms of responsibility" are evolving, and "stealing" from the DOD is one. The Catonsville Nine helped to shape them and put the issue best; pieces of paper are not as important as the people of Vietnam. These new forms require sacrifice, risk and action. It is not new, moral or responsible for university presidents to issue periodically, like annual reports from Liberalism, Inc., elegant denunciations of the war.

The "omission" disturbing Mr. Ruderman is that many Jason members oppose "U.S. involvement" in Vietnam. This fact is interesting if only because it is so ironic. What does it mean to oppose the war and continue to work for a Pentagon think tank?

Mr. Ruderman states that Jason has not been involved in "Vietnam War problems" (note the euphemism for sophisticated scientific methods to kill Vietnamese) for "over four years." Perhaps, but where is the proof? I attempted to verify this assertion, made repeatedly at the time of the protest by apologists for Jason, by inquiries to the Institute for Defense Analyses. IDA refused to provide any information on Jason's current activities.

Since Jason is secret—and it must be stressed that we would know almost nothing about it if The Pentagon Papers had not been made public—statements by Jason members about its activities that are unsubstantiated by proof must be regarded as partial and self-serving. Those made during the Pupin protest were certainly so.

Mr. Ruderman's remarks center on his affiliation with Jason. He rejects the call for his resignation and indicates his intention to continue secret research for the DOD. Yet the reasons he offers are not so much the value of his work for the Pentagon as his resistance to the criticism and tactics of the Pupin protest. Mr. Ruderman labels such criticism McCarthyism and announces that the attacks on Jason "dwarf the excesses of the McCarthyism of two decades ago."

This statement will be news to most Americans, but the hyperbole simply adds a comic touch to what is becoming the standard response of Jason professors and others responsible for the war: demands for information about or criticism of government affiliations are met with charges of McCarthyism. It will not work. By no stretch of the imagination can the Pupin protestors, a handful of academics whose only power is a willingness to be arrested to draw attention to an issue, be mistaken for a U.S. Senator able to dominate the media and the country in a period of anti-Communist hysteria.

Mr. Ruderman asks a valid question about what effect his resignation from Jason would have other than its "essentially symbolic antiwar value." Surely his emergence into the clean, fresh air of non-DOD science would have diverse immediate, practical, beneficial consequences. Mr. Ruderman could begin by telling the American people about the war research of Jason and perhaps the secret world of IDA. He could join those scientists who articulate and represent the best in his profession.

The work of physicists in the Air War Study Group at Cornell who published the seminal The Air War in Indochina (Beacon Press, 1972) is one example of scientists who use their gifts to expose the Pentagon and enlighten the public. By coming out of the Pentagon closet Mr. Ruderman could make a personal statement and help rebuild the tattered prestige of American science so damaged by war collaboration. The Air War in Indochina states the issue:

... the channeling of scientific and engineering effort into destructive applications of this sort [the air war] may well encourage the currently emerging disaffection with technology per se, when in fact technology may be needed for extracting mankind from a wide range of ecological disasters. This disaffection in the U.S. is fueled by the recognition that American scientists and engineers—civilians as well as those working for the DOD—have been deeply involved in the development of the electronic battlefield. (p. 160)

And now Mr. Garwin as adipose. Mr. Garwin has no time for bleeding hearts—or war protesters. He finds time every summer to spend several weeks at DOD expense with Jason, but he would not have doled out even an hour to an antiwar critic. Thus my approach was to tell Mr. Garwin of my participation in the protest when we met for an interview, not before. For example, when I arranged an appointment with
Jason member Foley, I told him of my participation in the protest; he agreed to a meeting. Since Mr. Garwin and I were unable to meet, Mr. Garwin had no way of knowing whether he would have been "forewarned" about my notorious past. I still wonder if Mr. Garwin would have gone through with the interview.

Mr. Garwin's attempt to discredit my article resulted in a fine catch of three typos. If there are so many other errors, as Mr. Garwin charges, why didn't he indicate them in his long rebuttal?

Mr. Garwin's homiletic description of the 1966 Jason Summer Study attempts to suggest a quiet Norman Rockwell drawing of middle-aged suburban neighbors chatting near a white picket fence about property lines. By pretending that Vietnam is two countries, that the Geneva Conference did not provide for unification elections in 1956, that the U.S. did not sabotage that agreement and prevent unification, Mr. Garwin tells, surely tongue in cheek, that it was "quite reasonable to consider whether 'good fences make good neighbors' in Indochina."

Mr. Garwin propagates this myth even as Mr. Kissinger discards it in the draft agreement for a ceasefire. Bad history certainly does produce first-rate sophistry and euphemisms extraordinaire. The Jason Summer Study Group was directed to devise a method of separating the peoples of Vietnam by a constantly renewed minefield of non-sterilizing Gravel mines (and possibly button bomblets) distributed in patterns covering interconnected valleys and slopes over the entire barrier region. . . . There would also be a pattern of acoustic detectors to locate mine explosions indicating an attempted penetration. The minefield is intended to deny opening of alternate routes for troop infiltrators and should be emplaced first. On the trails currently being used from which mines may—we tentatively assume—be cleared without great difficulty, a more dense pattern of sensors would be designed to locate groups of infiltrators. Air strikes using Gravel and SADEYES would then be called against these targets. The sensor patterns would be monitored 24 hours a day by patrol aircraft. The struck area would be reseeded with new mines.

The anti-vehicle system would consist of acoustic detectors distributed every mile or so along all truckable roads in the interdicted area, monitored 24 hours a day by patrol aircraft with vectored strike aircraft using SADEYE to respond to signals that trucks or truck convoys are moving.

The Gravel mines are small mines designed to damage the enemy's feet and legs. The button bomblets are small mines (aspirin-size) designed to give a loud report but not to injure when stepped on by a shod foot. Their purpose is to make a noise, indicating pedestrian traffic, that can be picked up by acoustic sensors. The SADEYE is a bomblet cluster, dropped from aircraft, which is exceedingly effective against personnel.

So much for Mr. Garwin's reasonable fence.

Mr. Garwin states that "what is under attack is the right of an individual, in his own time, outside of his regular job, to engage in legal activity to which some individuals are opposed." The plaintive claim that the Jason affiliation is "legal" is actually a devastating admission. Mr. Garwin does not argue that his work is uplifting, creative, necessary for national defense or even decent. Only that is legal.

Is it legal to intervene in Vietnam and slaughter Vietnamese by the hundreds of thousands because the U.S. prefers a rightist dictatorship to a socialist state? Sadly enough, in Mr. Garwin's sense, it is "legal." Because "legality" is determined by political power, the raw brutal power that comes from the barrel of guns: those that killed at Kent State, at Attica, for 20 years in Vietnam.

Let there be no equivocation on this score: the legality to which Mr. Garwin repairs is exactly the same state power that made it "legal" for German scientists to experiment on concentration camp inmates, that made it "legal" for Hitler to order the Holocaust. The Jason participants of 1966 cannot even claim they were following orders; they willingly, voluntarily, enthusiastically devised ways to cripple and kill Vietnamese.

Yet even Mr. Garwin's "legal" defense crumbles if the Nuremberg precedents are considered. And they must be considered, despite reluctance by many Americans to do so, apparently because this time the victims are Asians. For the 1966 Jason Summer Study group conceived and advocated methods of warfare expressly condemned by international codes of warfare. According to the Nuremberg findings, Jason
members who worked on the electronic battlefield, indicated by their own reports revealed in *The Pentagon Papers*, should be tried for war crimes.


> Given the conclusion that much of the American bombing in Indochina has been and remains in violation of the laws of warfare, it becomes important to focus on the issues of responsibility, both civilian and military, for the war crimes committed. Notwithstanding the unusually poor record of the armed forces in uncovering and punishing criminal behavior in Indochina, it is our view that there should be some official attempt to determine the extent of international law violations resulting from the air war and to fix responsibility for the transgressions. (p. 138)

Only full-scale investigation will reveal which key officials, civilian and military, were aware of bombing policies that included unjustified devastation, reprisals, collective penalties, and grave breaches of the proportionality rule, as well as widespread destruction of food crops... (p. 142)

The cycle closes. The Pupin protest called for no purges, advocated no black lists. The protest forced an issue: hundreds of American academics have used their university affiliations as a bridge to the DOD and State Department where they have collaborated in methods of warfare condemned throughout the world. They claim that academic freedom protects them from the effort to affix responsibility for those criminal acts. They insist that they be permitted to engage in secret research and consultation even though those activities are widely and authoritatively known to be war crimes.

If this is academic freedom, then God help the American university and the people of Indochina.

---

Reprinted from the September 18, 1972 and December 11, 1972 issues of *Christianity and Crisis*, copyright 1972 by Christianity and Crisis, Inc.
Political conspiracy was no surprise to you who read William W. Turner’s Power on the Right. Richard Boyle told of the secret war in Cambodia in Flower of the Dragon, long before Nixon confessed.

Here are more relevant books from

Ramparts Press

THE FATE OF MIDAS and other essays
David Horowitz

“These 12 essays deal with... ideological bias in the schools, corporate power in government, US imperialism, the growth of radical movements, etc... His comment that ‘a revolutionary movement thrives on candor just as surely as a ruling class lives by deception’ is powerfully apposite at this time.”

—Library Journal
RC0327 7.95/5.60 (cloth)  RP0335 2.95/2.10 (paper)

PALESTINE—the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Edited by Russell Stetler

“a useful counter-balance to one sided press reports...”

—Choice
RC0181 6.95/4.20 (cloth)  RP019X 2.95/2.10 (paper)

VOICES OF A BLACK NATION—Political Journalism in the Harlem Renaissance edited by Theodore Vincent

“Voices of a Black Nation is a valuable collection of historical documents which tell us where the black press and black movements have been, by extension, provides us with insight into the black liberation movement today.” —from Foreword by Robert Chrisman, editor, The Black Scholar
RC0343 10.00/7.00 (cloth)  RP0351 3.45/2.40 (paper)

SONG OF ARIRAN A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution
Nym Wales and Kim San

“Kim San’s first-person account of his long soldiering in the revolutionary ranks explains in vividly human terms what motivated the Korean and Chinese masses to fanatical allegiance for independence and self-determination”

—Roy Hurlbert Palo Alto Times
RC0211 7.95/5.60 (cloth)  RP022x 2.95/2.10 (paper)

Beat inflation! Give yourself a present of 3 cloth books for $10.00. Join the Book Conspiracy today!

First price is publisher’s list. Boldface shows members price.

To Ramparts Book Conspiracy, Box 10128, Palo Alto, CA 94303
Yes, I want to become a Book Conspirator and receive Notes from the Underground which also lists other outstanding books. Enclosed is $10.00. Ship my three books postpaid.

Name ____________________________
Address ____________________________
City ____________________________ State __ Zip __

New in Paperback.

—Nelson Algren, L.A. Times
RC0203 6.95/4.90  RP0239 2.95/2.10

MARXISM IN OUR TIME Isaac Deutscher “The book is, in effect, an anthology of Deutscher, and each essay is a gem of cogent argument and polemics.”

—Library Journal
RC0068 5.95/4.20  RP0289 2.95/2.10

THE GAY LIBERATION BOOK Len Richmond and Gary Novara, editors contributions by Wm. Burroughs, Allen Ginsberg, Paul Goodman, Paul Jacobs, Huey Newton, Gore Vidal, Alan Watts, etc. “... eloquent collection of essays, poems and drawings”

—Publishers Weekly
RC0006 7.95/5.60  RP0319 3.95/2.80

IRONIES OF HISTORY Essays on Contemporary Communism Isaac Deutscher “... none of the narrow dogmatism of more orthodox Marxist-Leninists...”

—N.Y. Review of Books
RC0130 2.95/2.10

POST-SCARCITY ANARCHISM Murray Bookchin “... a relevant analysis of modern society and a pointed, provocative discussion of the ecological crisis.”

—Library Journal
RC0056 6.95/4.20  RP0041 2.95/2.10

BLACK POWER AND THE GARVEY MOVEMENT Theodore Vincent “As essential politically as it is fascinating to read”

—The Guardian
RC0076 5.95/4.20

POWER ON THE RIGHT William W. Turner
Former FBI agent turns spotlight on many characters now scurrying from Watergate.

RC0033 5.95/4.20

P.O.W.—Two Years with the Vietcong George E. Smith “... must stand as one of the most revealing documents to come out of the war...”

—Human Behavior
RC0114 5.95/4.20

STRICTLY GHETTO PROPERTY—the story of Los Siete de la Raza Marjorie Heins “a thorough, hardnosed investigation... compassionate yet objective”

—Library Journal
RC0122 6.95/4.90  RP0106 2.95/2.10

BEAT THE HEAT—a Radical Survival Handbook ILS and Peoples Lawbook Collective

RP0173 2.45/1.75

DAUGHTER OF EARTH Agnes Smedley

FP0104 2.50/1.75

LATIN AMERICA REVIEW OF BOOKS 1 edited by Colin Harding and Christopher Roper, critical reviews of over 100 books by distinguished scholars.

LP0013 3.00/2.10


SW6144 6.00/4.20
Regional Integration:
Japan and South Korea in America’s Asian Policy

by Herbert P. Blix
continued to grow—underground within Korea and as an armed diaspora in Siberia, Manchuria and China proper. It triumphed, ultimately, of course, with Japan’s defeat in August 1945.

Out of their experience of great cruelty at the hands of the Japanese and their Korean collaborators, and from their gruelling resistance struggles to regain their lost independence, a legacy of bitter anti-Japanese hatred formed in the Korean people which affected their relations with democratic Japan in the postwar period. With the Japanese, however, feelings of innate racial superiority, born of the previous forty years of exploitative rule over Korea, also lingered on, fueling attitudes of discrimination and unconcern. Thus, conservative leaders in Japan allowed their country to be used as a U.S. base against North Korea, while the desire of many Japanese business leaders and bureaucrats to re-establish economic domination over at least the southern portion of Korea bears unmistakable similarities to past relationships.

The following study of Japan and South Korea in America’s Asian empire traces the evolution of the regional integration strategy from its weak beginnings in the late 1940s to a situation where it now seems that a partially independent Japan may be beginning to break out of the framework of integration and subordination to U.S. aims. Our point of departure is the American decision of August 1945 to partition the Korean peninsula.

2. Planting the Roots of Dictatorship

On August 14, 1945, the day Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration which specified its unconditional surrender to the United Nations, President Truman promulgated General Order Number One, a carefully drafted War Department document which sought to define the new Asian balance of power by detailing procedures for the surrender of Japanese forces throughout Asia. In colonial Korea the Japanese military authorities south of the 38th parallel were ordered to transfer power directly to the Americans; those north of the 38th parallel were ordered to surrender to the Russians, who had come into the war against Japan at the last moment and swept through most of Manchuria and Korea. The demarcation line was deliberately drawn so as to leave the capital (Seoul), two-thirds of the Korean people (about 20 million) and most of Korean agriculture in the American zone, though Korea’s industrial foundations were in the north. Since American forces had not yet arrived in Korea, the Japanese colonial administration in the south was directed to continue functioning. By ignoring Korean demands for immediate independence—precisely because the political balance of power in Korea at the time overwhelmingly favored the left—General Order Number One sowed the seeds of the Korean civil war. While the defeated Japanese were to be at least partially liberated from their own imperialism, being forced to retain their prewar bureaucracy, and subjected, within a short time, to an indirect American military rule, the liberated Koreans were to be subjected completely to direct rule by the American army for the next three years. While the Potsdam Declaration would be partially implemented in Japan, the spirit of the Cairo Declaration, acknowledging Korea’s need to be freed from a “slave-like” condition, would be entirely ignored in Korea. Such ironies typify the denouement of an imperialist war.

By immediately substituting its own for Japanese colonial rule and then laying the foundations for an indirect domination, Washington liberated Korea from the Japanese as it had earlier “liberated” the Philippines from Spain. But whereas in the Philippines it took over forty-seven years to achieve nominal independence in 1946, in South Korea Washington telescoped the progress into three. It took just that long to plant the roots of an indigenous dictatorship designed to serve U.S. policy goals.

On September 8, 1945, twenty-one troop ships carrying Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge’s 24th Corps began arriving at the Korean port of Inchon. The following day the Americans received the formal surrender of 170,000 Japanese troops who were stationed south of the 38th Parallel. On September 12, General Hodge proclaimed the establishment of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (AMG), and reporters who gathered for the occasion heard him exclaim that the situation among Koreans was “chaotic with no central theme except desire for immediate independence.... As a matter of fact the Japanese are my most reliable source of information.” Determined to transform his zone into a permanent bastion of anticommunism, a politically secure advance base for the containment of Russia, Hodge moved to crush the Korean left which had an underground governmental structure and enjoyed overwhelming popular support throughout the peninsula. Hence the initial necessity of collaborating for a few weeks with the Japanese after their surrender, while retaining intact, for a much longer period, the Japanese legal and economic control structure. Building on the foundations of Japanese colonial rule, mobilizing the same Korean police and other collaborationist strata that the Japanese had relied upon, Hodge succeeded in implanting in South Korea a fascist, right-wing dictatorship. Thus the three years from September 1945, when AMG was created, to May 1948, when the Syngman Rhee dictatorship superseded it, mark the implantation period of postwar dictatorship in South Korea.

Washington paralleled its occupation of Korea with a diplomatic initiative known as the trusteeship concept, which was designed to bring the entire peninsula into its sphere of influence. Just as he had acquiesced earlier in the U.S. project for dividing Korea at the 38th parallel, so Stalin, at first, went along with this new American scheme. On December 25, 1945, the foreign ministers of Russia, Britain and the U.S., meeting in Moscow, agreed, without consulting any Koreans, to continue the Soviet-American military commands in Korea until they could be superseded by a five-year, four-power trusteeship system. During that time a Soviet-American Joint Commission would be formed to set up a provisional democratic government for the entire peninsula. The ultimate effect of this agreement was to widen the breach between the two occupation zones and particularly between left and right forces in south Korea. When the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, in a series of meetings held in the Spring of 1946 and the early Summer of 1947, failed to agree on which Korean political groups should be consulted in forming a provisional government, the U.S. used this as the pretext for turning the whole problem over to the U.S.-dominated United Nations. Coming after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, this bit of diplomacy could not but help push forward the development of two separate Korean states.

The history of how these two separate states were formed in the Korean peninsula between 1945 and 1948 need
not be repeated in detail here. It suffices to say that the birth of the Syngman Rhee presidential dictatorship depended on the same forms of U.S. support later to become so well documented in the case of southern Vietnam. Under AMG the Koreans experienced famine, high unemployment and constant political terror from Rhee's thugs and American MPs. In order to create a client government, AMG passed ordinances restricting the political liberties of all but pro-American, right-wing Koreans and filled the jails with Rhee's opponents. At the same time that it waged internal warfare against the Korean population, Washington began to turn the south into an advanced base for the containment of the Soviet Union. "Operation Bamboo," launched by AMG in January 1946, was a program to build the nucleus of a South Korean army from elements of right-wing vigilante groups and private landlord armies. It would "contain" the indigenous population while military base construction, first announced by the Pentagon as early as June 1946, would help "contain" the Soviet Union.

In 1947, following the announcement by the U.S. Government in March that it planned to intervene directly in civil wars throughout the world (the Truman Doctrine), U.S. military policy in south Korea began to change. In July Truman sent Lieutenant-General Albert Wedemeyer to East Asia to investigate the Chinese and Korean situations. In the section of his Korean report dealing with the strategic importance of the U.S. zone, Wedemeyer stressed that ideally the U.S. should "ensure the permanent military neutralization of Korea." However, as long as Soviet troops remained in the north, the U.S. "must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the world an 'ideological retreat.'" The military standing of the United States would decline accordingly, not only throughout the Far East, but throughout the world." Despite his cataclysmic perspective, Wedemeyer believed that the U.S. occupation garrison in Korea was a liability since it could not be defended in the event of a major Asian war. Seeking to rationalize the U.S. position in Korea from the perspective of an all-out war strategy, he recommended that American forces be withdrawn "concurrently with Soviet occupation forces" and that the U.S. continue with what he termed a policy of "Koreanization"—a policy which actually began in the fall of 1946. By no means did Wedemeyer's recommendations, which were accepted by Truman, signal an American intention to abandon South Korea. They do indicate, however, that U.S. policy toward Korea had entered a period of redefinition during which there would be considerable uncertainty in Washington concerning South Korea's military importance in the event of nuclear war against the Soviet Union.

By the summer of 1948 "Koreanization" was ready to be tested. On May 10 Rhee's men won the American-rigged and UN-supervised elections held only in the south. four days later the People's Committee in the Russian zone cut off all electrical power for the south, ending the last vestige of economic relations between the two zones. Then on August 15 the Republic of Korea (ROK) was inaugurated with Rhee as president and AMG dissolved itself. Thus began the period of indirect U.S. domination over South Korea through a client dictatorship. In September Washington signed a provisional military agreement with Seoul, while in the north the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) emerged on September 9, claiming to be the only legitimate government of all the Korean people. Twenty-one months later the Korean peninsula was engulfed in all-out war.

The regime created by the United States in the south had one notable characteristic—a lack of national autonomy—and this was reflected most vividly in the south's armed forces. Estimates of its strength ran from 100,000 to 114,000 men by March 1949 (compared to the estimated 125 to 135,000 for the north), but this ROK military establishment required U.S. help in everything from operational planning, base and personnel administration to equipment and logistics support. Throughout almost every level of its command structure American military advisers, members of a 500-man Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), could be found, even after the main U.S. troop departure in June 1949. In addition, except for the crucial year from June 30, 1949, to July 12, 1950, when they were controlled by Rhee, supreme command of all ROK forces was vested in U.S. hands.

Economically, the situation was no different. The US-ROK Financial Affairs and Property Agreement, signed on August 24, one week after the inauguration of the new state, authorized continued U.S. economic control over South Korea. Outwardly it transferred to Seoul all rights and titles to former Japanese properties held in escrow by AMG since September 1945. The fine print, however, carefully exempted from transfer all property deemed essential by the Pentagon, including office buildings, private mansions, enormous tracts of land for bases, and even mining concessions. Thus the U.S. Government remained the largest single property holder in South Korea even after its formal withdrawal. In addition, the new regime's survival continued to depend on U.S. economic aid. Under AMG such aid rose from $6 million in 1945-46 to $93 million in 1946-47 and $113 million by 1947-48. Thereafter, ever-larger amounts of aid, channeled into the country by the newly created Economic Cooperation Commission, kept the regime afloat.

What the government of the newly created state of South Korea represented in August 1948, therefore, was really no more than three constituencies: dictator Rhee, his police and army, and a small landlord-business elite. South Korea's nascent bourgeoisie, it should be noted, had a double collaborationist character. Originally nurtured by the Japanese during the assimilationist phase of their rule (from 1919 onwards), it was later wedded to the U.S. cause by AMG's three-year-long policy of granting pro-U.S. businessmen special purchasing and selling rights for U.S. aid commodities and using the disposal of Japanese property to win supporters for Rhee.

An illegitimate, corrupt, foreign implantation, a puppet regime in the most literal sense of the word, the Rhee regime could not long survive without killing off its opponents. Between August 1948 and the start of the Korean War, Rhee launched a terror campaign against his opponents throughout South Korea. His army, police and para-military "Youth Groups," buttressed at times by U.S. tactical units, suppressed the Cheju Island and Yosu rebellions of April and October 1948, which in turn fed the flames of a widespread guerrilla movement.

In 1949 the regime's economic and political crises deepened. A conscription law enacted in July, which made all males between the ages of twenty and forty eligible for induction, contributed to a growing sense of war crisis, even though it was not implemented fully until 1952. Between July and December 1949, Rhee's army launched an average of nearly three "counter-guerrilla actions" daily.
While Rhee was conducting his repression against dissidents in the cities and in the countryside, a mini-war was going on along the 38th parallel. By year’s end Pyongyang had charged Seoul with 1,836 violations of the 38th parallel and “claimed there were 90,000 guerrillas fighting in the south,” while Seoul claimed killing 19,000 enemies in the south’s border regions. Acting meanwhile in the age-old manner of the precarious puppet, Rhee sought to overcome his internal contradictions by externalizing them. His constant threats to invade the north began in early 1949 and accelerated the following year, particularly after his overwhelming election defeat of May 1950. Coupled with provocations against the north, Rhee and his agents made continuous appeals for more U.S. aid to Ambassador Muccio in Seoul, MacArthur in Tokyo and the State Department and influential friends in Washington, always stressing South Korea’s critical strategic importance as a continental bridgehead for operations against the Soviet Union and China. On the eve of the Korean War Rhee’s very existence, like Chiang Kai-shek’s on Taiwan, had come to depend on an intensification of the U.S. anticommunist offensive in East Asia.

Washington, for its part, was wary of Rhee’s machinations and divided internally over just how positive its Asian policy should be; but it was determined not to be ejected from South Korea as it had from China. On January 26, 1950, the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed. A few weeks later Congress put itself on record against any peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula by passing a Korean aid bill which “carried the proviso that aid would be terminated ‘in the event of the formation in the Republic of Korea of a coalition government which includes one or more members of the Communist Party or of the party now in control of the government of North Korea.’”

3. Preparing Japan for Counter-Revolution

At this point it is necessary to place Korea in the context of overall U.S. Asian policy. The disintegration of the Rhee régime during 1948-50 coincided with Chiang Kai-shek’s ejection from the mainland; the Chinese People’s Liberation Army began its counter-attack against larger, U.S.-armed and financed KMT armies in the fall of 1947; by October 1949 most of the mainland had been liberated and the Chinese People’s Republic established. Viewed in the U.S. as a defeat for American policy—elements of two U.S. marine divisions had been intervening in the Chinese civil war ever since early October 1945 and the U.S. had given the KMT massive amounts of aid—the “fall” of China provoked powerful demands for a more “positive” foreign policy in Asia which no U.S. government could ignore.

Rhee’s imminent collapse also coincided with stepped-up U.S. efforts to secure Indochina for French colonialism. The counterpart of the puppet Rhee régime in South Korea was the puppet Bao Dai regime in the newly created state of Vietnam. This artificial entity—a joint contrivance of the U.S. and France to stem the revolutionary tide in Indochina—came into existence with the signing of an agreement between Emperor Bao Dai and the French on March 8, 1949, and was officially recognized by the U.S. and Britain on February 7, 1950. Its creation simultaneously escalated the French Indochina War, which had been underway since December 1946, and inaugurated the start of open U.S. participation in it. There followed the Truman regime’s publication of France’s request for military assistance against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese National Front (Lien Viet) on February 27, the arrival of the first U.S. warships in Saigon harbor on March 16 and the first demonstrations in Saigon against U.S. interference in the war on March 19. On May 25, exactly one month before President Truman internationalized the Korean civil war, the U.S. Congress appropriated $30 million to feed the French war machine in Indochina. In short, the U.S. helped move the first Indochina War into a more intensive stage of conflict even before it intervened massively in the Korean civil war; thereafter U.S. policy toward Korea and Indochina developed interdependently, with Washington paying for French mercenaries (including Africans, Germans, Thais and many Vietnamese) in Vietnam and employing its own American conscripts plus Koreans and an assorted UN contingent in Korea.

If the Korean problem is to be seen in an Asian and global context, however, one must focus not on Indochina, but rather on Japan. In the period before June 1950, Japan holds the key to understanding the origins of the Korean War.

Although Japan had figured as the lynchpin in the entire U.S. strategic position in Asia ever since 1949, top American policy planners, both civilian and military, did not achieve a consensus on the importance of South Korea for Japan’s defense until after the Korean War began. Before that time American leaders were divided over South Korea’s defensibility and assigned it a relatively low strategic priority, as seen in the Wedemeyer Report and the American troop withdrawal of 1949. Yet this did not mean that the U.S. was ever willing to abandon South Korea politically, or that U.S. Asian policy during 1949 and early 1950 went on the defensive, or that when border warfare escalated along the 38th Parallel the U.S. was unprepared to meet it with force. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s famous speech of January 12, 1950, to the National Press Club, for example, was actually aimed at informing both Moscow and Peking that Washington intended to retain an indefinite military presence in Japan regardless of what peace settlement might be worked out. Though his domestic critics were attracted to that portion of his speech which defined the U.S. “defensive perimeter” in the Pacific in such a way as to exclude both Taiwan and South Korea, those to whom Acheson directed the speech regarded it differently. As John Gittings recently argued, “What impressed Peking in its published analyses was not what was excluded from the ‘defensive perimeter’ but the far greater expanse of territories which it did include. ‘It is clear,’ stated an editorial in People’s Daily on 1 February 1950, ‘that the American imperialists have assigned a major and permanent position to Japan in their defensive perimeter’ and that the U.S. intended to annex the Ryukyus… On Korea itself, a Washington-watcher in Moscow or Peking would not have concluded so readily as his domestic critics that Acheson had washed his hands of the southern half of the peninsula. Acheson distinguished between American responsibilities in the northern part of the Pacific area, including Korea as well as Japan, and the southern part (Indochina and Southeast Asia) where ‘the direct responsibility lies with the people concerned.’ Korea belonged to the upper half of the league table, together
with Japan although "in a lesser degree" than the latter. The exclusion of Korea from the "defensive perimeter"... stemmed from an essentially military definition of those interests.... It was not a political definition of those interests.

While U.S. policy regarding the precise place of Korea in its overall Asian policy was, at this time, obviously ambivalent, the thrust of U.S. policy in Japan, especially since the middle of 1948, had a logic of its own. Japan's transformation into a base for waging counter-revolution—the chief development in occupation policy in the year and a half preceding June 1950—carried its own momentum and might have eventually led the United States to re-incorporate South Korea into its military defense perimeter even if the Korean War had not occurred when it did to illustrate the essential inconsistencies in Acheson's "defense perimeter" speech. Many aspects of U.S.-Japan relations seem to bear out this interpretation, and the evolution of Japan-ROK relations after the Korean War certainly lends substance to it.

In November 1948, three months after the creation of the ROK, the final decision was made to deal with occupied Japan as a potential military ally and member-in-good-standing of the U.S. empire rather than as a defeated enemy. Actually, however, this "reverse course" in U.S.-Japan policy had been underway almost since the inception of the General Douglas MacArthur regime. One of the first Asian peoples to feel its effects were the Koreans. For SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers—MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo) the Korean problem had two aspects: one was the question of the Koreans in Japan—approximately 2.4 million Koreans at the time of the surrender, of whom one million had been forced to emigrate after 1939 by Japanese colonial authorities; the other was that of steering Japan toward severing all remaining ties with the Russian zone of Korea. For three months after Japan's surrender, Koreans who could obtain sea passage returned to their homeland without any restrictions on the amounts of currency and valuables they could take with them. Wishing to end this unregulated movement, SCAP ruled in November 1945 that Koreans in Japan would henceforth be given free transportation back to Korea but permitted to take only one thousand yen (equivalent to twenty packs of cigarettes) plus their personal effects. All of their other possessions, gained through hard labor at low wages in mines and factories, had to be left behind.

This official repatriation program ended on December 31, 1946. By then the Korean community in Japan numbered from 600,000 to 700,000, and was once again acquiring notoriety. The official repatriation program proceeded in the midst of anti-Korean hysteria, paralleling the U.S. attack on radical elements in occupied south Korea. In a campaign that was actively abetted by SCAP, the Koreans became objects of attack from the American-censored Japanese press, the Diet and various branches of the Japanese bureaucracy. By the summer of 1946 they were being blamed for Japan's black market and an increase in crime, accused of being carriers of cholera, of paying no taxes, of "being brave today after having cowered in fright during the war," etc. Koreans who chose to remain in Japan thereafter were on the defensive, objects in effect of dual occupation decrees.

On August 4, 1946, SCAP issued a memorandum for Japanese authorities entitled "On matters concerning the definition of allied nation, neutral nation, enemy nation, special position nation and nation of unsettled status." Korea was defined as a "special position nation." By their unwillingness to recognize the Koreans as a liberated people, as reflected in this definition, and by their numerous open admissions of preference for Japanese over Koreans, Americans were contributing to the recrudescence of anti-Korean prejudice. On October 13, 1948, one month after the state of North Korea came into existence, SCAP ordered the Tokyo Police Agency not to let the North Korean flag or posters depicting it be displayed at any time within the territory of Japan. This again called forth an enthusiastic response from the Japanese government. It proceeded to close privately operated Korean schools in Japan, oppress those Koreans who were pro-North Korea and push an assimilationist policy toward the small pro-Rhee minority in Japan.

While this reverse course in the treatment of Koreans in Japan was unfolding, a series of American missions and reports, beginning with the Clifford Strike report of March 1947, made it clear by 1948 that no reparations would be given to the victims of Japanese aggression in Asia. In 1948 with political tension escalating rapidly in South Korea and all-out civil war in China, General MacArthur finally ordered all interim reparations removals of Japanese industrial equipment stopped and the whole issue tabled until after the conclusion of a peace treaty. Thus U.S. Asian strategy, which made Japan first a "keystone," then a "workshop" and ultimately, after the Korean War, envisioned making it an "arsenal" for all of anticommunist Asia, meant two things as far as Korea and the rest of Asia were concerned. First, it implied the restoration of Japan's pre-war position of superiority over its Asian neighbors. Secondly, it ruled out the possibility of restoring Japan-Korean relations on a basis of equality. Both of these implications were clearly illustrated in the subsequent transformation of the meaning of Japanese war reparations from something negative—compensation for damage and injury suffered by Japan's neighbors and a reminder of Japan's past aggression—into something positive—a constituent element of its future reconstruction and even a cold war weapon. The reverse course and especially the reparations issue reinforced Rhee's hatred of postwar Japan, a hatred which derived partly from political expediency and partly from his long experience as an exiled nationalist. Hoping to restore economic relations with the Japanese on a cooperative basis, Rhee visited Tokyo as MacArthur's guest for the first time in October 1948 and again in February 1950. Each time he found the Japanese uninterested and the prospects of ever obtaining reparations bleak.

In fact, Japan eventually settled the Korean reparations issue on its own terms, something which had been implicit in Washington's Japan policy by 1948 and, indeed, from the time it decided to reconstruct Japan within the conservative framework of its prewar ruling class minus the military elite. Once Washington had reinterpreted the meaning of reparations to serve Japan's and its own interests, once it had begun to capitalize on the Japanese feeling of racial and social superiority to its Asian neighbors, conservative Japanese governments were free to act. After Syngman Rhee passed from the scene, South Korea quickly shifted its position from demanding "claims" to begging for "aid." The Japanese, first, arrogantly rebuffed ROK property claims, arising from the Japanese plundering of the peninsula, with counterclaims of...
their own. Later they forced the ROK to abandon its concept of "property and claims rights" in favor of a fictitious notion of "economic cooperation." With the signing of the Kim Chong-pil-Ohira Masayoshi "claims" memorandum on November 12, 1962, the ROK acknowledged the impossibility of resisting its consolidation within the Japanese sphere of the U.S. empire.

The "reverse course" policy distorted later Japanese-Korean relations as well as Japan's own political development; the general crisis in U.S.-Asian policy, in turn, determined the "reverse course." During 1949 and the first half of 1950 the U.S. accelerated its political, diplomatic and military preparations in Japan for launching counter-revolution in Asia, with Korea as a primary target. These preparations began with MacArthur's New Year's warning to the Japanese people that their anti-war constitution did not preclude the right of self-defense. Three days later, on January 4, 1949, SCAP permitted the ROK to establish a mission in Tokyo accredited to MacArthur's Headquarters.

This special arm of the Rhee regime was charged with the task of winning supporters among the 600,000-strong Korean community in Japan. The combat effectiveness of MacArthur's Far East Command depended on the Eighth Army whose main combat units were all undermanned and weighed down with occupation duties. In April, MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army combat units—the 1st Cavalry Division in central Honshu, the 7th Infantry Division in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, the 24th Infantry Division in Kyushu, the 25th Infantry Division in south-central Honshu and the 9th Anti-aircraft Artillery Group in Okinawa—to divest themselves of all civil administrative duties in order to concentrate solely on military training. With an actual strength of 45,561 and a combat strength of 26,494 as of June 1950, the Eighth Army sought to partially offset its manpower deficiencies by employing over 150,000 Japanese personnel "in roles normally performed by service troops." MacArthur's April policy directive was followed by a new training program announced on June 10. The Eighth Army's combat divisions, together with the Far East air forces and naval forces, were ordered to turn themselves into an integrated naval, air and ground fighting team as quickly as possible. On August 8, 1949, SCAP acquired an area in the vicinity of Mount Fuji "which would accommodate limited division exercises over very rugged terrain." 30

While the Far East Command proceeded with its training preparations, on September 8, the Japanese government, on SCAP's orders, dissolved the leading Korean organizations in Japan which had ties with the North—the Korean Democratic Youth Alliance and the League of Korean Residents—confiscated their property and expelled their officials. In Washington, the months between June and November 1949 witnessed an acceleration of preparations for a peace treaty with Japan that excluded the Soviet Union and was predicated on an anticommunist security principle.

In late October 1949, the U.S. commenced construction of expanded air base facilities on Okinawa, using the $58 million that had been appropriated for that purpose by Congress in July. This strengthening of Okinawa was integrally related to the failure of American policy in China, Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Taiwan, and the start of preparations for a follow-up invasion of that strategically situated island by the People's Liberation Army. Viewed from General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, the growing danger to Taiwan may have raised the prospect that nearby Okinawa would eventually be completely outflanked. This meant that American air power based on Okinawa would be unable to guarantee Japan's defense. A perceived danger to Japan's Okinawan flank of defense, in turn, may have led MacArthur to reassess the importance of his South Korean flank. Less speculative were the consequences of base contraction on Okinawa and the improvement of existing air fields in Japan. By the time hostilities commenced in Korea, the U.S. had already prepared adequate air support facilities for major military operations. According to an official naval historian, "The capacity of Air Force bases in Japan and Okinawa exceeded the forces available and shortly after the commencement of hostilities, two B-29 bombardment groups were flown out from the United States to make up, with the 19th Group already there, the Bomber Command of the Far East Air Forces." But already by June 1950 MacArthur had at his command "the largest aggregation of USAF units outside the continental limits of the United States." 31

Throughout 1949 and the first half of 1950 the Far East Command continued to implement a program informally known as Operation Roll-Up. Designed to equip the Eighth Army's infantry divisions with reclaimed equipment from World War II stockpiles scattered throughout the Pacific, the project involved transporting vehicles, weapons, ammunition and other types of supplies to Japan for repair and storage. Much of the repair work was done in specially designated Japanese factories under the supervision of a small American staff. In 1949 alone 200,000 measurement tons of ordnance supplies were moved to Japan from Okinawa.

While the Eighth Army stockpiled military equipment in Japan, America's leading oil monopolies were also busy establishing financial control over the Japanese oil industry. Between February and October 1949 tie-up arrangements were concluded between the following Japanese and American oil companies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Date Acquisition</th>
<th>% of Stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toa Neneryo—Standard Vacuum Oil (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey)</td>
<td>Feb. 11</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nihon Sekiyu Caltex</td>
<td>March 25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koa Sekiyu</td>
<td>July 13</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsubishi Sekiyu—Tide Water Associated</td>
<td>March 31</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showa Sekiyu—Shell</td>
<td>June 20</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maruzen Sekiyu—Union Oil</td>
<td>Oct. 21</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this same period Japan's leading aluminum producers, Nihon Keiken Zoku and Toyo Aluminum, came under the financial control of Canada Aluminum, while Westinghouse Electric together with International Standard Electric re-established pre-war investment ties with Mitsubishi Electric and Japan Electric. Completion of the framework for this subordination of Japanese capital was pre-eminently the work of Detroit banker Joseph Dodge, MacArthur's newly appointed economic adviser. In March 1949 Dodge translated...
the occupation's "reverse course" economic policy into an austerity budget which the Japanese Diet then passed without revision on April 16. Its long-range aims were to foster reconcentration in Japanese industry, primary economic ties with the U.S. and, eventually, limited militarization. To guide Japan along this path, Dodge introduced on April 1, 1949, the lever of the U.S. counterpart fund "special account," 37 which SCAP and Washington later used, after the Korean War began, to channel Japanese tax money into direct and indirect Japanese military production. (Fifteen years later, beginning in 1965, Japan would use this same technique against South Korea, creating a "counterpart yen fund" and a "claims fund special account" with which to guide Seoul's economic development along lines which served Japan's interests.)

Having created an economic-financial framework for Japan's long-term subordination to the U.S.-dominated capitalist bloc, SCAP thus began to revive Japan's industrial war potential at the same time that America's leading defense contractors moved to bring key sectors of Japanese industry under their direct control. From Japan's long-term viewpoint this was perhaps the most significant development of 1949 and early 1950. Initially, SCAP had stopped reparations confiscations when only 30 percent of designated confiscations of Japanese industrial property had been carried out. Of the untouched plant, 72 percent was directly related to the manufacture of armaments. At first only a few of the smaller arms manufacturers returned to the repair and production of conventional armaments and equipment for U.S. forces in Japan. But by January 1951, six months after the start of the Korean War, as much as 80 to 90 percent of Japan's intact war-related productive capacity may have been directly engaged in the manufacture or repair of weapons and Japan was started toward an embryonic military-industrial complex. 38

During the first half of 1950 the counter-revolutionary momentum in U.S. Asian policy accelerated, stimulated by the Republican party assault on Truman's methods of implementing containment, the so-called "fall" of China, and the Soviet breaking of the U.S. nuclear monopoly. It appears that the American actions mainly in Japan (but also in support of the French in Indochina, Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan, and the former collaborationist elite in the Philippines) were encouraging Syngman Rhee to escalate his war provocations against North Korea, while perhaps simultaneously convincing North Korea of the futility of pursuing its goal of national unification by peaceful means. 39

The year 1950 began with the signing of the U.S.-ROK Military Assistance Agreement on January 26, a two-day conference between Syngman Rhee and MacArthur (February 16-18), and visits to U.S. military installations in South Korea and Japan by America's top military leaders—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman, Army Chief of Staff Lawton Collins and Air Force chief Hoyt Vandenberg. When the military chiefs toured the Yokosuka naval base on February 2, Rear Admiral Benton W. Decker, the base commander, told them of Yokosuka's critical importance as the only U.S. naval base west of Hawaii capable of repairing warships of any size during wartime and of its indispensability as a logistics support base for the army and air force. Decker reportedly requested at least $6 million for construction to bring the base up to its full potential and a guarantee of its indefinite use by the Navy even after the ending of the occupation. 40

MacArthur's anguish over Truman's "weak" China policy, the civil war situation in Korea and his fear that the fall of Taiwan would outflank Okinawa and thus undermine the defense of Japan may explain his return to direct involvement in Japanese politics around this time and his efforts to make Japan a politically secure base for military operations anywhere on the periphery of China. Developments in occupation policy certainly support such a view. In February 1950, for example, SCAP ordered a step-up in the anticommunist witch hunts in the Japanese labor movement and school system. In March, after conferring with Syngman Rhee and Prime Minister Yoshida, SCAP broached plans for forcing all Koreans living in Japan to return to Rhee's police state. In April, John Foster Dulles, who "had played the leading American role in the creation of South Korea" in the UN, 41 was appointed chief Republican adviser to the Secretary of State in charge of formulating Far Eastern policy. His appointment, as Jon Halliday has argued, was designed "to insure a radical shift of policy." 42 Dulles ended forever the uncertainty surrounding South Korea's importance for America's Asian strategy.

In the two months preceding the outbreak of the Korean War some of the most striking developments in occupation policy were connected with the "red purge." MacArthur hinted that the Japan Communist Party (JCP) was an illegal organization (May 3); he imposed an emergency martial law decree banning all public meetings and demonstrations in Tokyo (June 1-7); finally he purged the twenty-four-member Central Committee of the JCP and seventeen members of the editorial staff of its organ Akahata (June 6 and 7). The JCP had been a vigorous opponent of granting naval and air base rights to U.S. forces. In the wake of these actions over 12,000 union workers and government officials were fired from their jobs for political reasons. On June 16 Major-General Charles Willoughby temporarily banned all public meetings and demonstrations throughout Japan. Nine days later, on June 25, the Korean War broke out. 43

But by this time Japan had been shifted by the "reverse course" into a position where the U.S. could safely use it as a "workshop" and base for waging counter-revolution. The Japanese and Korean left were being suppressed or neutralized, plans were underway for a postwar Japanese military establishment, Tokyo was being turned into an outpost for anticommunist delegations from all over Asia, and the U.S. military—though unprepared for June 25 psychologically and in terms of manpower—was training and stockpiling to meet a future escalation of civil conflict in South Korea (or the fall of Taiwan) with military force.

4. Japan in the Korean War

The Korean War, whose outbreak was a culmination of five years of a U.S. policy of violently repressing the national trend of Korean politics, was a civil war which the United States, for its own foreign policy and domestic political reasons, immediately internationalized and waged as a war of wanton destruction against the entire Korean people. Japan, which was in process of being transformed into a supply depot for war long before June 25, was drawn into it as the main, direct base of operations for U.S. forces. Right at the start of the conflict MacArthur permitted Japan's embryonic army,
the Police Reserve, to aid U.S. forces logistically in the war zone. While retired Japanese admirals and generals served in SCAP's Tokyo headquarters as "consultants," lower-ranking Japanese military experts served in Korea with the Eighth Army. Robert Murphy, first U.S. ambassador to postwar Japan, claimed in his memoirs that

*the Japanese with amazing speed did transform their islands into one huge supply depot, without which the Korean War could not have been fought.* . . . Japanese shipping and railway experts worked in Korea with their own well-trained crews under American and United Nations commands. This was top secret but the Allied Forces would have had difficulty remaining in Korea without the assistance from thousands of Japanese specialists who were familiar with that country.44

Like the origins and nature of the war itself, Japan's participation was kept secret in the United States and most Western countries. Yet on July 1, 1950, just a few days after the United States intervened militarily, the secretary-general of the Yoshida cabinet, Okazaki Katsuo, announced cryptically at a press conference that "Since the dispatch of U.S. troops is a United Nations police action, it is natural for some groups [ichibu no hito] to engage in hostile acts or other activities in compliance with Occupation orders." Formal cabinet approval to cooperate with the United States in Korea followed on July 4.45 The enormous importance of Japan's subsequent contribution is stated in an army-commissioned study:

*The depots and other facilities for backing up supply activities in Korea were located [in Japan]. The essential rebuilding program depended on Japanese industrial facilities and labor-resources which also provided vital services in the transportation and handling of supplies and the movement, housing, and hospitalization of troops. . . . All forces in Korea depended mostly on World War II trucks during most of the conflict—and most of those came from rebuild and overhaul operations in Japan . . . without the use of Japanese workers, an additional 200,000 to 260,000 service troops would have been required.*46

In addition to being a supplier of technical assistants and "engineering" troops in Korea, as well as a logistics support base,47 Japan was the major training area for U.S. forces bound for Korea; it was also the training area for ROK soldiers who comprised over half the units of the U.S. Army's Seventh Division.48

Japan's proximity to the war zone, yet safety from retaliation by a force incapable of challenging U.S. air and naval superiority, enabled American pilots to lead a normal home life: flying out in the morning to bomb Korean civilians, returning in the evening in time for "happy hour" cocktails at their officers clubs in Japan. Moreover, by its utilization as a rest and recreation area for U.S.-UN combat forces, Japan prostituted itself to the task of counter-revolution in the most literal way possible. From the Miura peninsula to Yamagahama, from Hakone to Hakodate, wherever there were U.S. military bases there were clusters of bars, cabarets, hotels, whorehouses—honky tonk rathees teeming with the flotsam and jetsam of Japanese society. Yokosuka, headquarters of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, had approximately 5,000 prostitutes and 1,500 whore houses in 1952 and nearby Sarushima (Monkey Island) was one of Asia's largest gambling sites, an early prototype of Seoul's notorious Walker Hill. So great was the symbiosis between the U.S. military and the Japanese power brokers of this former imperial naval base that in 1952 the city's Chamber of Commerce and Industry thought it appropriate to establish a "Yokosuka Song Promotion Society" in order to create and popularize a "suggestive" Yokosuka song that "could be sung by both American soldiers and Japanese, adults and children."49 "Yokosuka, Japan," the lyrics began, "a wonderful town,"50

Beer veree naisu and girls all around.
Up on the hill where the "cherries" bloom
I'm gonna make us a home sweet home.
Baby, what you do to me!

*Up on the mountain I look down at the sea— Ships going, ships coming, and one ship of love for me. Rocking gently on the waves, rocking to and fro, Oh I want to get on board, to get on board and go! Baby, what you do to me!*

American planes, taking off from Japanese airfields, dropped napalm in Korea manufactured under license by Nissan Motors and Ishi Tekka Company; American artillery fired Japanese-made shells in prodigious quantities, while for nearly three years Seventh Fleet ships, operating out of Japanese ports, bombarded Korea's coastline. In one way or another the Japanese people, their industry and merchant marine were mobilized to assist America's war effort. The Korean War provided the first great opportunity for reviving Japanese monopoly capitalism and militarism. With the internationalization of the fighting, large-scale U.S. "special procurements" superseded GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) and EROA (Economic Rehabilitation of Occupied Areas) as the main forms of U.S. aid to Japan. "Special procurements" orders placed just with Japan's former zaibatsu industries totaled from $600 million to $800 million dollars and accounted for nearly two-thirds of Japan's total exports between 1951 and 1953.51 Total "special procurements" contract awards during the five years from the outbreak of the Korean War to June 1955 came to $1,619,000,000 by unofficial count, and $1,723,000,000 by official Bank of Japan statistics.52

U.S. "special procurement orders" were soon transformed from purchases of a temporary and emergency nature into semi-permanent profits for Japanese business. Originally, this term meant Pentagon orders to Japanese industry for war materials for U.S. forces in Japan and Korea and for Korean wartime relief. But by 1952-53, "special procurements" had expanded to include orders for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan, Okinawan base construction and relief, economic and military assistance to U.S. allies under the MSA program (in the form of "machinery for military base use," machinery and tools, steel materials, chemical fertilizer and textiles) and, lastly, Korean reconstruction. Included in the latter were sandbags, barbed wire, fuel tanks, incendiary bombs, steel materials, railway
ties, freight cars, trucks, coal, chemical fertilizer, medicines and wool blankets. Most important of all, a new type of "special procurement order," called "educational orders," was added from about 1953. These consisted chiefly of finished weapons (ammunition, small arms, machine guns and trench mortars) and were one of the concrete ways in which the United States spurred Japan's illegal rearmament and eventually locked Japanese industry into the role of arsenal for anticommunist Asia. Thus not only had Japan secretly committed itself to supporting the division of the Korean peninsula by the end of the war, it had also embarked on indirectly furnishing guns and ammunition to the ROK under the "special procurements" formula. Even in the postwar period, despite the objections of Syngman Rhee, Japan became the essential source of supply for South Korean reconstruction.

The Korean War marked a military and diplomatic turning point in Japan's relations with Korea and China, the two countries that had fought Japanese imperialism longest and hardest. During and immediately after the war, the United States systematized its anti-China containment policy centering on military-economic ties with Japan. On September 8, 1951, at the San Francisco Opera House, the same building where the UN Charter was signed, Washington and Tokyo signed a peace treaty and military alliance which simultaneously incorporated Japan into the U.S. bloc and designated North Korea and China as major hypothetical enemies, while maintaining a U.S. military presence in "Free" Japan. On that day Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, in an exchange of notes with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, formally acknowledged Japan's involvement in the defense of South Korea. "In the Acheson-Yoshida notes . . . the Japanese Government agreed that the American bases in Japan would continue to support operations in Korea . . . for as long as there were American bases in Japan and a United Nations Command in Korea." With the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in June 1960, these notes were also renewed as the Kishi Nobusuke-Christian Herter notes. Basically they signified that the Japanese government considered North Korea as a legitimate, direct object of U.S. attack from Japanese territory. They also symbolized the ressurrection of a stripped-down version of Japan's traditional military policy toward Korea. With half the peninsula considered to be in "enemy" (i.e., independent Korean) hands, the Yoshida government and every Japanese government since has chosen to regard the Korean demilitarized zone as Japan's forward defense line and the existence of a separate South Korean state as essential to its own defense.

Thus the Korean War defined the Japanese government's relationship to the Korean people. To South Korea, Japan became a military backstop, providing bases for the U.S.-ROK military alliance, a staging area, a rest and recreation area, a logistics base extraordinaire—the silent but profitable partner of the United States in counter-revolution. To North Korea, Japan became the base for thousands of hostile military actions by U.S. intelligence-gathering ships and planes, of which the Pueblo (January 1968) and the EC-121 (April 1969) incidents would eventually become the most publicized. Hostility toward North Korea has been a permanent aspect of Japanese foreign policy up to the present. Even after the recognition of the People's Republic of China, for example, Japan has refused diplomatic recognition to the DPRK.

Economically, too, the Korean War rekindled Japanese business interest in Korea: first in "special procurement orders," then in "rehabilitation," and eventually, by the early 1960s, in a direct, old-fashioned desire to secure control of the Korean market for the products of Japanese industry. By the 1970s Japanese economic expansion into South Korea would give birth to an autonomous dimension of activity beyond U.S. control. To be sure, that outcome was implicit in the very concept of a regional military and economic integration of the basic U.S.-Japan dependency relationship, which was, ultimately, the most enduring legacy of the Korean War. But though Washington could immediately utilize both Tokyo and Seoul to project its military power outward towards the Chinese mainland (read "containment") and into Southeast Asia, it could only realize the economic integration of the region provisionally and in stages; that is, by gradually accumulating the material, political and ideological conditions for its realization. One obstacle here was Syngman Rhee, whose anticommunism lent itself easily to military containment, but whose need for a more meaningful base of domestic support also led him simultaneously toward an anti-Japan posture. Indeed, this was Rhee's one and only point of contact with the consciousness of the Korean people. It alone could procure some small measure of popular support.

Though Washington could force Japan and South Korea to begin preliminary negotiations leading to eventual normalization of diplomatic relations as early as October 20, 1951—one month after the signing of the San Francisco treaties and in the midst of the Korean War—it could not prevent Rhee from aborting them by imposing a maritime defense line around South Korea's coast, seventy-five miles out at sea, from which Japanese fishing vessels were prohibited from entering. Though Washington could see that only a unified U.S.-Japan-ROK military alliance held the key to an all-Asian, anticommunist military alliance, it could not make Rhee understand that fact and forswear anti-Japanism.

The other obstacle to regional integration lay in Japan itself. Economically, Japan's industrial structure in the early 1950s was not yet ready for concentration on overseas economic expansion. Militarily, article nine of its anti-war constitution stipulated that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." Reinforcing article nine throughout the occupation period was a Ministry of Education policy of inculcating a negative evaluation of war in Japanese youth. However, after the October 1953 Ikeda-Robertson talks, in which the U.S. and Japanese governments reached an understanding on the need to foster a greater defense consciousness in the Japanese people, this official policy underwent an about-face in order to meet the long-term military and ideological requirements of the U.S.-Japan military alliance, but the Japanese people, and particularly Japanese intellectuals, would not permit formal constitutional revision. This ruled out rapid remilitarization and made reliance on other regional armies an absolute necessity for the United States. Regional integration in the period ahead would have to take the form of a division of labor.
The Korean War ended with the Korean people ravaged and more divided than ever: the foreign-imposed barrier of the 38th Parallel transformed into a Demilitarized Zone; their great dream of national unification temporarily set back by the enormous destruction wrought by the U.S. in the name of the UN. The North Koreans, who suffered the greater proportion of deaths and destruction, the signing of the armistice agreement on July 27, 1953 meant the start of "socialist reconstruction" and rapid, independent economic development; for the South Koreans, whose land was also a ruined battlefield, it meant something entirely different: a billion dollars in U.S. "aid" to buy off Syngman Rhee and a new U.S. effort to stabilize the south as a permanent anticommunist buffer state with a new role to play within America's Asian empire.

That role emerged from the various successes and failures experienced by the United States during the Korean War: MacArthur's failure to destroy the socialist regime in North Korea (September-November 1950), necessitating a reformulation of U.S. war aims (late 1950-early 1951); the partial achievement of reduced U.S. objectives; the lack of French success in Indochina, which was consistently viewed by American leaders as an extension of the Korean conflict; and the indisputable American success in consolidating the counter-revolution in South Korea by forging a vast control structure of the ROK army, paramilitary groups and police forces under firm U.S.-Rhee control.

In other words, after the Korean front had been stabilized around the 38th parallel and peace negotiations begun, the United States continued to fight a stalled war in Korea for two years in order to realize specific objectives both within Korea and outside of it. Internally, it "Koreanized" the fighting and firmed up the partition of August 1945. Externally, the United States was less successful. Prolonging the war, and the misery of the Korean people, did create conditions within which an advantageous peace treaty for Japan was secured and the rearmament of both Japan and West Germany begun. But two chief goals of U.S. foreign policy, one ideological and one military, were not achieved. The war did not "deflate" China's political and military prestige throughout the Third World. Nor could the U.S. military effort in Korea buy enough time to stave off a major setback in Indochina. It is in connection with these two failures that the initial rationale behind the U.S. plans for post-armistice Korea must be seen.

Although Washington continued after 1953 to use South Korea as a critical anticommunist buffer state for the "protection" of Japan, as early as 1952 U.S. leaders saw a potential role for it in another area. By then the Truman regime had succeeded in "Koreanizing" much of the ground fighting and America was fighting two proxy wars: one in Indochina, the other in Korea. Thus when candidate Eisenhower charged, in the closing weeks of the 1952 presidential campaign, that there was "no sense in the United Nations, with America bearing the brunt of the thing, being constantly compelled to man [the] front lines.... if there must be a war, let it be Asians against Asians, with our support on the side of freedom," Truman could answer, a few weeks later, "The United States is now supporting Republic of Korea military forces totaling approximately 400,000 men. Our training schools are turning out 14,000 South Korean soldiers a month. There are 50 percent more South Korean troops in the battle lines today than there are Americans."

In short, the new potential value of South Korea lay in its U.S.-trained army, the fourth largest in the world and the largest army of trained "natives" in the U.S. "coalition." Touted by Pentagon officials as the best "comparable return moneywise for the equivalent amount of money," the ROK army had become by 1953 the primary model for the U.S. military assistance program in Indochina, and its expansion, revitalization and support the primary object of all U.S. policies in South Korea.

Thus while Japan became the object of massive U.S. investments in productive industries in the five years following the armistice, South Korea became the object of a massive "defense support program." And while the United States concentrated on building up Japan as the military arsenal of non-communist Asia, an economic counterweight to China and a future military ally, it conceived its Korean defense support programs much more narrowly: to serve the interests of the dollar, to solidify an imperial frontier by sustaining the military containment of China, which had begun with the Korean War, and to have an Asian army in waiting if it was needed in Southeast Asia.

Consequently, while Japan recovered and was beginning to surpass its pre-War II position in the world economy by 1960, South Korea remained unindustrialized and the colonial-parasitic nature of its industrial structure even more pronounced than in 1945. Finally, while Japan started after 1960 on a road leading to economic competition and junior partnership status with the United States, South Korea was inevitably headed for military dictatorship, increased dependency on foreign monopoly capital and the overseas sale of its armed forces. The main factors which brought this situation about remain to be explained: first in relation to South Korea, second in relation to Japan.

Three main periods stand out in the history of U.S.-ROK relations after 1953. From 1953 to about 1958: the period of the ROK military build-up; 1958 to 1960: the period of the transition in U.S. global military strategy or of Syngman Rhee's last days; 1961 to the present: the period of Park Chung Hee's military dictatorship or of full-scale mercenarization.

In the first period, from July 27, 1953 (the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement), to June 21, 1957 (the day the United States formally abrogated the arms-limitation provisions of that agreement), South Korea's development was shaped by an American commitment to raise its combat strength to twenty divisions—an amount which completely ignored Seoul's ability to ever sustain such a force on its own. Eisenhower and Dulles may have considered this decision both in terms of securing Rhee's approval for the armistice and inhibiting a major redeployment of Chinese forces from North Korea toward Indochina after the ending of Korean hostilities. Whatever the reason, North Korean sources, which I have not been able to confirm, charge that it was followed by a second decision to further expand the size of the ROK military which
was made in the wake of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (May 7, 1954).

In late July 1954, the same week that the Geneva Accords on Indochina were signed, Rhee arrived in Washington seeking additional aid. Protracted talks between teams of officials followed, during which the South Koreans agreed, among other things, to purchase aid materials from their former enemy, Japan, and to retain their armed forces under American operational control. In return, the United States is alleged to have agreed to pay for a $200,000-man increase in the overall size of the ROK military. These decisions were officially confirmed on November 17, 1954, in the form of an "Agreed Minute Between the United States and the Republic of Korea." In the unpublished "Appendix B" of the minute, the United States reportedly agreed to raise the ROK armed forces to a total strength of 720,000. This included a 661,000-man army, a 16,000-man navy, 27,000 marines and a 16,000-man air forces. The published portions of the November 17th minute referred to a U.S. "intention and policy to ... support a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment as outlined in Appendix B, including the development of a reserve system...."

Whatever the size of the increase in ROK combat strength after the armistice, the ROK army had grown so large as to force the United States to increase its control over it, if only to prevent Rhee from eventually using his forces to renew hostilities against North Korea. Thus two U.S. divisions (about sixty thousand men) and KMAC continued to advise, train and otherwise control the ROK military. More importantly, control was achieved by keeping a tight rein on the amount of gasoline and ammunition supplied to south Korea. With U.S. "advisers" spread through every level of the ROK military structure, determining everything from oil and ammunition levels to the annual size of the military budget, and each U.S. service branch in direct daily liaison with its ROK counterpart, Americans directly shaped the ideology, training methods and organizational structures of the ROK military.

Having embarked on a policy of furthering the full-scale militarization of South Korean society, the United States could hardly ignore the economic and legal contradictions that such a policy entailed. Without an economic "defense support program" through which to channel massive amounts of U.S. assistance, the U.S.-ROK military control structure would be unviable. Without scuttling the key political-military provisions of the armistice agreement, it would be difficult to turn South Korea into a permanent anticommunist military base and achieve regional integration with Japan. Yet industries constructed primarily to meet the needs of America's Korean policy could hardly be expected to contribute to the sustained, balanced development of the ROK economy. Likewise, an arms build-up in violation of the armistice would not only threaten North Korea's very survival and leave the entire peninsula in a permanent state of crisis, it would also eventually undermine Rhee's civilian dictatorship. All of these contradictions became acute during the second period of U.S.-Korean relations.

The second period began on June 21, 1957, when the U.S. formally abrogated sub-paragraph 13d, article two of the armistice, and ended with Rhee's overthrow on April 26, 1960. Sub-paragraph 13d prohibited the further build-up of war materials by both sides and directed Inspection Teams of a "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission" to supervise the military status quo at ten ports of entry, five in the north and five in the south. Directly after the abrogation of sub-paragraph 13d, the United States brought its latest model jet fighters and atomic weapons into South Korea, just as it had done in Taiwan after the May 7, 1957 agreement with the KMT for the placing of Matador tactical missiles. By early 1958 the United States had "Honest John" missiles, atomic artillery and a "Pentomic Division" in South Korea and had acquired additional leases for the construction of Nike missile bases on Okinawa. While China was proceeding with the withdrawal of its last "volunteers" from North Korea (completed in October 1958), a new stage of U.S. involvement in ROK internal affairs was about to begin.

On July 1, 1957, the Pentagon abolished its Far East Army Headquarters in Tokyo and moved its UN Command Headquarters from Tokyo to Seoul, where it continued to double as the U.S. Eighth Army Command. Simultaneously, the Defense Department established a new Pacific Command in Hawaii. Paralleling these Pentagon organizational changes, Washington pressed Japan to speed up its preparations for assuming a more active role in South Korea and Southeast Asia. Between 1956 and 1957 the U.S. military garrison in Japan was reduced from 117,000 to 77,000 personnel in the first of several large-scale personnel reductions. On June 14, 1957, the Kishi Nobusuke regime, which had come into office four months before, announced the start of Japan's first long-range Defense Build-Up Plan, programmed at $57.2 billion yen and supplemented by U.S. Military Security Assistance Aid in the amount of $34.2 billion yen.

Behind the renewal of the arms race in the Korean peninsula, the turning of South Korea and Taiwan into bases for waging atomic warfare and the start of Japan's first long-range military build-up lay the Soviet Union's success in launching the world's first unmanned satellite and its ICBM tests, which deprived the U.S. mainland of its vaunted nuclear sanctuary status. In the late 1950s the two superpowers entered a period of nuclear stalemate, their nuclear strategies showing the first signs of convergence. The psychological and strategic underside of this trend was the tendency for the U.S. to step up its own counter-revolutionary activities in the smaller nations of the Third World, particularly in Southeast Asia.

In short, changes in the nuclear balance of terror between the two superpowers had ushered in an era of nuclear stalemate and thus diminished the nuclear strategic significance of America's perimeter bases ringing the Soviet Union and China, but not their conventional military significance. The new era of the 1960s would be one of preparing for "limited war"—a fact reflected symbolically in 1957 with the publication of Henry Kissinger's book on the theory of limited war and concretely in 1959 with the start of joint tactical exercises (involving the use of nuclear weapons) between U.S. Pacific forces and the client military establishments in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam. Instead of leading to an abandonment of perimeter bases, nuclear stalemate led the United States to upgrade the value of its forward bases and client armies in South Korea, Japan and South Vietnam. Overseas bases were now wanted primarily for control of the empire itself, while having client armies and client states to protect had become an end in itself.

The external factors that set the stage for Rhee's overthrow now fall into place. The emergence of the limited
war concept and the upgrading of overseas perimeter bases and client armies created an environment in which the United States became at once more aware of the need to strengthen South Korea's military elite, more dissatisfied than ever with Rhee's refusal to normalize relations with Japan (on Japan's terms), and more cost-conscious about the implementation of its ROK aid program. The fact that Washington's balance of payments problem became chronic from 1958 onward was an important incentive behind its desire to subordinate South Korea to Japan. Equally important was Japan's desire for overseas economic expansion. In April 1959 the United States opened formal talks with the Kishi regime for revision of the 1951 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. With Kishi actively cooperating in laying the foundations for a trans-Pacific military-industrial complex, and U.S. "non-grant" military assistance to Japan on the rise, particularly after 1959, Washington anticipated a new era of increased Japanese military and economic participation in propping up South Korea. . . if only Rhee could be removed.

On March 15, 1960, in the twelfth year of his misrule, Rhee staged another fraudulent election. Running unopposed, he accumulated 92 percent of the vote with the remainder of the ballots termed "invalid." When spontaneous mass demonstrations against election irregularities broke out on election day in the industrial port city of Masan, Rhee's police broke them up with tear-gas and gunfire, killing at least fourteen people and injuring perhaps one-hundred. Three weeks later, sympathy demonstrations led by university students demanding new elections and the resignation of Rhee's hated vice-president, though not Rhee himself, began to spread to every major city in South Korea. Finally, on April 19 Rhee was forced to mobilize the army and declare martial law. But the soldiers called out to suppress the demonstrators remained neutral; the protests continued.

This situation was ideal for the United States, which could simultaneously dump old Rhee, appear as the defender of "ROK democracy," and yet insure that the only internal change would be one in court personalities. On "Bloody Tuesday," April 19, Rhee's police killed 125 demonstrators and wounded over 500. On April 21 U.S. Ambassador McConaughy issued an aide-memoire which "included a list of actions 'the government of Korea might well consider taking'" with a view to breaking down Rhee's system of political control. The United States was intervening in this fashion, the note said, "as the principal sponsor of the Republic of Korea," because it was concerned that "the present situation, if not corrected, could easily provide fertile ground for Communist manipulation." On April 22 Secretary of State Herter declared publicly that "Rhee had employed means unsuited to a free democracy," thereby encouraging the students to increase their demands "to include the dictator's own resignation." On April 26, Rhee's bronze statue was toppled from its pedestal in Pagoda Park while he, in the presence of Ambassador Walter F. McConaughy and U.S. General Carter B. Magruder, the "UN" military commander, announced his decision to resign.

Rhee's removal ushered in a brief interregnum of relative freedom in South Korean life during which many Koreans began to sense that the root cause of their misery was the domination of their country by America. When signs of a many-sided struggle against the status quo finally crystallized during April-May 1961 around the long-taboo themes of peaceful national unification and anti-Americanism, there occurred the coup d'état of May 16 that prevented South Korea from being lost to U.S. imperialism.

The third period of America's Korean policy began with the establishment of Park Chung Hee's military dictatorship and can be called the period of ROK performance. Ruling class power was now concentrated in the hands of a usurpatory segment of the military, the most Americanized institution in South Korean society, which was headed now by Park Chung Hee, formerly Lieutenant Okamoto Minoru of the Imperial Japanese Army.

Initially, Park had two tasks to perform for his new commander in chief, President Kennedy. First, to make the ROK politically safe again so that ROK armed forces could continue to serve U.S. interests, thereby realizing their own raison d'être. Success came easy, Park replaced Rhee's ad hoc system of thought controls with an all-pervasive, thoroughly rationalized one, reaching down to every level of social organization. He began his reign with a ban on all political activities, until the junta which he headed could complete its own political apparatus, a new "Anti-Communist Law" and, in June 1961, a new Central Intelligence Agency (ROK's CIA) with reported ties to its U.S. prototype. By the early 1970s this CIA, under Park's loyal assistant, Lee Hu Rak, controlled the nation's press, weekly magazines, radio, television, popular records, public billboards and even advertisements in local theaters and tea houses. Under U.S. tutelage South Korea had become a nearly absolute totalitarian dictatorship.

Park's second task was to stabilize South Korea economically. He achieved this by (1) dispatching ROK troops and civilian workers to fight for the United States in Vietnam, thereby earning, among other things, "special procurements" and various "remittances:" (2) inducting large amounts of foreign loan capital; (3) exporting South Korean coal miners and nurses by contract to West Germany; and (4) normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan, thereby securing Japanese "economic cooperation" as a constituent element of ROK economic planning.

A new phenomenon in the typography of nation states would make its appearance on the world stage during the late 1960s, Venalia of the mercenary state. But the conditions for its emergence were all in place by 1965. After fourteen years of pressuring Japan and South Korea to resolve their differences, the United States—in a final application of muscle necessitated by its deteriorating position in South Vietnam—had effectively fused the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty with the October 1953 U.S.-ROK military alliance, thus laying the legal foundations for shifting the burden of empire in Northeast Asia to Japan. His flanks protected by the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty, Park tied South Korea's fate to the "limited war" in Southeast Asia and, simultaneously, opened South Korea wide to domination by U.S. and Japanese capital. The U.S.-Japan dependency relationship, axis of America's Asian strategy since the late 1940s, could be regionalized thereafter in the most concrete way. It could be used to foster a hierarchic pattern of integrated military-economic relations between the two industrially advanced partners, who were cooperating in counter-revolution, on the one side, and industrially backward, relatively impoverished South Korea, whose armed forces served the common interests of both in Vietnam, on the other. In this pattern, which was conceived in the late 1940s but
emerged clearly only after 1965, the South Korean people were on the bottom, their interests constantly sacrificed to American-Japanese objectives; the Japanese, while remaining in a definite dependency relationship vis-a-vis the United States, played the role of "junior partners," able to act autonomously in their economic relations with the ROK and gradually relieving the United States of its military "burdens" there as well.

But to better understand the content of the regional integration that is being fostered today in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to turn to the Japanese dimension.

6. Division of Labor II: Japan's Policies Toward South Korea

Japan's objectives in South Korea after 1953 were diplomatic, military and economic. The major thrust of Japanese diplomacy throughout the early 1950s was on joining the international organizations of the U.S. bloc; normalizing relations with the former subject peoples of Asia, particularly the Koreans, was a low priority item. The World Bank, then shifting its attention from repressing communism in Western Europe to preserving as much of the Third World as possible for the system of private capitalism, accorded Japan formal membership in August 1952. COCOM (the Coordinating Committee), an organization of the major capitalist trading nations, established under U.S. leadership in 1950 to wage economic warfare against communist bloc countries, made Japan a member in September 1952. Membership in COCOM's China Committee (CHICOM) came that same month, though Japan had been forced to subscribe to an embargo on trade with communist China ever since the start of the Korean War. Full-scale compliance with the CHICOM embargo on trade with China was, reportedly, enforced after April 18, 1952 (the day Japan regained its formal independence) by means of the secret "Takeuchi-Linden Agreement." The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) reluctantly granted Japan associate membership status in October 1953 and "full membership," though under restricted conditions, in September 1955. Finally, in 1956, Japan became a member of the United Nations, the most nearly universal of international organizations forged by the United States to manage the post-World War II world in its own interests. Thus, in terms of achieving its major objective—reintegration in the U.S.-dominated world system—Japanese diplomacy was both successful and rapid.

Against this record of rapid successes in inter-imperialist diplomatic relations stands Tokyo's record of vaccination and slowness in normalizing relations with the Koreans. The basic Japanese policy toward divided Korea has always been one of favoring the south and discriminating against the north. But for a long time the Japanese government was content simply with the de jure recognition which it had granted the ROK by signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and subscribing to the December 12, 1948 UN General Assembly resolution on the independence and legitimacy of the ROK. In 1956, after becoming a UN member, the Japanese government began to uphold the UN resolution on Korea which legitimized continued U.S. occupation of the South and violated the UN Charter's own principles of national self-determination and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

Almost a decade later, on June 22, 1965, the government of Sato Eisaku signed a basic treaty normalizing diplomatic relations with the ROK. Immediately thereafter, commencing with the 1966 UN General Assembly, the Sato government became a joint sponsor, along with the United States, of the annual Korean resolution. Meanwhile, in the ten-year interval between joining the UN and becoming an annual sponsor of pro-ROK resolutions on the Korean question, Japan's military and economic interests in South Korea gradually deepened.

Militarily, as noted earlier, Japan continued to give logistics support to U.S. forces in South Korea long after the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement. However, beginning in 1960, with the renewal of the U.S.-Japan military alliance, Japan's involvement in the U.S.-ROK defense set-up gradually deepened. One way to understand this growing involvement is to contrast the military provisions and overall function of the original San Francisco treaties with that of the revised Security Treaty of 1960.

The 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan gave the United States a legal foundation for continued military rule over Okinawa (article 3) and allowed it to proceed with the forcible expropriation of Okinawan land for military use. At that time B-29s were taking off regularly from Okinawa's Kadena air base to bomb targets in the Korean peninsula. The U.S. precondition for the peace treaty was the first Security Treaty; it granted U.S.-UN forces in Japan and Korea unlimited use of Japanese military bases and helped rationalize the system for channeling Japanese resources into the conduct of the Korean War. Continued U.S. military aid, integrally linked to the first Security Treaty in the form of direct aid grants and "educational orders," helped modernize Japanese industry and fostered the development of the Self Defense Forces. By 1958 Japan had advanced economically, militarily and politically to the point where it required a more formally equitable relationship with the United States. The new Mutual Security Treaty and accompanying Kishi-Herter notes of January 19, 1960, reflected these facts as well as the awareness of ruling circles in both countries of the need to assuage a Japanese public opinion increasingly divided over the treaties' renewal. The new Security Treaty, consequently, deleted the more objectionable features of the first, shifted the burden of suppressing domestic disturbances to the Self Defense Forces and stipulated that henceforth "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of U.S. armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of [Japanese] facilities and areas ... as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan ... shall be the subjects of prior consultations with the Government of Japan." 83

However the treaty's real significance did not lie in such equalizing features, which were contrived, in any case, solely to assuage Japanese public opinion, but in its underlying premise, designed to support American policy aims under the new conditions of the 1960s. Whereas before the United States assumed complete responsibility for Japan's "defense," henceforth, as stipulated innocuously in article 3, Japan itself assumed that responsibility. The 1960 treaty appeased both the Japanese government's desire for a larger measure of military power and the American desire for a joint strategic system in which Japan's Self Defense Forces would, at long last, act as a dependent, subordinate unit within the newly reorganized Pacific Command structure.

Such a strengthened security system was needed,
according to article 5, in order “to meet the common danger” of “an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan,” though, of course, there was no existing military threat to Japan then, just as there is none today. But as the Kennedy regime began to expand its air base and missile facilities on Okinawa—the key island base situated in the center of America’s Asian military coalition: approximately 800 miles from Tokyo; 750 from Seoul, 725 from Manila, 310 from Taipei and 1,300 from Saigon—and as it began to implement the policy of “special war” in South Vietnam, the real meaning of the revised treaty became clear. Just as the original treaty had been a device to insure continued Japanese support for the Korean War, so the revised treaty became a devise for insuring Japan’s official support in the waging of war against the peoples of Indochina.

During the late 1950s a “U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group” (MAAG-J), established in March 1954 with headquarters within the Self Defense headquarters at Ichigaya, Tokyo, had helped concretize the U.S.-Japan military alliance. The revised treaty now supplemented it with a “U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee on Security” whose function it was to provide an exchange of intelligence at a higher level and to foster joint analysis of the military situation in East Asia. It was in this committee that Washington renewed its pressure on Japan to begin coordinating defense planning with South Korea. On February 1, 1963, at the urging of the Pentagon, the Defense Agency began its first full-scale study of Japan’s military role in a military revolt within the South Korean army, such as the one that had brought Park to power, escalated into a renewed Korean war. Given the code name “Three Arrows Study” (Mitsuya kenkyū) and designated top secret, the study was brought to light by a socialist member of the Diet in 1965. It revealed for the first time the interlock between the Self Defense Forces, the revised security treaty and the Korean situation: it also showed that neither the Pentagon nor the Defense Agency had complete confidence in the ROK military. The “Three Arrows Study” provides a convenient benchmark for gauging Japan’s growing military-operational responsibilities for the defense of South Korea. In late June 1963, when the study was completed, Tokyo assumed that in the event of renewed Korean hostilities, the role of the Self Defense Forces would be supplementary in nature, limited, at most, to joint or combined operations with U.S. forces; today it anticipates playing the main role. In 1964 U.S. pressure on both Seoul and Tokyo increased in proportion to the worsening of U.S. position in South Vietnam. Three Arrows was thus followed by the Japan-South Korea normalization treaty of 1965, which, though it contained no military provisions, was viewed by top policy planners in both Washington and Seoul as laying the foundation for further Japanese—ROK military collaboration. It is not without interest to note that prior to the conclusion of that treaty, the Cabinet Investigation Office (the Japanese equivalent of the U.S. CIA) expressed the following view of South Korea in the September 1964 issue of Research Report, a government publication.

Japan is an indispensable base for the defense of South Korea. Conversely, South Korea controls the entrance to the Japan Sea and is extremely important for the security of Japan. Viewed historically, not allowing South Korea to fall to hostile forces had become the number one goal of Japanese foreign policy. Since Meiji two [legitimate] wars were fought—the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars—in order to prevent South Korea from falling under control of hostile forces.

A short time later, as the Japan-ROK talks entered their final negotiating stage, Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy stated in a press interview in Seoul on October 3, 1964, that “in the event the ROK is attacked by the communist side, both the American and Korean governments of course, and Japan too, within the limits permitted by its constitution, will assist South Korea to repel the communist armies.” On March 28, 1965, five months before Park forced ratification of the normalization treaty through South Korea’s National Assembly, the ROK defense minister, Kim Song-un, while enroute to Saigon, stated to newsmen at Tokyo’s Haneda airport that “If agreement is reached in the Japan-Korea talks, it will naturally give rise to cooperative relations between the ROK military and Japan’s Self Defense Force.” Four years later, on November 21, 1969, came the Nixon-Sato Joint Communique which stipulated that the defense of South Korea was “essential” to Japan’s own security. Thereafter it remained for Washington to implement the actual transference of the main military supervisory duties for South Korea from the Pentagon to the Defense Agency.

In 1970 the Pentagon announced plans for that year to reduce the U.S. garrison in South Korea from 64,000 to 50,000, and to give the Park dictatorship approximately $1.5 billion in military aid over the period 1971 to 1975. Meanwhile Park Chung Hee had been busy in South Korea. In April 1968, he established a 2.3-million-man “Homeland Reserve Force.” On July 5, 1968, he inaugurated his first “Three Year Plan for Completion of War Preparations” and “First Defense Industry Consolidation Plan,” while accelerating the training of his essentially mercenary forces. Between January 1967 and December 1969 a total of 107 joint and combined training exercises were conducted between U.S. and ROK forces, with peripheral Self Defense Force participation. In the spring of 1971 the United States, Japan and the ROK conducted “Operation Freedom Vault,” a nine-day-long combined war exercise involving U.S.-ROK airborne units and utilizing Okinawa and Japanese homeland bases.

As the ROK moved for the first time toward self-sufficiency in the production and repair of conventional weapons—military vehicles, tanks and ammunition—as it acquired up-to-date weapons from America’s Vietnam arsenals, as it readied itself, in short, to independently aid other anticommunist regimes in Asia, so, in turn, the Japanese Defense Agency increased its preparations for assuming the main military role in supporting South Korea and also in protecting U.S. troops and bases on Okinawa after its reversion to Japan. In 1971, the year the Defense Agency hired 300 “civilian” ferry boats for exercises designed to transport tanks and troops to South Korea and dispatched a large military mission to Seoul, these preparations were just getting underway. But by the end of the decade, when Japan will be nearing completion of its Fifth Defense Build-Up program, the Self Defense Forces will have been transformed from a dependent unit within the American alliance system into an independent one able to assume primary responsibility for
backing up South Korea and defending U.S. bases on Okinawa. And the dictatorship in Seoul will have advanced its military preparations to the point where it can conduct limited military interventions of its own in so called post-Vietnam Asia; either in support of U.S.-Japanese monopoly capital, as it has been set up to do, or even to protect Japan's economic interests against America's, as U.S.-Japanese economic competition may someday give it the encouragement to do.

The very existence of such options suggests at once the inherent instability and the contradictions of regional integration. Japanese big business, beginning in the late 1960s, advanced rapidly into Southeast Asia (Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines) and East Asia (Taiwan and South Korea).

In Korea, the purpose was to secure the Demilitarized Zone as Japan's front line of defense. It also was anxious to realize high profits from exploiting Korea's cheap wage labor—the same reason that prompted Yankee merchants to step up their capital investments throughout Pacific Asia at the same time. For Japan the turning point was, of course, the 1965 treaty and claims settlement. Before that time the United States had been responsible for thwarting balanced industrialization in South Korea by policies which were extremely effective in nurturing the premature development of monopolies in the ROK export sector, widening the market for U.S. surplus manufactures and relieving America's subsidized farmers of their surplus agricultural products...by making Korean peasants subsidize them. Now Japan entered the act.

The 1965 treaty settled the long-outstanding reparations issue between the two countries. Japan agreed to give Seoul $200 million in public loans, $300 million in free grants and at least $300 million in commercial credits over a ten-year period beginning in 1966. Though the reparations were called "economic cooperation" or the "congratulatory fund for independence" by the Japanese negotiators and "reparations" by the Koreans, it was a good deal for both sides. For Japan the $300 million in grants included trading debts that Seoul had accumulated since 1948; the funds were put into a special account that could be utilized only with prior Japanese government approval; and Japanese goods and services destined for Korea under the terms of the agreements had to be carried by Japanese ships and insured by Japanese firms. 93

For the monopolists of the Korean Businessmen's Association who had been lobbying for a Japan treaty since 1961, the economic opening to Japan was a godsend, while for the Park regime it may have seemed a step toward a future political alliance, as well as a necessary defensive measure in case its participation in the Indochina War led to renewed hostilities with North Korea.

After 1965 the Japanese government established a committee system to coordinate state political interests and private economic interests in dealing with Seoul. It consisted, initially, of an annual Japan-ROK Ministerial Conference and a Japan-ROK Economic Committee; later, in January 1969, a Japan-ROK Cooperative Committee under the chairmanship of former prime minister Kishi Nobusuke was added. Naturally, Japanese capitalists regarded this three-tiered structure as a guarantee by their political representatives of their future "private" investments in South Korea. At the first Ministerial Conference (August 1967), the Sato government agreed to furnish Seoul with $200 million in private loans; at the second Ministerial Conference (August 1968) it agreed to supply $90 million in private loans; at the third Ministerial Conference (August 1969) it agreed to cooperate in building the Pohang Integrated Steel Works and to furnish a $5 million private loan; at the fourth Ministerial Conference (July 1970) Tokyo agreed to provide loans totaling $160 million to help finance the construction of four heavy industry plants and the development of small industries, agriculture and export industries.

Meanwhile, direct Japanese investment in South Korea had increased from only $1.2 million in 1965 to $27.1 million in 1969, while South Korea's trade gap with Japan during the same period climbed from 3.8:1 to 6.7:1. 97 By March 1970 Japanese companies had acquired control of about 90 percent of South Korea's fertilizer industry, 64 percent of its chemical fiber industry, 62 percent of foodstuffs, 48 percent of glassmaking and cement and 43.5 percent of its chemical industry. In the field of joint ventures with South Korean companies, Japanese capital controlled less than half the stock in 19 percent of all tie ups, half the stock in 33 percent of all tie ups, over 50 percent but less than 100 percent of the stock in 22 percent of all tie ups, and 100 percent of the stock in 26 percent of the tie ups. 98 While tied to the United States militarily and still dominated by American capital, South Korea had also clearly reentered the Japanese economic sphere.

The confluence of U.S. and more recently Japanese economic interests may be seen in the field of agriculture. U.S. agricultural imports to South Korea began as early as 1945, but surplus agricultural products under Public Law 480 and the "counterpart funds" formula were not added to the Korean aid program until 1955. Thereafter surplus wheat, raw cotton, barley, canned pork, tobacco leaf, etc., poured into the south to the amount of $202,648,000 by 1961. However, 80-90 percent of the counterpart funds which the United States transferred to the Rhee government from the sale of such commodities was spent non-productively as military expenditure, while the remainder may have ended up in the coffers of Rhee's Liberal Party. Since the United States controlled the amount transferred, the timing and the application of the counterpart funds, the whole program worked to strengthen American leverage over ROK financial operations.

During the 1960s U.S. surplus agricultural products, mostly wheat, cotton and rice, continued to pour into South Korea, as indicated by the following figures: 100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>$19,913,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>$44,926,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>$67,308,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>$96,787,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>$60,985,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>$59,337,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>$37,951,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>$44,378,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>$55,927,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>$74,830,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This American agricultural dumping helped widen the gap between agriculture and the rest of the ROK economy, with the share of the former in GNP falling from 38.7 percent in 1965 to 28.1 percent in 1969. 101 At the same time it helped sustain the ROK's enormously inflated military structure,
forced farmers off the land and into the cities, where they become members of a reserve army of unemployed, and enabled ROK capitalists to feed the urban work force and still maintain low wages.

By the late sixties Japan had entered the ROK grain market and in 1970 more than half of Japan's rice exports went to South Korea. Yet in the competition with America, Japan apparently fared second best. As one American correspondent explained, "... Japanese officials suspect that diplomatic pressure was applied to the South Korean Government (in 1970) to buy more American, less Japanese, surplus rice. Japan sells rice on the same easy credit terms, but has less political muscle to make deals than the United States."102

Given these facts of American and Japanese agricultural policies in South Korea, it is unfortunate though not surprising to learn that in 1972, in order to reduce its dependence on imported rice and conserve South Korea's own rice crop for earning foreign exchange via export, the Park dictatorship began enforcing a ban on eating rice on Wednesdays and Saturdays in both homes and restaurants. On those days South Koreans were ordered to eat bread instead.103

Behind the enormous influx of Japanese direct investments in South Korea lay the attraction of cheap Korean wage labor made available to foreign investors under ideal conditions of exploitation. In 1970, for example, the average monthly wage of Korean workers in manufacturing was only 13,950 yen or one-sixth the 86,540 yen monthly wage of Japanese manufacturing workers.104 The Park regime denied Korean workers employed in foreign-owned enterprises the right to strike and created "free export zones" in the interior and along the coast (i.e., inland and coastal "treaty ports") where 100 percent foreign-owned factories, employing strikeless Korean labor, could export their products free of tax.

Against this background, and after five years of open dealing with a dictatorship anxious to facilitate the influx of foreign capital, a leading Japanese capitalist made one of the most significant disclosures of the thinking of the Japanese business world on the future of ROK-Japan economic relations. In April 1970, Yatsugi Kazuo, a longtime friend of dictators Park Chung Hee and Chiang Kai-shek, and a participant in Japan's "Korea lobby," prepared a report for the second general meeting of the Japan-ROK Cooperation Committee. The "Yatsugi Report" or the "Draft Plan for Japan-Korea Long-Term Economic Cooperation" called, in effect, for a concentration of effort in two key areas.105 In one area South Korea was urged to expand its "export free zones" and "bonded land areas" and "take more efficient charge of processing Japanese manufactured goods" in middle and small industries. Eventually, as Japan-ROK economic cooperation progressed, a "model case of an Asian EEC" would come into being. The first step would involve linking South Korea's Namhae coastal industrial region south of Pohang, with Japanese firms are constructing a Korean steel industry, with Japan's Chugoku industrial region, specifically: Tottori and Yamaguchi prefectures in southern Honshu and a portion of Oita and Fukuoka prefectures in eastern and northern Kyushu respectively. A striking feature of this plan for an East Asian EEC is the dominant role implicitly envisioned in it for Japanese industrial groups who have their headquarters in Osaka and Nagoya. Historically, ex-samurai businessmen and politicians from southwestern Japan took the lead in advancing Japan's interests in Korea. The same is true today: the original "Korea lobby" which formed during the period of the Kishi regime centered on conservative politicians in alliance with Kansai capitalists;106 in 1970 Kansai industrial groups again took the initiative in trying to rationalize the economic gains Japan made in Korea since 1965.

The other area where the Yatsugi Report sought ROK cooperation was in developing so called "specialization and cooperative industry" (bungyō to kyōgyō). This involved transferring to the ROK's new "treaty ports" the labor-intensive and processing sectors of such main Japanese industries as steel, aluminum, oil and zinc refining, chemicals, plastics, electronics and even shipbuilding. In other words, if South Korea "cooperated" in solving the contradictions of Japan's economic development by furnishing greater amounts of land and cheap labor (for Japanese industries which were finding it difficult to expand within Japan from the viewpoint of land utilization and environmental pollution), the ROK industry would receive, in return, the benefits of Japanese capital and advanced technology. With Japan supplying the imported parts, raw materials, capital and technology and South Korea the labor and territorial space for processing it all for re-export, a "vertical international division of labor" would be realized and the Japan-ROK trade imbalance rectified, eventually.

And so to the South Korean question—how does a basically rural, underdeveloped country which is functioning in the international arena as a mercenary state, but is committed to the goal of a high GNP, relate to its economically advanced neighbor—the Yatsugi Report and, by extension, the Japanese business world, replied: by again becoming its economic colony and its source of proletarian wage labor.

7. Conclusion: Recent Developments

Diplomatic events of the past few years have tended to underline the historical rather than the structural nature of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alignment. Can the ending of overt American aggression in Vietnam, the return of ROK mercenaries to South Korea, and new diplomatic configurations in Asia dissolve overnight an interconnected military-economic-political formation that has been twenty years in the making? The evidence presented here certainly does not support a positive answer to that question, yet it would be foolish to ignore the new dimension that has been added to Japan-ROK regional integration by the current restructuring of international relations in East Asia.

That restructuring began in 1971 and was revealed to the world during the U.S. election year 1972, when Nixon made two precedent-shattering trips to Peking and Moscow in connection with his plans for extricating the United States from direct involvement in the Vietnam War. Russia and China began tacitly to cooperate with the United States in dampening down revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia and exploring possible areas of future cooperation with the United States. In so doing they raised the specter of a united front of giant continental powers seeking to govern the world jointly in their own interests while still maintaining a certain level of confrontation and competition, if only to satisfy their respective domestic needs. It was in this context that Japan's
newly-installed prime minister, Tanaka Kakuei, responding to Peking’s initiative, quickly normalized diplomatic relations with China, its geographically natural trading partner, and dumped Taiwan, its erstwhile ally ever since the Korean War. The change in Sino-American relations from confrontation to rapprochement, the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, and the Japanese withdrawal of formal diplomatic recognition from Taiwan represented one side of the restructuring process. The other was the apparent easing of tension in South Korea’s diplomatic relations with various communist countries and, most importantly, the start of talks with North Korea on the problems of north-south reunification. It is difficult to believe that a regime which is committed, of necessity, to reliance on U.S. and Japanese military and economic assistance and takes anticomunism as its only raison d’être can strive seriously for national unification—the basic goal of every nationalism. Yet it may well be that the current talks between Seoul and Pyongyang are genuine and will lead, eventually, to procedures and a time-table for national reunification. Or it may be that Pyongyang intends at this stage to use the unification issue to speed the departure of the U.S.-UNI presence in South Korea, weaken the loathsome Park dictatorship, and lighten the oppression of the Koreans in the south. There is also the possibility that the ongoing conversations between Seoul and Pyongyang, together with the recent signs of a quasi-rapprochement between Japan and North Korea,107 will serve merely to stabilize rather than undermine regional integration.

One can, of course, never predict the future; but this much is certain: the United States shows no signs of reassessing its role in Korea, although American policies since 1945 are more responsible for creating and perpetuating the Korean tragedy than any other single factor. Moreover, the start of north-south talks has coincided with more repression in the south: the imposition of martial law, outlawing of all opposition parties, dissolution of the National Assembly, rewriting of Park’s own constitution in such a way as to strip the people of their few remaining civil liberties while granting him permanent dictatorial powers, and even the harassment, intimidation, and, in certain cases, kidnapping of Korean dissidents living abroad. The Park regime, fearful of a violent upheaval which may yet overthrow it, has tightened its military and CIA control over every aspect of life and thought in the south108—to the point where it is now as isolated politically at home as it once was abroad. Unification of the Korean people will surely be achieved someday, but probably not before this client regime goes the way of its predecessor.

NOTES


4. I am indebted to Frank Baldwin for this information from his Ph.D. thesis.


10. Sawyer, 41-45.


15. Kim Hui-il, 121.


20. Dunn, 77.


27. Rimu Bon, 1, 26.


29. Schnabel, 54.

30. Schnabel, 55.


33. Field, 55.

34. Schnabel, 59.


36. The key provisions of the SCAP memorandum to the Japanese government establishing the counterpart fund (SCAPIN 1988 of April 1, 1949) read as follows:

1. The Japanese Government will establish as of 1 April 1949 a special account in the Bank of Japan in the name of the Japanese Government to be designated the U.S. Aid Counterpart Fund for
Japanese Stabilization (hereafter called the Fund) and will make deposits in Japanese Yen in this account in amounts commensurate with the dollar cost to the Government of the United States of American Aid (including any cost of processing, storing, transporting or other services incident thereto) furnished Japan by the United States.

2. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will from time to time notify the Japanese Government of the dollar cost of the United States Aid and the Japanese Government will thereupon deposit in the Fund a commensurate amount of yen computed at a rate of exchange which will be indicated to the Japanese Government by the Supreme Commander.

3. The Japanese Government will be permitted to draw from the Fund only such amounts and only for such purposes as may be approved by the Supreme Commander.

4. The Japanese Government will be required to submit to the Supreme Commander separate and specific proposals for any desired use of the Fund.

In preparing these proposals the Japanese Government will take into account the imperative need for promoting and maintaining internal monetary and financial stability, for stimulating exports and for carrying out the other objectives set forth in the letter of 19 December 1948 from the Supreme Commander to the Prime Minister.

5. . . . proposals by the Japanese Government to advance Counterpart Funds for private and public investment programs will be considered in the light of achievement by the proposed recipients of specific programs of rationalization and economic stabilization.

38. Takahashi Ryozo, "Běi seisan keikaku no zenbā" [The Entire Picture of the Defense Production Plan] in Chōō Kōron [Central Review] (April 1953), 77-78. Further research may show that these figures are excessively high.


41. Stone, 16.

42. See Jon Halliday, Three Articles on the Korean Revolution, p. 17. Stimulating essays calling for a rethinking of the meaning of the Korean War, brought together in a single pamphlet by the Association for Radical East Asian Studies, 6 Endsleigh Street, 3rd Floor, London WC1, United Kingdom.

43. Suzuki Masashi, 119; for a convenient chronology of events in Japan at this time see Tōyama Shigeki, ed., Shiōjī senso niji nen shi [Historical Materials on Twenty Years of Postwar History], Nenpyō [Chronology], Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1967), 226-227.


45. Rimu Bon, II, 32-33.


47. In 1952 at the height of the Korean War, the United States had unrestricted use of 1,212 "military installations" in Japan proper. These consisted of 579 military barracks, 54 housing complexes, 69 air bases, 37 port facilities, 83 practice ranges, 42 factories, 140 warehouses, 26 medical facilities, 129 communications facilities and 53 "other facilities." In addition, the U.S. military command barred Japanese fishermen from hundreds of miles of specially designated naval and air force gunnery target ranges in the rich fishing waters surrounding Japan. Source: Nihon shibōshihō kōsa: senso Nihon no seijī to keizai [Lecture Series on Japanese Capitalism: The Politics and Economy of Postwar Japan], Vol. 2, Kōwa kara MSA e [From the Peace to MSA] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1953), 157.0 A more up-to-date American study, however, mentions a figure of over 2,500 U.S. "military installations" in Japan in 1952. (Global Defense—U.S. Military Commitments Abroad. A Publication of Congressional Quarterly, Vice, September 1969, p. 34.)

48. The question of U.S. bases and troops in Japan during the Korean War deserves an independent study.


50. Protests by Yokosuka housewives soon stopped the Chamber of Commerce from disseminating the song.

I am indebted to Professor Edward Cranson of Harvard University for this translation.

Tamaran Bushi

1. Jypaan, Yokusuka wanda furu
Biya mo garu mo veinaisu
Cheri sätteru an oka ni
Saito kōmu o tsukurīta
Tamaran taman

2. Mukashi don to utsu iki no machi
Ima jy a nana iro niji no machi
Iki na banya no yūkikaeru
Tooku no deru yo ni kāsu no ame
Tamaran taman

3. Yama no u e kara umi mireba
Defu e irefune ko ni fune
Nami ni yurarete yurayura to
Washi mo noriyata ane fune ni
Tamaran taman


53. Nakahara Tone, "Tokuju no nenkan—tunaguru Nihon keizai" [Three Years of Special Procurements and their Connection with Japan's Economy], in Sekai, No. 90 (June 1953), 141-143.


58. New York Times (October 18, 1952), 12.

59. Although the cheapness of the ROK soldier is a constant Pentagon theme from at least 1953 onward, the quoted words are General Leenitzer's, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an exchange with Senator J. William Fulbright during the March 23, 1960 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the U.S. defense program in South Korea.

The Chairman: I am informed that we supply about 110 percent of the total defense costs of Korea. In other words, we supply more than the Korean Government does.

General Leenitzer: Well in the case of Korea . . . you have a special situation of a suspended war. The security of the Republic of Korea is being provided primarily by a rather large number of [ROK] divisions, 18 to be exact . . . I believe that the record will show beyond any doubt that we do get more soldiers along the Demilitarized Zone in Korea per dollar than we are able to get in any other way. . . . we get more return per dollar in defense of Korea and also in the defense of the United States in that part of the world than we do probably in other areas where greater emphasis is being placed on more modern and more expensive types of weapons and equipment.

The Chairman: You think that in spite of the fact that in Europe they themselves pay 92 percent of the cost and we only pay 8 percent, whereas in Korea we pay 110 percent; is that right?

General Leenitzer: In Korea we have . . . 18 divisions—18 full-strength divisions—along that 155 mile front, and I don't know of any area where we get a comparable turn militarywise for the equivalent amount of money.
understanding that the United States and South Korea would withdraw from the postarmistice political conference after ninety days if no substantial progress had been made by that time.

Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: Norton, 1972), 147. Fifteen pages earlier, however, Taylor stated that the ROK army had reached twenty divisions by 1953.


The military build-up in South Korea immediately following the Korean Armistice should be considered in the context of the Eisenhower regime's Indochina policy at the time of the Geneva Conference which ended the U.S.-supported French-Indochina War. What strikes one immediately, of course, is the coincidence between the expansion of the ROK military in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the start of direct U.S. military intervention in Indochina in violation of the Geneva Accords. Just as the Korean Armistice Agreement—a fragile document signed only by the military representatives of the Chinese and "UN" sides, with Rhee refusing to participate—was nevertheless a "legal" obstacle to U.S. plans for perpetuating Korea's partition and turning the south into a permanent anticommunist buffer state, so also the election and military demarcation provisions of the Geneva Accords were "legal" in obstacles to U.S. plans for reproducing a Korea-type partition in Vietnam. Yet in both cases America's leaders regarded their own foreign policy objectives as higher than any international agreements and quickly resorted to tactics of sabotage and reinterpretation to nullify both.


65. These were articles four and two (sub-paragraph 13d). The former called for "the convening of a political conference of a higher level of both sides...to settle through negotiation the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea [and] the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." It was the first item of the
Armistice Agreement that U.S. policy demanded be reinterpreted. When the Geneva Conference convened on April 26, 1954, ostensibly for the purpose of discussing Korea, the United States quickly demonstrated its disinterest in seeing genuine peace return to either Korea or Indochina. It refused permission for neutral nations to participate in the Korean talks as voting members; it insisted, contrary to fact, that the Soviet Union had been a belligerent and hence could not participate as a neutral; and it rejected the principle that all political conference decisions required mutual agreement by both sides to the armistice. In this way, by insisting that individual countries that disagreed with conference decisions need not be bound by them, Eisenhower and Dulles sought to give Syngman Rhee a veto over any Korean political conference. Lastly, the United States stubbornly insisted that Korean unification could occur only through peninsula-wide elections supervised by the UN—the same organization that legitimized the fraudulent elections of May 1948, that branded North Korea an aggressor without a hearing, that covered the U.S. war of aggression with its own mantle of internationalism and had even attempted to destroy the north.


66. On the U.S.-ROK side the first step in formally abrogating 13d came as early as December 25, 1954, when the United States curtailed operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at Seoul airport, Kunsan and Kangnung. The illegal ROK military build-up was by then underway and the United States had begun to improve its airbase facilities at such places as Masan and Taegu, and its naval facilities at Chinhae, Pusan and Pohang. Construction of the giant U.S. air base on Jeju Island, known today as the second Okinawa, began in 1955. And in May-June 1956 the U.S. command stopped the operations of the Inspection Teams entirely throughout South Korea. [Nippon Times (December 26, 1954), 1; Kim Hui-il, note 58 above, 357-358.]

Violations of the armistice agreement on the North Korean side during the same period, according to American officials, took the form of bringing in new model armaments and jet fighters. See U.S. News and World Report (July 5, 1957).


The placing of atomic weapons in South Korea was long hinted at by Dulles and finally conceded in Congressional testimony on February 3, 1958, by Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Wiley: What is the situation in Korea?

General Twining: About status quo. It is pretty quiet over there. We still have our same forces. We are, you know, putting atomic weapons in Korea.


68. Following the conclusion of the Korean War, U.S. troop strength in Japan decreased as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force (including Marines)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961 (Aug.)</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 (Feb.)</td>
<td>40,700</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>19,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


69. Fujii Haruo, 130. The yen-dollar exchange rate at the time was 160:1.

70. In Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, first published in June 1957, Kissinger argued against a cost-conscious approach to "national security policies," in other words for the "New Look" and for development of tactical forces for waging limited war. In 1958 his book received the Woodrow Wilson Award from the American Political Science Association.

Another early advocate of "limited war" was Townsend Hoopes. In a 1958 Foreign Affairs article Hoopes argued that overseas bases were needed in order to support the "fire brigades" that would soon be formed to wage "limited war" far from America's shores. In his view, the two essential requirements were:

... our possession of highly mobile, stringently practiced "fire brigades" capable of effective limited action with appropriate weapons, and ... the will to defend our interests and those of our friends through the application of military force for rational and restricted purposes. ... The situations most likely to confront us on the boundaries of Eurasia will call for modern ground forces supported by tactical air and naval forces and employing primarily what are called "conventional" weapons.

Only if we face up squarely to the problem of limited war, show a willingness to enter upon "joint" military planning with our non-European allies and declare ourselves ready to commit appropriate forces to local and limited defense actions are we likely to hold together our alliances in Asia and the Middle East. Conversely, only if we retain forward positions of advantage overseas will we be able to maintain a valid capability for military action on the boundaries of Eurasia and thus to hold a favorable local power balance in selected areas.


72. "Non-grant" assistance consisted of two types: one involving the purchase of a finished weapon at a fixed price, as in the case of the Sidewinder missile for the F-104J, the other type an arrangement whereby the United States would furnish Japan parts of a complex weapons system and then sell Japan the technical licensing rights to "home-produce" the remainder of the system. Total "non-grant" military assistance contracts jumped from 2.5 billion yen in 1958 to over 7 billion in 1959. Source: Shishido Fumitake, "Nihon no kokubō...)
ryoku—sono senryoku to keizaisai haiken" [Japan's National Defense Power—Its Fighting Power and Economic Background], a special research report in Chūō kōron (July 1960), 243.

73. According to Burchett, note 65 above, page 159, Rhee's only announced rival as president "died of an unknown disease in an American hospital one month before election day.


78. Moment, 25.

79. Matsumoto Hirokazu, 69.

80. For an interesting study of the World Bank see World Bank Report distributed by the International Information Centre, Grøndsegade 37, 1107, Copenhagen K, Denmark.


82. Fujishima Uda, "Namboku Chōsen tōitsu to gaihō seiryou" [North-South Korean Unification and Outside Forces], in Ajia [Asia] (October 1972), 53.


85. Fujii Haruo, 83-84. For the text of the "Three Arrows Study" and other important documents relating to the Self Defense Forces also see by the same author, Nihon no kokka kimitsu [Japan's State Secrets] (Tokyo: Gendai Hyōronsha, 1972).

86. Quoted in Fujiwara Haruo, 73.

87. Quoted in Fujiiwara Akira, "Ni-Kan-Bei no gunji talsel to Chōsen keizai no ranri to genjitsu" [The Theory of Neo-Colonialism] (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1969), 38, 64; Matsumoto Hirokazu, 175, 180; Kō Shun Seki, 396.


90. Nakagawa Nobuo, Kankoku no keizai kösō to sangyō batten [South Korea's Economic Structure and Industrial Development] (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1969), 38, 64; Matsumoto Hirokazu, 175, 180; Kō Shun Seki, 396.


94. Moment, 25.


96. On Japan's economic expansion in South Korea after 1965 see the chapter by Sakurai Hiroshi in Chōsen tōitsu e no taidō, cited in note 76 above.


106. Kwan Bong Kim, 88.

107. One of the more significant may have been the establishment in Tokyo on November 16, 1972, of a "League of Elected Officials to Promote Friendship Between Japan and North Korea." Among its members are Liberal Democratic Party dietmen and the governor of Tokyo, Minobe Ryōkichi.

108. Although North Korea reportedly reduced its defense spending for 1972 by almost half, from 30 to 17 percent, South Korean defense spending remained unchanged: in the ROK budget of 1973, defense expenditures will account for 28 percent of the total. Kiyoshi Takase, "Shakaishugi Chōsen keizai no ronri to genjitsu" [The Theory and Reality of the Socialist Economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea], in Ajia keizai [Asian Economy], Vol. 13, No. 8 (August 1972); Asahi Shim bun (December 3, 1972), 2.

***

"...invaluable resource book...

Viet-Nam: What Kind of Peace?
--depth analysis and complete documents of the 1973 PARIS AGREEMENT ON VIET-NAM.
--96 page handbook also includes:
- full text of 1973 Laos Agreement.

Order from: Indochina Resource Center
1322 18th St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
price: $1.80 (includes postage). Bulk rates available.

© BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
What Happened in Korea?

Rethinking Korean History 1945-1953

by Jon Halliday

The Pueblo incident was a stunning reminder of the hysteria and racism associated with the word Korea in the U.S. In spite of Vietnam and the great changes that have taken place within American society, the U.S. government and the military had little trouble in resuscitating the spectre of “brainwashing” and torture. The most diabolical cunning was attributed to the Koreans, who had legally captured the Pueblo and its crew. But as though at the touch of a switch, the American media and much of the nation again began to call for blood as they had done in the years 1950 to 1953. It would be a mistake to underestimate the success of America’s campaign of vilification against the Korean people and the Korean revolutionary movement. At times the phobia reaches absurd proportions.

In judging questions and historical sources about the Korean War it is appropriate to start with the only substantial critical work written by an American during the war: I. F. Stone’s The Hidden History of the Korean War. A trenchant analysis of the conventional/official explanation of the Korean War, it was originally published in 1952 and reissued in 1969. Stone’s book has many excellent qualities. It is, as Stone himself says, “a study in war propaganda, in how to read newspapers and official documents in wartime.” On this count alone, it is invaluable. In an utterly devastating way Stone manages to expose innumerable American lies about the war, particularly concerning the actions of Douglas MacArthur. He provides as well extremely pertinent and precise information about American manipulation of the U.N. and the confusions skillfully maintained about the status of the whole adventure. The material on how the Korean peace talks were stalled remains irreplaceable. And Stone was among the first to insist that America was waging a war of destruction against the Korean people.

It is good that Stone’s book has been reissued, but being rather apolitical it demands a rigorous reexamination. The America of 1973 is not the America of 1952. A few elements signal the distance; for example, the indiscriminate use of “satellite” to describe both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, or Stone’s eulogy of Truman: “Truman always seemed a good human being . . . and as honorable and decent a specimen of that excellent breed, the plain smalltown American, as one could find anywhere in the U.S.A.: not a man who would deliberately do any harm, but the victim of circumstances and forces stronger than himself.” But such elements are only the fallout from the ideology of liberalism.

As yet there is still no Marxist history of the Korean War. Reissued without revision or new material, Stone’s book begs to be set in the present context. Reading it now, one is struck with how the eulogy of Truman is the corollary and the obverse of the omission of any discussion of Kim Il Sung. Stone cannot be criticized for centering his study on America’s actions and lies, but even so the book is lopsided because the Koreans are “faceless.” In the war years even a liberal like Stone could not see whom America was fighting — and killing. But if you cannot see the Korean people, you cannot see their struggle and cannot understand why the U.S. attacked them.

Stone does not confront the following themes, which are integral to the hidden history of the war: the nature of the American seizure of south Korea in 1945 and the subsequent installation of the Rhee regime in Seoul; the history of the Korean communist movement; the political and social background to the escalation of the fighting in late June 1950; the politics of the liberation of the south in June-September 1950 and why the revolution failed to hold the south; the guerrilla struggle behind imperialist lines. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) appears almost solely as statistics. Kim Il Sung is mentioned only twice, on p. 224, and in a context from which he could be removed without altering the sense of the author’s argument.

The result is not unlike a history of the Vietnam War which does not talk about Ho Chi Minh or Vietnamese
political organizations. Even a history purely of American aggression should deal with the object of aggression. Some of Stone's omissions are presumably due to the grave lack of material available at the time he was writing. But it is doubly hard now to understand what happened unless one examines first the Korean people's struggle for independence.

Toward a Methodology for Studying The Korean War

Given the work to be done, I here suggest only some avenues which need exploration.

1. Counter-revolutionary 'liberation': Korea can be compared in some ways to, say, Italy or Greece in Europe.

2. U.S.-induced political re-organization in occupied areas: this involves both the re-organization (or reinforcement) of political forces (Christian Democrats in Italy, Nationalists in Korea and China) and the re-organization of territory and territorial boundaries (Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos).

2a. In conjunction with the point above, Russian complicity in America's division of Korea needs to be scrutinized.

3. The history of both the Communist and the Nationalist movements in Korea which were politically contiguous (as in China).

4. The establishment of the People's Republic of Korea in 1945.

5. The struggle in south Korea against the U.S.-Rhee regime; in particular the guerrilla struggle in 1948-50; plus a critique of the existing material on the 'origins,' 'causes,' etc. of the 1950-53 war.

6. The politics of the 1950-53 war. What was the nature of the brief liberation of the south, and why did the revolution not hold the south?

7. The 1950-53 war and America's enactment of its general plan for holding down East and Southeast Asia (Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indochina).

8. The effects of the Korean War on the forces of revolution in Asia: what lessons did China learn from combat with U.S. forces? What have been the effects on the Korean revolution?

9. Korea's place in the ongoing history of counter-revolution: what were the credentials of the key figures involved (Van Fleet from Greece, Dulles, Rusk, etc.)? What were the connections with Vietnam (French military invited up to Korea; Maxwell Taylor and others active in both Korea and Vietnam)? The Geneva Conference of 1954?

Reconstructing Korean History from 1945 to 1950: Memoirs and Other Sources

General Collins is only the latest of a string of American generals and politicians who have devoted books, or sizeable sections of books, to the Korean War. Others include Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgway, Mark Clark, Maxwell Taylor, C. Turner Joy, and William Dean — all the top land commanders except Van Fleet, plus one admiral, C. Turner Joy, who was chief negotiator at Panmunjom for a time. Among civilian politicians, both former President Harry S. Truman and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson have given lengthy accounts, and diplomats George Kennan and Robert Murphy rather briefer apergus. This mass of documentation, which was not available at the time Stone wrote his Hidden History, represents a goldmine of information. There is, of course, plenty of dross. But the lesson of Stone's book applies fully: a critical reading of official texts can turn up the raw material for thorough analysis. These texts are not in themselves enough to provide a total analysis, which can only be derived from wider reading and the opening of government archives. But they provide some invaluable insights, and they must be dealt with if the history of American aggression in Korea is to be set straight and made intelligible to those brought up on official mythology.

A necessary corollary to the study of imperialist sources is a close reading of socialist material on Korea. Not the least of American successes has been the triumphal disqualification of information from the DPRK. The proscription has been extended to material from China on the Korean War, and to left-wing writers such as Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington. It must be said that in certain very important ways the left has facilitated the task of mystification by failing to confront the key issue — the right of the Korean people to stage their own revolution throughout the entire country without outside interference. Instead, much of the left, both inside and outside Korea, accepted the narrow framework imposed by Western imperialism.

Since I have tried elsewhere to reconstruct in outline the key issues in Korean history between 1945 and 1950, I shall here limit myself to a rapid overview of these events, with reference to the value of the main material on these events, indicating in particular where the main lacunae lie, and where the sources are especially rich.

On the history of Korean communism, Suh's The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 is invaluable, though it must be read critically. Suh has also edited a very useful volume of the basic documents of the Korean Communist Movement. On the establishment of the People's Republic in 1945 there is nothing approaching an adequate study, although there are elements for a study in Cho's Korea in World Politics, with scraps of information in Burchett, Suh and others.

Almost all previously published American sources have some passages on the division of Korea; these vary from the incredible to the ignorant. Ridgway, for example, writes: "Its [Korea's] division at the 38th parallel was almost accidental, a mere military convenience, of such minor concern to military historians at the time that no one today can say for certain just who first suggested it." Gen. J. Lawton Collins, on the other hand, has a rather detailed account of how the 38th parallel was chosen. According to Collins, it was done by two American officers (one of whom was Dean Rusk, then a major) about midnight on August 10-11, 1945. Given only half an hour to draw a line, and with only a small-scale wall map of the whole of the Far East at hand, Bonesteel and Rusk seem to have settled for the first line they could find north of the capital, Seoul. Collins' account does not tally either with Truman's or with the fairly detailed version provided by John Gunther. Collins neither refers to other versions of the division of Korea nor references his own account. Russian sources on the division, as on the December 1945 Moscow Conference, are hopelessly defective. Korean material on the 1945 events, likewise, is weak.

The American occupation of Korea is fairly well documented. Much the most vivid and informative source is...
Mark Gayn's Japan Diary, 17 which has outstanding reportage on American repression, use of Japanese stooges in the police, the 1946 uprisings, and related events. Also of great value are the works of Reeve, Meade and Green. 18 Interestingly, General Ridgway, who presumably noted its effects during the Korean War, states without qualification that U.S. policy in 1945 was catastrophic. Like the other generals, Ridgway ignores America's assault on the government set up by the Koreans, the People's Republic. But he does acknowledge that confirming in office "the despised Japanese administrative officials [was] a major blunder." This, he says flatly, "cost it [the United States] the confidence and the cooperation of the Korean people." 19

A neglected source is General Dean's Story. Dean, who was captured in 1950 during the KPA (Korean People's Army) advance south, had served in Korea from October 1947 to January 1949. As military governor of South Korea he was in charge of such key arrangements as the police, rice collection, and the railroads. The south Korean army (known as the "constabulary") also came under his command. Dean, interrogated about prison conditions under his administration, acknowledged that they were "overcrowded" and claims to have been "very disturbed" to find that people were being held for long stretches without trial: "In April 1948 I had pardoned more than thirty-five hundred at one time because I found that some of them had been incarcerated for as long as eighteen months without trial, and charged only with talking against the government, or opposing rice collection." 20

Charged by his captors with having helped to organize the rigging of the 1948 elections, Dean admits only limited fraud. By his account, his response to charges made against him was weak and inadequate. 21

In the autumn of 1948, after the Americans had forced through the establishment of the "Republic of Korea" under Syngman Rhee, thereby sanctioning the division of Korea, widespread guerrilla war broke out in the south. The major conference held in P'yongyang in April 1948, which gathered together all the major political leaders of both north and south, with the sole exception of Rhee, had voted unanimously for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and against any division of the country. 22 Within the south, Rhee and the U.S. policy had virtually zero support. 23

The pre-June 1950 guerrilla struggle is very poorly documented. Sawyer's Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War provides some details. Scattered references may be found in accounts by Ridgway, MacArthur, and Dean. 24

The outbreak of uprisings, which started on the island of Cheju, off the south coast of Korea, triggered a chain of defections in the puppet army. The regiment dispatched to quell Cheju itself revolted and helped to liberate Yosu and the nearby town of Suncheon. Another regiment sent from Kwangju, the provincial capital, also went over to the rebellion. The uprising held Yosu for an entire week, and after its collapse numerous soldiers and local Communists and students escaped to the mountains and set up guerrilla nuclei. A month later a second revolt started at Taegu, the site of a big upheaval in 1946.

It is regrettable that there is so little material on these uprisings, since they obviously were widespread and had extensive popular support. 25 In particular, it is notable that land conditions were very bad and the concentration of Japanese settlers extremely high in the Taegu area, which revolted in both 1946 and 1948. 26 Moreover, although the 1948 upheavals were for the most part put down in the cities, the areas which exploded were again centers of guerrilla and anti-imperialist action during the 1950-53 fighting.

Dean provides some of the most interesting data on guerrilla activities. He commanded the American retreat in 1950, lost contact with his forces, and wandered for a month in the hills before being captured. At one point he thought of heading for a town called Kumch'on, but ruled it out as too difficult.

We would have to pass through a defile; and the hill country around Yongdong always had been full of Communists. Even in the occupation days hunters passed up this fine deer country because of the many guerrillas. . . .

In detailing his troubles on the run, Dean provides a stark picture of life in the south:

I wanted to avoid the charcoal people. Many of them had been Communist sympathizers and outcasts even in the old days, and I was afraid to trust them. . . . Up here in the mountain area I seldom found a house standing – the result of the South Korean government's pressur campaign against the guerrillas, which had consisted largely of burning the house of anyone the constabulary or police even suspected of harboring or cooperating with the guerrillas. 27

Who Began the War?

The guerrilla campaign appears to have escalated in 1950, and much of this activity was in the region of the 38th parallel, particularly on the Ongjin peninsula (to the west of Seoul), which was largely liberated in June-July 1949. The existence of guerrillas, of course, does not in itself suffice to characterize the entire political process in Korea, but it indicates a revolutionary situation in south Korea before what is called "the Korean War." And it demonstrates the political inanity of arguing about who fired the first shot on one day in June 1950, or who crossed what line first.

The point is an important one because the Korean left and almost all of its supporters throughout the world have accepted discussion of the causes of the Korean War in terms of bourgeois legality. But the situation demands to be dealt with by the very different criteria of revolutionary justice. Korea was one country, with a united people; the unity of the country was sabotaged by the U.S., with Soviet complicity; all moves towards reunification and political independence were blocked by the Americans, and the political forces which might have been able to work for these ends were imprisoned, killed or otherwise disqualified.

The obvious parallels are Vietnam and China: the case for reunification of these two nations does not require repetition here. The Vietnamese and Chinese peoples are entitled to use whatever means they feel appropriate to achieve their ends. The same goes for Korea. And indeed there is a strand in the case which North Korea has presented which follows this line. A letter from the DPRK to the UN reads:

The government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic deems it necessary to declare that should the United Nations ignore in the future the will and strivings of the Korean people, considering only the selfish interests of a small group of traitors and betrayers of the Korean people, the Korean people will not abandon the struggle
and will reserve for itself the right to continue by measures at its disposal the struggle for... removal of UNCOK and for final unification of the country by its own forces into a united democratic state.\textsuperscript{28}

But when the war started, the DPRK based its case on the (frequently rather imprecise) charge that "ROK" forces had attacked the north, which had then launched a counter-attack.\textsuperscript{29}

It is still an open question whether, as the DPRK and some Western sources stated, the ROK launched a cross-border attack of unusual proportions on June 25, 1950. Whatever the truth in this specific matter, the fact is that the very existence of the ROK was an attack on Korean unity and independence. The DPRK had the absolute right to liberate the south whenever it so wished. It is to weaken its own case to present the decision to liberate the south in late June 1950 merely as a response to an ROK assault.

There is no dispute about the fact that Syngman Rhee and his Japanese-trained officer corps wanted to invade the north.\textsuperscript{30} But they did not have the strength to do so successfully, although they certainly launched numerous irritating and destructive raids across the parallel. Even if the ROK launched the kind of attack on Haegu on June 25 which the DPRK claimed, a reason has to be found for why the DPRK decided to "counter-attack" precisely when it did, and to the extent which it did.\textsuperscript{31} The leadership of the DPRK apparently concluded that a significant switch had taken place in American policy which only gave them a few months at most to secure the liberation of the south. This switch is indirectly confirmed by Douglas MacArthur (not always a reliable source), who recorded that America did change its policy in mid-1950. When Dulles was in Korea, on June 19, he apparently reversed the previous policy, enunciated by the State Department, by stating his belief before the Korean legislature that the United States would defend Korea if she were attacked.\textsuperscript{32}

The evidence is strong that the DPRK acted on short notice: the KPA was only half mobilized by June 25, and there appears to have been little mobilization of cadres in the south in preparation for the liberation. There was, however, plenty of spontaneous support once the liberation drive began.

Varying Explanation of "Counterattack" and Failure

As early as the morning of June 25, 1950, P'yongyang Radio stated that the DPRK had declared war on the ROK, as a result of an invasion by ROK forces, and that the KPA had struck back in self-defense, beginning a "righteous invasion" of the south.\textsuperscript{33} The next day, in a broadcast Kim Il Sung called it a civil war: "The war we are fighting against this traitorous clique, a civil war which it started, is a just one for the country's unification, independence, freedom and democracy." The DPRK government, "having discussed the prevailing situation, ordered the People's Army to start a decisive counter-attack and wipe out the enemy's armed forces."\textsuperscript{34}

It is well-known that the Korean revolution received very little support. This was not only because of the prevailing cold war climate, but also because the DPRK did not stick unequivocally to the revolutionary explanation they had initially offered. The DPRK hedged and repeatedly presented the U.S.-ROK aggression, which was real, in a de-historicized way. The point was that American aggression occurred not in June 1950 but in the summer of 1945 and had continued without letup thereafter. North and south Korean accounts of the country's division start only at 1948, making it difficult to adopt a revolutionary position of support for the revolution.

The reasons why the revolution failed to hold the south are closely related to the reasons why the DPRK decided to "counter-attack" when it did. The official DPRK explanation is as follows:

1. American superiority in men and equipment, particularly after the Inch'on landing (September 1950);
2. Counter-revolutionary sabotage by Lieut. Gen. Kim Ung, Yi Sung-yop and others (leading in particular to the loss of Inch'on and Seoul), plus Mu Jong's mistakes.
3. The paralysis of the Party organization in the south due to a) brutal repression; and b) subversion by the Pak Hon-yong/Yi Sung-yop group, in particular by providing false information on the Party's organized strength in the south and thus causing a miscalculation in the Party's strategy for liberation.\textsuperscript{35}

The last reason needs to be considered first. No doubt the southern party leaders, who had fled to P'yongyang earlier, were urging liberation as soon as possible. Their cadres had suffered terribly under Rhee and the Americans. Nevertheless, when the KPA crossed the 38th parallel, there was considerable support from the southern masses. The official U.S. Army history of the war records that on June 25 a meeting was held at Taegu, several hundred miles from the 38th parallel, at which the Americans decided to evacuate the city and fall back on Pusan, "since the Taegu area was a center of guerrilla activity, [and] there were widespread fears of an uprising by underground elements or of a guerrilla attack on the town."\textsuperscript{36} General Dean's account gives the same impression.\textsuperscript{37} Dean actually asserts that his position was reported to the KPA by a woman, who must have been a local. His description of fighting mentions "snipers" everywhere, both in the town and on the roads around. Korean engineers were sabotaging American train supplies by uncoupling the engines and driving them off. Dean continues to refer to "infiltrators" — but his actual text makes it clear that these were guerrillas and local fighters: "My belief that the Communists could infiltrate almost at will had a good deal of early evidence to support it": at Pusan, handbills for the dock workers had appeared in the very first hours of the war — "even before the battle line had moved south of the Han River, at Seoul. And all the time I was with the troops, we were harassed constantly by roadblocks and snipers who went around our lines or right through them as infiltrators, with a minimum of difficulty."\textsuperscript{38} The situation in Pusan is indirectly confirmed by Sawyer, the official U.S. historian, who records that the local inhabitants raided the American compound, Hialeah, on June 28; the official account claims this was "looting" and that the American troops fired over the Koreans' heads.\textsuperscript{39}

Such fragmentary evidence could be supplemented. It is irrefutable that extensive guerrilla struggles went on hundreds of miles from the front for over two years after the KPA retreat from the south.\textsuperscript{40} So the official DPRK explanation is not entirely satisfactory.\textsuperscript{41} However, Kim Il Sung claims that after the 1948 suppression, "Party organizations were totally destroyed and the revolutionary forces were split in South Korea."\textsuperscript{42} It is impossible either to prove or to disprove this with the evidence available. Party organization may well have been very weak. But there certainly was some struggle in the
south: it is possible to state that the factor of popular support for the liberation was not a decisive element in the revolution’s failure to hold the south. But the difference between support and organization, particularly given the limited time available, was certainly great.

In any event, the official DPRK emphasis on bad information, plus alleged subversion and sabotage by the southern party leaders, needs to be explained. What little evidence there is comes mainly from the trial (and subsequent execution) of most of the southern party leaders after the end of the war in 1953. The southern party figures were then charged with attempting to stage a coup in P’yongyang with the help of southern guerrillas. Mu Jong, the KPA general who had led the Korean contingent on the Long March with Mao, was fired after the disastrous retreat following the Inch’on landing.

How can one read the meager evidence? It is reasonable to assume that there was plenty of discussion both before June 25, 1950, and afterwards on whether the “counter-attack” then was a good idea, and it is not hard to imagine a group arguing that the decision was an error. It almost led to the extinction of socialism throughout the country by the end of 1950 and shattered the gains of five years of toil in the north; it brought about redoubled repression and hardship to millions in the south — and ultimately death to millions. But the internal machinations of the alleged coup have never been revealed, and it gives the appearance of a scapegoating operation designed to deflect criticism from the actual decision to try to liberate the south in late June 1950. Although this does not mean that a group did not try to oust Kim, using as a key argument the incorrect decision in 1950, and perhaps subsequent errors, including the disadvantageous 1953 agreement (cf. below).

Retroactively this coolness towards the southern party and its leaders has helped to smother analysis of what actually took place in the south in the brief weeks of liberation, and after. The Rhee regime more or less broke down when the KPA crossed the parallel in strength. The ROK army “disintegrated” in the words of the official U.S. Army historian. Quite a few of the American advisers fled to Japan along with American civilians. Upheavals, of varying strength, occurred in places as widely separate as Seoul, Taegu, and Pusan, the last hundreds of miles from the “front line.” Again, Dean is an invaluable witness. Apart from the guerrilla (“infiltration”) aspect mentioned above, Dean’s narrative brings out clearly the enormous popularity of the KPA, the wide popular support for the liberation, and the enthusiastic participation of the population in the brief attempts at reconstruction.

After his capture, Dean was escorted to the next town by one KPA soldier:

_The one thing I noticed especially was that my guard was quite a hero to all the small children we met on the way. Whenever we passed a group he would say a phrase to them and the children would reply in chorus. . . . they all knew it and repeated it with enthusiasm. Often the children would start singing a marching song . . . the Immun Gun [KPA] song. I thought, “Boy, these Communists have done a job of indoctrinating these youngsters.” They were delighted with the soldier._

Dean also passed groups of young people drilling with the KPA:

_It seemed like a very long time for close-order drill to last, but they kept it up. Once again I was struck by the fact that if the people of South Korea resented the northern invaders, they certainly weren’t showing it. To me, the civilian attitude appeared to veer between enthusiasm and passive acceptance. I saw no sign of resistance or any will to resist._

Dean also repeatedly notes evidence of popular support; he was amazed to see large groups of people working on roads without armed guards watching them (a situation he implies was unheard of under the Rhee regime) and he also notes that the KPA had armed some of the local inhabitants, a step that would have been unthinkable without an absolutely secure political base.

The events on the island of Koje off the south coast were another striking example of the political situation. The island held a major prisoner of war camp containing between 80,000 and 200,000 prisoners. To counter the American blockage of repatriation to country of origin, the prisoners on Koje staged a series of political revolts, culminating with the seizure of the camp commandant, General Dodd, on May 7, 1952 (the only American general, apart from Dean, captured during the war). While most Western accounts present it merely as an internal prison revolt, Mark Clark’s account makes it clear that the prisoners had extensive local islander support. After 12,000 American troops suppressed the revolt with tanks, they also had to remove the surrounding civilian population. Boatner, the officer in charge of this operation, “removed the village that served as a key center in the communications network Nam Ii’s men established with the prisoners . . . and tightened controls so that contact between villagers and prisoners was next to impossible.”

To summarize, the official DPRK explanation of why the revolution failed to hold the south is inadequate, for it obfuscates the reasons behind the decision to liberate the south in late June 1950. The explanation is too technistic since American superiority in arms and equipment in Vietnam has not been sufficient to halt a similar popular resistance movement. And lastly, it fails to deal with the fact that support in the south for the revolution seems to have been very high. Probably comparable with that in South Vietnam, the strong support was not tied into what appears to have been a relatively weak organization. The KPA was only in the south for two and one-half months, not enough to consolidate a political position. All the evidence points to a miscalculation in P’yongyang, where the leadership did not envisage such a rapid intervention. Preparation for this contingency was woefully inadequate at all levels. When Western intervention blocked the liberation of the South, the southern party leadership (which may well have argued a different line from that of Kim II Sung) was used as a convenient scapegoat.

The Peace Talks and the POW Issue

The main reason for the numerous revolts in the Korean POW camps was the fact that America, for the first time in its history, rejected the principle of repatriation to country of origin. The implementation of this American decision involved: (a) a terroristic campaign in the camps under “UN” control to keep as many KPA and Chinese prisoners from returning home as possible; and (b) a massive psychological

© BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only. www.bcasnet.org
campaign to explain away American POW support for the anti-imperialist cause. The elements for a coherent reconstruction of both sides of this are not available. 49

Who Won the War?

While both the "UN" and the DPRK claim victory in Korea, both sides speak as though they are thoroughly dissatisfied with the outcome. This may be because both sides have decided to confuse two separate stages of the fighting. One could say tentatively that the Americans were pleased at preventing the complete liberation of Korea in June-September 1950, but disappointed at not succeeding in subjugating the entire north in September-November 1950. The DPRK was disappointed at not liberating the south, but relieved at preventing the permanent American occupation of the north. The DPRK is correct in stressing that it won a victory by thwarting the American hope of eliminating socialism in Korea. But the DPRK is wrong to present its case the way it has done up to now.

The Lessons Learned by the Participants

As the only occasion when it engaged in full-scale combat with Western armies, the war must have been extremely significant for the Chinese army. Many of China's top military commanders, including P'eng T'eh-huai, Lin Piao, and Ch'en Yi 50 fought in Korea. The Chinese perspective was summed up by P'eng just after the end of the war:

"... The heroic Korean people withstood the severe test of war... The valiant Chinese People's Volunteers waged a just struggle, defended the security of their motherland and helped the Korean people, thus safeguarding the smooth carrying out of China's work of economic restoration and construction. After three years of fighting, the crack troops of the biggest industrial power of the capitalist world were held at the place where they first unleashed their aggression. Not only were they unable to advance a single step forward, but they found themselves daily falling into increasing difficulties."

But P'eng seems over-optimistic about the negotiations. The delegates, he says, "have always been able ... to fight on and win victories. ... They resolutely yet patiently waged a serious struggle and at length led the unprecedentedly long, complicated and tense Korean armistice negotiations to success, thus opening the way for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question." 51 Yet, more than eighteen years later, Korea is still divided. P'eng concludes:

"All our commanders and fighters will take seriously the experience of the three years of war and two years of negotiations. We will learn the advanced military science of the Soviet Union, raise our knowledge of military affairs and our political level and strengthen the fighting power of our troops. We will enhance the glorious spirit of internationalism, protect the interests of the Korean people..." 52

For the Americans the war was equally important for it marked the first time their army was fought to a standstill in spite of vastly superior firepower and technology. And it is important to realize that at the time when MacArthur's Tokyo office was reporting that "UN" forces were outnumbered by 4 to 1 on the Pusan perimeter, the U.S. and ROK forces (47,000 + 45,000) actually outnumbered the KPA (70,000) by about 9 to 7. 54

One of the main American commanders in Korea, General Van Fleet, had just led the suppression of the Greek revolution. 55 The Korean War also soldered America's links with France. Truman's declaration of intervention in Korea also covered stepped-up activity in Vietnam (as well as Taiwan and the Philippines). Mark Clark records that he arranged French Marshal Juin's visit to Korea and that he himself visited Indo-China in March 1953. A number of Korean Military Advisory Group officers moved straight from Korea to Vietnam along with some ROK military men. 56

Perhaps the most interesting observations come from Maxwell Taylor. The Uncertain Trumpet gives some clues as to how Taylor concocted his plans for Vietnam. The Korean war, according to Taylor (who was 8th Army Commander there), was a "setback" to Massive Retaliation orthodoxy, because it "contradicted many of its basic assumptions." But the real lesson of Korea was not absorbed in the U.S.; instead of weakening faith in atomic air power, Taylor laments, it strengthened it. 57 From the Korean War Taylor seemingly derived the lesson that America needed a "flexible response" strategy which he later pioneered in Vietnam. Ridgway, who was probably America's most capable general in Korea, appears to have emerged from the war with some apprehension about the American infantry's capacity to fight a long and tough land war in Asia. 58 Ridgway gave his endorsement to the Panmunjom settlement; a land war with the Chinese, he saw, could be "endless." 59 It was Ridgway who, as Army Chief of Staff in 1954, blocked the plan for U.S. forces to intervene at Dienbienphu. 60

Now is certainly the time to become aware of and stress that the Korean people have sustained for over half a century an uninterrupted struggle against Japanese and American imperialism. In the process, and particularly since 1945, the Koreans have paid an outrageously high price for that struggle. Their suffering makes it incumbent on us to work to set the record straight. Even if the Americans did not win the war, they certainly did not lose the negotiations. Korea is still divided. The Conference convened in Geneva in 1954, which was originally called to discuss Korea, ended up virtually ignoring this unhappy land.

* * * *

It is heartening that the issues of civil war and the guerrilla struggle are now being integrated into Western analyses of the 1950-53 war, 61 for this is an essential step towards reconstructing a total picture of American aggression in Korea from 1945 to the present. Authorities like Edgar Snow, 62 while supporting the struggle of the Korean people, are also prepared to write as he does, unequivocally, that he does not believe the "official DPRK" and Chinese line on the origins of the war. The Pueblo incident was at least a temporary setback to a reanalysis of Korean history which will now, hopefully, be undertaken. 63 The rectification of America's own vision of its intervention in Korea is a crucial part of the overall task of reconstructing the history of American aggression against Asia, from the Philippines to Indochina.

* This review essay is a revised version of the third article, "On Reading Material on the Korean War," from Three Articles on the Korean
Notes

2. Stone, xiv.
4. In particular, it would have been interesting to have seen a development of the point made in the publishers' foreword (by Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy): "our attitude toward it [the Korean war, when it began] differed in one (extremely important) respect from that of I. F. Stone. He saw it then as a case of international aggression; we regarded it as a civil war which was transformed into an international war only when the United States sent planes and troops into Korea. From the former point of view, the question of who moved first is of decisive importance. From the latter point of view, it is not." (p. x, April 1952 edition)
5. An outline is given at pp. 17-18; but even this is not wholly satisfactory. Stone refers to the May 30, 1950 elections in south Korea as "the first free elections in Korean history" and credits Dean Acheson with "creating" a crisis for the Rhee regime "by insisting on free elections." Although Rhee was roundly defeated, the elections were as "the first free elections in Korean history" and credits Dean Acheson decisively. From the latter point of view, it is not." (p. x, April 1952 edition)

8. Contrary to some opinion, Kim Il Sung's Selected Works, P'yongyang, 1965 (2 vols.), contains much useful material. Both the P'yongyang Times (weekly) and Korea Today (monthly) merit a closer reading than they have received, on the whole, among the left in the West. For example, Han Ung Ho, "U.S. Imperialists are the Criminals Who Committed Ceaseless Military Provocations and Ignited Aggressive War," Korea Today, No. 169 (1970), is a text which will yield information on a careful reading.
9. Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington, Koje Unscreened, London, n.d., (1952) was a pioneering study of conditions in the "UN"-controlled POW camps—a study which was dismissed with
10. "The Korean Revolution," Socialist Revolution, Vol. 1, No. 6 (November-December 1970); the English text published there was subjected to some infelicitous editing which I was unable to check and does not represent my thought at all points; an authentic version is available in French in Les Temps Modernes, No. 299-300 (June-July 1971); henceforth, SR/TM.
12. Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics: An Evaluation of American Responsibility, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967. A relatively unfriendly Western writer has this to say on the People's Republic: "Its popularity soon spread among the provinces of the country. By the time the XXIV Corps arrived the 'Republic' appeared to have a legitimate claim that its voice constituted, as no other group had in forty years, the will of the Korean people." (Carl Berger, The Korean Knot, Philadelphia, 1957, p. 52.)
15. Truman, p. 334; John Gunther (The Riddle of MacArthur, London, 1951, pp. 162-3) states that the dividing line was drawn in Washington in early August, and recounts the scene, as described by an eyewitness:

Several one-star generals hurried into the Pentagon with the statement, "We have got to divide Korea. Where can we divide it?"

A colonel with experience in the Far East protested to his superiors, "You can't do that. Korea is a social and economic unit. There is no place to divide it."

The generals insisted it had to be done. The colonel replied that it could not be done. Their answer was, "We have got to divide Korea and it has to be done by four o'clock this afternoon."

16. A standard work such as V. Vorontsov, Koreya y planakh SSRa a godi storov mirovyx osnov [Korea in U.S. plans during the Second World War], Moscow, 1962, which purports to deal with how Korea came to be in its present condition, does not even mention Stalin or Molotov. One person who could shed much light on the early period is Semyon K. Tsarapkin, who was political adviser to the Soviet military command in Korea. Interestingly, Acheson (p. 352) notes that Tsarapkin was active in Russian peace feelers at the UN during the Korean war.
18. W. D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea, London, 1963; E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea, 1951; A. Wigfall Green, Epic of Korea, 1950; the chapter on Korea in David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam, is also excellent.
20. Dean, p. 73; on the prison situation, cf. Gayn's account.
22. See SR/TM and references there.
23. As emerged from the May 1950 election, when only 27 members of the previous assembly were re-elected, and those supporters could be sure of only forty-five of the 210 seats.
25. On the whole, Cho, cit., pp. 230ff. is the fairest. The present dictator of South Korea, Pak Jung Hi, was apparently involved in some murky way in the 1948 events and at one point was actually sentenced to death.
26. Hoon K. Lee, Land Utilisation and Rural Economy in Korea, London, 1936, Table 132, p. 288, shows that in the mid-1930s South Cholla Province, which was the biggest center of guerrilla activity in
1950-52, had the highest number of Japanese settlers and the highest total of Japanese-owned land of all the provinces of Korea.

27. Dean, pp. 37, 48, 49; cf. p. 54, where Dean states that he only came across one house intact; he did not dare go down to the valleys because of popular support for the liberation.


29. The evidence for this is presented fully by Karunakar Gupta, "How Did the Korean War Begin?" China Quarterly 52 (1972). The DPRK claimed that ROK troops attacked the town of Haeju, the seventh largest city in North Korea. On June 26 at least two leading bourgeois dailies in the U.K. (including the Manchester Guardian) reported that U.S. officials had confirmed that the ROK Army had captured Haeju on June 25. This may, of course, have been a false report; nonetheless, it is striking in that it coincides with the North Korean claims about an ROK attack. It should also be noted that one of Britain's leading diplomatic experts on the Far East, Sir John Pratt, publicly supported the DPRK position. Gupta develops some of his points further in an answer to critics in China Quarterly No. 54 (April/June 1973), pp. 363-368.

30. According to the New York Times (March 14, 1950), fifteen Seoul Members of Parliament were sentenced to prison terms "for opposing the invasion of North Korea by South Korean forces" (quoted in D. N. Pritt, New Light on Korea, London, 1951, p. 12).

31. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945-1954, New York, 1972, pp. 578 ff. argue that the DPRK "counter-attack" was initially a limited one, and was not at first designed as the start of a full-scale invasion. After extensive research in archives and unpublished papers, the Kolkos conclude that the precise facts on the Rhee-MacArthur relationship are still too obscure to allow for a dismissal of the possibility that Rhee might have attacked the North, even with inferior forces and no hope of military success.

32. MacArthur, p. 324. MacArthur, of course, was trying in his memoirs to disclaim responsibility for what happened in Korea. All the same, this is a fair statement of the facts.


there were 4 enclosures “each cut up into eight compounds, with each compound planned to hold 6000 prisoners.” Since all accounts indicate overcrowding, the ‘plans’ were presumably fulfilled.

48. Clark, p. 64. Cf. Ridgway (The War in Korea, p. 215). Koje Unscreened remains irreplaceable. All imperialist accounts of events in the camps are defective. Acheson is even at variance with himself (Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 655 and 705, on the uprising on Pongam-do). The most illuminating is that by Ridgway in Soldier: “I wanted the killing machinery on hand to do a thorough job.”

49. Joy’s account in How Communists Negotiate is surprisingly informative, since in retrospect, Joy distances himself from the official U.S. position which he sustained at Panmunjom. In particular, he criticizes the U.S. stance on the POW issue:

It must be admitted that besides humanitarian considerations, the major objective of the Washington decision to insist on voluntary repatriation was to inflict upon the Communists a propaganda defeat which might deter them from further aggression. It was thought that if any substantial portion of the ex-Communist soldiers refused to return to Communism, a huge setback to Communist subversive activities would ensue. I regret to say this does not seem to have been a valid point.

Cf. Collins, p. 343, where he writes that the “deliberate utilization of prisoners of war to harass their captors and warp (sic) world public opinion in their [i.e., the Communists’] favor was an effective new tactic.” Cf. Acheson, p. 655, where he notes the devastating effect the POW revolts had on Washington’s allies and the resulting weakening of Washington’s negotiating position.

50. On P’eng, see note 67 in Sit (p. 133); it is interesting that while Mark Clark calls P’eng “a foe of high merit” (Clark, p. 87), the Khushchev memoirs complain that P’eng’s battle reports were very over-optimistic, and that this was a major cause of lack of success (pp. 372-3). Both Collins (pp. 217-18) and MacArthur (p. 374) assume Lin Piao’s presence, and that the document which MacArthur attributes to Lin (p. 375) is surely a fabrication. What happened in Korea most likely was important in later Chinese political events, since one of the accusations leveled at P’eng Teh-huai when he was dismissed was concern in the fighting in Korea.

51. Peng Teh-huai, A Report on the Chinese People’s Volunteers in Korea, September 12, 1953 (Supplement to People’s China, October 1, 1953), p. 5. In view of P’eng’s dismissal, this text can no longer be assumed to be fully authoritative; it only represents the then-official position.

52. Peng, p. 8.

53. Peng, p. 12. Already during the war it was clear how much prestige China had gained. Truman’s letter to MacArthur (early January 1951) contains as its second point: “To deflate the dangerously exaggerated political and military prestige of Communist China which now threatens to undermine the resistance of non-Communist Asia and [threatens] to consolidate the hold of Communism on China itself. . . .” (cited by Collins, p. 250).


55. It would be interesting to know how many of the present ruling Athens junta were in Korea. And of the ruling Egyptian clique? (Van Fleet having also been active in Ethiopia).

56. Clark, pp. 319, 321-2. Collins, after helping “to bring Rhee into line” over the POW issue in 1953 (“I enjoyed this assignment”), was then asked by Dulles to go to Vietnam the following year “to solve some of the problems of Vietnam in the early days of President Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime” (Collins, p. 357). MacArthur, in disparaging Truman’s knowledge of the Far East, notes that at the Wake Island meeting with Truman – which only lasted about one and a half hours – Taiwan did not figure on the agenda, although Indo-China did. (Reminiscences, p. 361)


58. Taylor, pp. 18-19. Ridgway, appointed Army Chief of Staff in the Eisenhower purge of May 1953, soon found himself out of sympathy with the “New Look” and was prematurely retired in 1955.

59. Ridgway, The War in Korea, p. 236. Rather different estimates were given by Van Fleet and Clark; Clark endorses the armistice, “considering that we lacked the determination to win the war.” (Clark, p. 2)

60. Collins, pp. 384-85. Collins appears to have gone to some trouble to attempt a comparison of Korea and Vietnam (pp. 382-390), but his conclusions are of staggering banality, and his version of Vietnamese history just looks laughable in the light of the information recently revealed in the Pentagon Papers.

61. See, for example, the way in which the struggle in south Korea is integrated by Edward Friedman in his excellent “Problems in Dealing with an Irrational Power: America Declares War on China,” in Friedman and Selden, eds, America’s Asia, pp. 218, 227.


It should be noted that, in spite of P’eng’s reference to “the advanced military science of the Soviet Union,” the evidence is that the Russians supplied the Chinese with fairly outmoded equipment – for which they then demanded payment: about $2 billion (U. O. Ghent-Gosnell, Far Eastern Economic Review, September 18, 1971, p. 57).

CORRECTION
Several errors occurred in the typesetting of the Kagan-Diamond review article of Richard Solomon’s book. Among the most important was the omission of an acknowledgment to Doug Sparks, the students at Grinnell College, Leigh Kagan, and the Bulletin staff, plus the addition of the last sentence of the text.
THE ASSASSINATION OF NGO DINH DIEM

King prawns bristle at the rim
Of his glass, curled in a show of red
Around fresh lettuce and mayonnaise.
He dabbles the fingerbowl, brushing off
The odd pieces and whiskers. As wine
Is served, a small carp appears
Out of air in a bowl of aspic.

Tomorrow, when you read about his assassination
For the first time, be moved: this was Diem:
A schoolboy once again, sauntering back
To the palace from his paper corpse
As large as life, grinning like 'Big Minh'.
(As front-guys grapple: as former people
Spin down from balconies in their pants:
As the bourgeoisie adventure among the rubble
To get their cars, proclaiming freedom.)

THE FRONT

In our homes, among the people: so inhabiting
That water that we appear as fish.
Yet they must fight even for air
Because they treat us like foreigners.

As perch that walk over the land
On their fins, vanishing under fire
Into their first element, into cool ponds.

Yet now in bunkers, tunnels, any caves,
We are like ourselves, like worms
Not fish, like articulate men.

So that we can make our own ways
From these pieces of life and dwellings.
Knowing that different people will live here
After us because of our lives.
Imperialism and Asia: A Brief Introduction to the Literature

by Mark Selden

Editor's Note: This bibliography is a preliminary introduction to the literature available on imperialism. It is incomplete and we therefore invite readers to submit additions to this initial list. As an ongoing project, we hope to collect titles and ideas for further publication in following issues.

I. A solid introduction to the literature of U.S. imperialism, theories of imperialism, and an entree to U.S. imperialism in postwar Asia can be gleaned from the following three works:

- Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism, The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Monthly Review = MR);
- K. T. Fann and Donald Hodges, eds., *Readings in U.S. Imperialism* (Porter Sargent);

II. Theories of Imperialism and U.S. Imperialism.


Joyce and Gabriel Kolko and William Appleman Williams have provided the major historical interpretations of...
U.S. imperialism. Williams’ *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Delta) is an incisive view of imperialism during two centuries of U.S. history. The first two massively documented volumes of the Kolko’s trilogy on the U.S. and the world provide superb global analysis of the major directions of contemporary U.S. imperialism: *The Politics of War. The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (Vintage) and *The Limits of Power. The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945-1954* (H&R). Gabriel Kolko’s *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Beacon) and David Horowitz, ed., *Corporations and the Cold War* (MR) explore the roots of imperial power in the men and corporations who direct U.S. foreign policy. Two recent works explore aspects of the contemporary face of U.S. imperialism in the Nixon era: Michael Klare’s *War Without End. American Planning For the Next Vietnams* (Knopf) and Virginia Brodine and Mark Selden, eds., *Open Secret: The Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine in Asia.* (H&R)

Pierre Jalee’s three books explore economic aspects of imperialism: *The Pillage of the Third World* (MR); *The Third World in World Economy* (MR); and *Imperialism in the Seventies* (Third Press). Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth* (Grove) remains a classic account of the psychological costs of imperialism on the victims; Michael Tanser’s *The Political Economy of International Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries* (Beacon) is the outstanding work on oil and imperialism.


III. Imperialism in Asia

This is an undeveloped field. The beginnings of an imperialist analysis as a critique of prevailing modernization theory can be found in James Peck, “The Professional Ideology of America’s China Watchers,” in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., *America’s Asia. Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations* (Vintage) and carried forward with an exchange between Peck and John Fairbank in the CCAS Bulletin II: 3 (April 1970); the debate continues with more hard data on the Chinese case in an exchange between Andrew Nathan and Joseph Escherick in IV: 4 (December 1972). Herbert Bix’s “Japanese Imperialism and the Manchurian Economy,” *China Quarterly* (July 1972); Edward Friedman’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, “The Center Cannot Hold” (Harvard University, 1968); and Hu Sheng’s *Imperialism and Chinese Politics* (Peking Foreign Languages Press) offer important perspectives on imperialism in China. See also AREAS, *Hong Kong: Britain’s Last Colonial Stronghold* (London: Association for Radical East Asian Studies, 1972, mimeo).


Kathleen Gough and Hari Sharma, eds., *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia* (MR) is the best introduction to imperialism in contemporary South Asia. See also Charles Bettelheim, *India Independent* (MR) and Michael Kodron, *Foreign Investments in India* (Oxford).

Gabriel Kolko’s essay “The American Goals in Vietnam,” in Chomsky/Zinn, *Pentagon Papers,* is one of several essays in the volume pointing toward an imperialist analysis of the Indochina War. See also CCAS, comp., *The Indochina Story* (Pantheon); Nina Adams and Alfred McCoy, eds., *Laos: War and Revolution* (H&R); “U.S.

Amado Guerrero’s *Philippine Society and Revolution* (Pulong Tala) and William Pomeroy, *American Neo-colonialism, Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia* (International Publishers), by a leading theoretician of the New People’s Army and a former Huk fighter, respectively, offer two perspectives on U.S. imperialism in the Philippines.

A number of works which do not employ an imperialist framework provide valuable insight into the workings of imperialism in Asia. Notable among these are Gunnar Myrdal’s *Asian Drama. An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (Vintage); Hla Myint, *Southeast Asia’s Economy. Development Policies in the 1970’s* (Prager) is an Asian Development Bank study which provides a classic picture of the neo-colonial past and future of the area—baring revolutionary change; Harold Malmgren, ed., *Pacific Basin Development. The American Interests* (Heath), sponsored by the Overseas Development Council.

For many Asian countries—Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, Korea—there is not yet to my knowledge significant English language work analyzing the record of imperialism. Frank Baldwin, ed., “Korea,” Jon Halliday, “Japanese Capitalism,” and Mark Selden, ed., *Remaking Asia: Essays on the American Uses of Power*, all forthcoming in 1974 at Pantheon, are among the works in progress which focus on imperialism in Asia. Yet these barely begin to address the large and largely uncharted issues which remain to be studied by a new generation of students.

IV. Selected Periodical Sources.


---

**Contributors**

Frank Baldwin, a Korea specialist, spent the last year on a Fulbright fellowship in Japan and is now an editor of the *Japan Interpreter*.

Herbert Bix teaches history at the University of Massachusetts, Boston.

Jon Halliday is on the editorial board of *New Left Review*. He has just completed a history of Japanese capitalism to be published in 1974.

John Comer is a British poet.
The front cover shows a tank (flying a flag emblazoned with the Mitsubishi corporate symbol) undergoing testing. Both cover illustrations are taken from a special issue of MAINICHI GURAFU, May 1, 1971, entitled: "Nihon no senryoku: heiru o nuida riku-kei-kugun" [Japan's War potential: Lifting the Veil from the Land, Air and Sea Self-Defense Forces].

© BCAS. All rights reserved. For non-commercial use only: www.bcasnet.org