Richard L. Garwin

                          IBM Research Division
                     Thomas J. Watson Research Center
                               P.O. Box 218
                        Yorktown Heights, NY 10598

                              (914) 945-2555

                      Adjunct Professor of Physics,
                           Columbia University;

                         Adjunct Research Fellow,
                       Kennedy School of Government
                           Harvard University)

                            February 27, 1992

                                  to the
                       Committee on Foreign Affairs
                           United States Senate

   (Published in Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
       One hundred Second Congress, Second Session), pp. 130-147).


       START  should  be ratified and implemented as soon as possi-
       ble.  The post-START era is well under way with  the  initi-
       atives  set  in motion by President Bush September 27, 1991,
       and disablement and guarded storage of many thousands of nu-
       clear warheads  must  be  our  urgent  near-term  objective.
       Post-START  forces  should have an early goal of 3000 actual
       strategic warheads on  each  side,  plus  perhaps  400  air-
       delivered tactical weapons.  As soon as other nuclear powers
       see  merit  in  reductions, the U.S. and Commonwealth should
       move each to 1000 single-warhead weapons.  The threat of ac-
       cidental or unauthorized launch should be handled by instal-
       lation of a passive destruct-after-launch system rather than
       by active defenses, and  theater-range  missiles  should  be
       eliminated  by extending to all nations the INF Treaty which
       binds the U.S. and the successor states of the Soviet Union.

    (Embargoed until 1000, Thursday February 27, 1992.) 

       R051TEST                 022092TEST                 02/24/92
              Views of the author, not of his organizations


       I   am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  to  testify  on
       Post-START.  Two Committee reports of last spring  and  last
       fall,  "START: Present Status and Prospects," and "The START
       Treaty in a Changed World" provide an excellent  background,
       so  that  I will not repeat much of the factual material and
       analysis shown there.  It is almost 20 years since I  testi-
       fied  in  support of the ABM Treaty and the SALT Limited Of-
       fensive Agreement.  Had we been steadfast at  that  time  in
       our  purpose and in our understanding of the perils posed to
       the world by large numbers of Soviet  nuclear  warheads,  we
       could  well  have  avoided the tremendous buildup of nuclear
       weaponry on the two sides, at great savings in treasure  and
       years  of  exposure to that hazard.  Had we had the imagina-
       tion and guts ten years ago that have been  evident  in  the
       last  year,  START could have been fully implemented by now,
       rather than just beginning.

       In any case, it is important to put  into  force  the  START
       Treaty,  not  only to achieve the modest benefits of the re-
       ductions for which it provides, but especially to  have  the
       detailed vehicle of obligation and mechanisms which will en-
       able  and  support  further reductions and limitations which
       are so much in the interest of U.S. and world security.

       In his testimony last fall, Dr. Panofsky ably presented  the
       substance  of the report of the National Academy of Sciences
       Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC)
       of which I was also an author.  That unanimous  report  lays
       the  foundation  for  moving beyond START, and was soon fol-
       lowed by the initiative of President George Bush and that of
       President Mikhail Gorbachev toward the unilateral reduction,
       elimination, and in many cases the  destruction  of  nuclear
       weapons--  especially  tactical  nuclear weapons which would
       have been untouched by START itself.  Those initiatives were
       wise but long overdue, since it is not the intended  purpose
       of  nuclear  weapons  (to  fight on the battlefield, for in-
       stance) which poses the greatest peril, but the fact that  a
       nuclear  weapon  can destroy a city.  The possession of more
       nuclear weapons on our part has not in any  way  compensated
       for  the  increased hazard posed by the enormous increase in
       numbers of nuclear  weapons  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,
       which,  themselves,  are now seen by their holders not as an
       asset but as a costly and dangerous liability.

       So a lot of attention is being given to  the  implementation
       of the Bush-Gorbachev-Yeltsin initiatives.  Although this is
       not  the  primary  topic of my presentation, the three items
       are linked-- START implementation, destruction of many thou-
       sands of tactical nuclear weapons, and  the  nature  of  the
       post-START world.

       It  is  important  that  the  process  of  removing all non-
       strategic weapons to the Russian Republic be  completed,  as
       scheduled, by July 1, 1992, and that this process be carried
       out  safely.   Weapons to be moved are temporarily disabled,
       as I understand it, transported, disabled  more  permanently
       in  many cases on their arrival, and stored for destruction.
       According to information from the other  side,  capabilities
       for  the  disassembly and destruction of nuclear weapons can
       provide routinely for 1500 such per  year,  but  also  could
       handle some 4500 per year, except for a shortage of adequate
       storage  facilities  for the plutonium that would be removed
       from  the  weapons.    As  has  been  indicated  in   recent
       testimony(1) by Administration witnesses,  there  is  active
       discussion  between  the  U.S. and the Commonwealth of Inde-
       pendent States to identify  adequate  storage  capabilities,
       secure transport capabilities, and the like.  In view of our
       proven  inability  to imagine the political future, it would
       be prudent to implement as quickly as possible  these  meas-
       ures that have been sketched by the Presidents, to eliminate
       physically weapons which are now regarded as a liability and
       a  hazard  not only to the other nations of the world but to
       one's own nation.

       Here I go beyond the CISAC report to present my  own  views,
       in  the light of the political evolution thus far and of the
       initiative of the Presidents.   I recommend  that  all  non-
       strategic  nuclear  weapons  be destroyed, except, as an in-
       terim  measure,  for  fewer  than  1000   (say   400)   U.S.
       air-delivered  weapons  that  might  remain nominally at the
       service of NATO; an equal  number  of  similar  air-launched
       weapons would be retained, for the time, by the Commonwealth
       of Independent States, or by Russia.  Previous testimony in-
       dicated  general  agreement that U.S.   and Soviet strategic
       forces could each be reduced to the  level  of  3000  actual
       warheads, and I urge that this be done quickly.

       It is a welcome change to see frank discussion about what it
       is  that bothers us, and, in some cases, even solutions that
       really address the problem.  It was not always thus.

       For instance, the development of the MX  10-warhead  missile
       (Peacekeeper)  and  its deployment in Minuteman silos was in
       no way a remedy for the silo vulnerability that was used  to
       motivate the MX program.

       In  his Los Angeles Times article July, 1991, former Presi-
       dent Reagan recalls with approval his March  1983  announce-
       ment  of  the SDI program, which, he says, called for an SDI
       "effective enough to stop a high percentage of incoming mis-
       siles  from destroying our own arsenal, in order to discour-
       age an enemy from launching an attack in the  first  place."
       Of  course,  SDI  had  no  such  effect;  the  1983 and 1984
       Scowcroft commission reports explained why  such  an  attack
       was  not a matter of strategic concern; and the goals of the
       SDI in any case were not the (actually  achievable  but  un-
       sought)  goal  of preserving the strategic retaliatory force
       but rather that of rendering Soviet nuclear  weapons  "impo-
       tent and obsolete," so that we could abandon our own nuclear

       As more nearly achievable goals for SDI replaced the initial
       purpose,  it  was  often  observed that it would be cheaper,
       quicker, and more reliable to eliminate half of  the  Soviet
       strategic  warheads  by  a treaty than to attempt to nullify
       them in flight to their targets, and there is now  consensus
       that such reductions are feasible, important, and urgent.

       SDI  goals are now focused, for the present, on the achieve-
       ment of GPALS-- a Global Protection Against Limited  Strike.
       This is to include protection against an unauthorized or ac-
       cidental  launch  of  nuclear-armed  missiles  of the former
       Soviet Union, defense of the United States against  nuclear-
       armed ICBMs from a third-world nation, and protection of de-
       ployed  U.S.  forces  and friendly and allied cities against
       shorter range ballistic missiles, armed with  chemical,  bi-
       ological, or high-explosive warheads.

       Additional questions raised in last year's testimony include
       the role of nuclear testing, and specifically of space-based
       weaponry.    I  will  address  all  of  these briefly in the
       post-START context.

       I  assume  and recommend that these be transferred to secure
       and internationally guarded storage, in the  owning  nation,
       pending  destruction,  except  for 400 warheads intended for
       air delivery.  Control and verification should be  aided  by
       an  exchange of declarations and continuing information, in-
       cluding serial numbers of weapons  and  their  major  compo-
       nents,   with   the   attachment   of   tags  of  increasing
       reliability.  Much of the benefit of such tags would be  ob-
       tained by a simple "license plate" assigned irrevocably to a
       particular  warhead, to aid accountability and verification.
       How else could one verify an assertion that, say, 9870  tac-
       tical  warheads  remain in a dozen storage sites?  It is not
       practical to put them all on display simultaneously  and  to
       immobilize  them  until they are counted.  Far better to use
       random sampling of a detailed declaration.


       Weapons removed from aircraft can be restored in a couple of
       days or hours.  ICBMs taken off alert can be  back  in  full
       action  in  days  or  weeks.   Those warheads slated for de-
       struction under START or post-START should be  removed  from
       their  delivery  vehicles, disabled, tagged, and transported
       to secure and internationally guarded storage to await their
       eventual destruction, as proposed by President Bush  in  his
       September 27 initiative.

       There  is now general agreement that these reductions should
       be made without the necessity of building  any  new  system.
       This  puts  the  emphasis  on  the preferential retention of
       single-warhead missiles and on downloading--  the  reduction
       of  the  number  of warheads carried by an individual MIRVed
       missile.  It is a limitation on  warheads  themselves,  com-
       bined with individual accountability and destruction of sur-
       plus   warheads,   that   permits  reliable  and  verifiable

                 A regime for controlling warheads, of course, must
                 incorporate  data  exchange  and  verification,  a
                 strict control of warhead construction and remanu-
                 facture,  and  must  be  buttressed by a cutoff of
                 production of highly enriched  uranium  (HEU)  and
                 plutonium.    In reality, neither the U.S. nor the
                 Commonwealth is producing HEU, and  the  U.S.  has
                 produced no plutonium for several years.  With the
                 destruction  imminent  of  many  thousands of war-
                 heads, there will be  in  any  case  no  need  for
                 plutonium  production  in the Commonwealth, and it
                 has been stated that it  will  cease  within  this
                 decade; it is evidently a make-work activity.

       Warheads  totalling  a given number are no greater threat to
       the other side if they are housed on MIRVed missiles than on
       single-warhead missiles.  Quite the contrary, in fact, since
       singlets provide better flexibility, a wider range  of  tac-
       tics, and the like.

       For  equal numbers of warheads on the two sides, MIRVs are a
       problem for their owner, because a single warhead exploding
       near a silo housing a MIRVed missile can destroy four or six
       or ten warheads.  It is true, however, that even a side with
       singlet missiles may be rendered insecure by an equal number
       of  warheads  on  MIRVed missiles on the other side, but the
       interaction is complex:

                 A side possessing (only) MIRVed missiles in  silos
                 will recognize the vulnerability of those missiles
                 to  accurate  warheads  from  the other side, and,
                 lacking effective defense, it will likely rely  on
                 Launch  Under  Attack  (LUA)  or Launch On Warning
                 (LOW) either as a residual capability or as a  de-
                 clared  strategy  to  deter  a  disarming  strike.
                 Thus,  if we assume the U.S. had only singlet mis-
                 siles in silos and  the  Soviets  only  10-warhead
                 SS-18s  in silos (with an equal number of warheads
                 in total) the U.S. should certainly  be  concerned
                 that the Soviets might anticipate a first, disarm-
                 ing  strike  from  the  U.S.,  and would be ready,
                 therefore, to launch their  missiles  on  warning,
                 thereby  assuredly  deterring such an attack.  But
                 what happens if there is a false warning signal?

       The resulting critical dependence on warning  systems  high-
       lights  our  foolishness  in  introducing  MIRV in the first
       place, and the tragedy of not proposing to ban MIRV  in  the
       SALT  negotiations, when such a ban could have been verified
       by production and deployment limitations  in  the  U.S.  and
       test limitations in the Soviet Union.

       But  in  1992,  the important point is that U.S. security is
       not in any way impaired if Russia should retain a few
       MIRVed missiles, whether by agreement or clandestinely. And the
       new  political  situation permits and encourages cooperative
       warning systems to reduce further the instability just  dis-
       cussed, and to limit and to verify actual numbers of nuclear

       Another point that is widely misunderstood involves the cost
       or "economics" of operating ICBM or SLBM systems with single
       warheads instead of their full complement of MIRVs.  For in-
       stance,  the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff are cited as provid-
       ing an illustration of a post-START initiative force of 4700
       U.S.  strategic  warheads,  of  which  500   would   be   on
       Minuteman III  downloaded  to  single  warheads,  2300 on 17
       Trident submarines with 432 C-4 and D-5 missiles,  and  1900
       on  possibly  95 B-1s with 20 ALCM each.  If a force of 2000
       strategic warheads were  to  be  obtained  by  reducing  the
       Trident  loading  to  1000  total and the B-1 loading to 500
       total, it is widely reported that the cost  per  warhead  in
       the SLBM deployment would be excessive.  In fact, the actual
       operating  cost  of 17 Trident submarines with 1000 warheads
       would be somewhat less than with 2300  warheads,  not  more.
       We  would  save money.   The operating cost could be further
       reduced by housing the 1000 warheads on a fleet of eight in-
       stead of 18 submarines, but many, including myself,  believe
       this to be "too many eggs in one basket."

       If  one  considers  a strategic force for the longer term of
       1000 warheads, total--  perhaps  400  on  singlet  ICBMs  in
       silos,  400  on SLBMs, and 200 on ALCMs-- one would have the
       choice between operating 18 Trident submarines, each with 24
       missiles downloaded to a single warhead, or  18  submarines,
       each  with  20 launch tubes blocked, and the other four con-
       taining 6-MIRV SLBMs.   The vulnerability  of  the  SLBM  to
       anti-submarine  warfare (ASW) is identical in the two cases,
       unlike the situation of silo-based weapons.    Nevertheless,
       there  is a strong preference for downloading even the SLBMs
       to singlets, because  a  modern  SLBM  has  intercontinental
       range,  and  if  it  remained  a MIRVed missile for the long
       term, the infrastructure and testing of MIRVed weapons would
       continue indefinitely.  This would constitute an unnecessary
       potential for breakout, involving the deployment  of  MIRVed
       SLBMs on land.  So I have a strong preference ultimately for
       downloading the SLBMs themselves.

       As  has been discussed in previous testimony to this Commit-
       tee, while many believe it would be highly desirable to  re-
       duce  the  strategic  warhead  numbers  of the former Soviet
       forces to 1000 for the longer term, and that it would be ac-
       ceptable to reduce U.S. holdings to the  same  number,  this
       could  not  practicably  be  achieved without limitation and
       even reductions on the nuclear forces of the other three ma-
       jor nuclear powers, Great Britain, France,  and  China.    I
       strongly  believe  that it would be in the interest of these
       three nations to commit now to begin reductions of their own
       holdings to a level of 300 each, when U.S. and former Soviet
       holdings reach 3000, so that for the longer term, with  num-
       bers  like  1000, 1000, 300, 300, and 300, each of those na-
       tions would have about 30% as many warheads as the  U.S.  or
       Russia, rather than one or two percent, as is now the case.

       1000  WARHEADS  EACH? A possible future (and a desirable one
       compared with the 60,000 nuclear weapons we now have in  the
       world, or alternatively with the future of massive prolifer-
       ation of nuclear weaponry), would be a continuation for many
       decades  of  U.S.  and  Commonwealth strategic forces at the
       level of 1000 warheads each,  with  no  additional  tactical
       weapons.   Nuclear warheads can be maintained in working or-
       der by non-nuclear testing and occasional "remanufacture" to
       original specifications (although some would prefer  another
       course).  A nuclear weapons establishment capable of remanu-
       facturing,  say, 200 warheads per year would be adequate for
       this purpose.  It would need to be safeguarded against clan-
       destine use, to ensure that one warhead  was  destroyed  for
       every one manufactured.

       The delivery vehicles themselves pose a very different prob-
       lem.   They are far more complex than a nuclear warhead and,
       especially if downloaded to singlet configuration, are enor-
       mously oversized and much more  costly  than  necessary  for
       their  future  purpose.    Furthermore, it makes very little
       sense to demand that future Soviet forces  indefinitely  in-
       clude SLBMs capable of carrying 10 warheads, even if down-
       loaded to one.  Over the years, each side  should  have  the
       option,  once,  to replace a large MIRVed missile by a small
       single-warhead missile, sized to carry the existing  warhead
       and some suitable package of penetration aids.

       Eventually,  not only the missiles, but also the replacement
       submarines could be much smaller, and perhaps more numerous,
       with the same total number of launch  tubes  in  the  force,
       each carrying a singlet missile of intercontinental range.

       I  emphasize that there is no urgency for the development of
       such missiles or submarines, but that around the year 2000 a
       modest development program should be  initiated  that  would
       result  in the deployment of small missiles and smaller sub-
       marines around the year 2006, as a way of  reducing  ongoing
       expenditures  and  limiting  the  future  launch  capability
       (breakout potential).

       A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS? This question was  ad-
       dressed  by several witnesses in the 1991 hearings including
       Stephen J. Hadley and James R. Schlesinger.  The former  im-
       plied  that  we will continue testing to improve our nuclear
       explosives, "that is to say make them cleaner, smaller, with
       less radiation,  and  so  on."    On  the  other  hand,  Dr.
       Schlesinger states explicitly,

                 "I  do  not  and  have not favored a comprehensive
                 test ban.  However I can see  the  possibility  of
                 comprehensive test limitation-- with a low thresh-
                 old  and  a  limited number of tests.   That would
                 serve to sustain confidence in the reliability  of
                 the  stockpile--  while precluding the development
                 of new nuclear explosive devices."

       I have the same  goals  as  James  Schlesinger,  but  having
       worked on nuclear weapons for many years at Los Alamos, I am
       confident  that  stockpile reliability, safety, and security
       can be maintained without  continued  nuclear  testing.    I
       would strongly advocate that the United States take the lead
       now  in  negotiating  a  comprehensive ban on nuclear tests,
       which would take full effect in 1995, and which would permit
       the five nuclear powers a decreasing number of small  under-
       ground tests until that time.

       We need a CTBT in the fight against proliferation of nuclear
       weapons.   This is not so much because a test ban will abso-
       lutely prevent a nation from developing  its  first  nuclear
       weapon.    This  can be done, with some probability, without
       any nuclear test at all.  But a nation violating a universal
       test ban puts itself outside the law or  generally  accepted
       custom.    UN military action against Iraq and the scattered
       references in the Hearing  record  to  "military  sanctions"
       point  the  way to the ultimate response to imminent nuclear
       proliferation.  I believe that the United  States  would  be
       far  more  effective  in  leading  world  opinion and action
       against proliferators in an era in which we have universally
       abandoned the right to test nuclear weapons underground.

       As a matter of simple human nature, it is very difficult for
       our nuclear weapons people to believe that somehow they have
       a  right  to  test nuclear weapons, while those in other na-
       tions do not.  On the other hand, I  predict  that  we  will
       have  very  little  tolerance for nuclear tests in other na-
       tions if we have abandoned them ourselves.

       it is the ends in which we are interested, the means tend to
       assume compelling importance, perhaps because some action
       is involved-- a first step toward the goal.  As usual, however,
       it  is  desirable  to disaggregate the goals, to see whether
       their elements might be better  achieved  (sooner,  at  less
       cost,  more reliably) by a different set of means.  This was
       the case, for instance, with the  reduction  of  the  Soviet
       strategic  threat  by  negotiation rather than by active de-
       fense.  It could have been the case in the reduction of silo
       vulnerability by a close-in non-nuclear defense rather  than
       by  space-based  weaponry.    And  it  is  the case with the
       laudable aims of GPALS.

       Dr. Schlesinger's testimony regarding ICBMs stated "There is
       no third world threat and it is not going to emerge in  this
       century;"  Harold Brown had testified to the same conclusion
       ("aside from China").  The one-site deployment  proposed  by
       the  Missile  Defense  Act  of 1991 (for deployment by 1996)
       would thus have the sole purpose of defending against  unau-
       thorized  or  accidental  launch  of former Soviet strategic
       weapons.  This problem can be addressed far more effectively
       and sooner by  cooperative  efforts  with  the  Commonwealth
       leadership  to  verify  and  to improve the integrity of the
       permissive action links  apparently  used  with  all  Soviet
       strategic weapons.(2) A totally separate system  that  could
       be implemented within a year or two and would assuredly find
       a  willing partner on the other side would be an enhancement
       to the PAL, with might actually be separate and  could  log-
       ically be called a passive Destruct After Launch (p-DAL).(3)
       This would capitalize on a  system  that  has  traditionally
       been  available on deployed Soviet operational missiles, ca-
       pable of destroying the missile after launch in case  it  is
       not  responsive to its guidance system.  The p-DAL would un-
       conditionally energize the destruct mechanism a few  seconds
       after launch,  unless an appropriate coded signal had been
       received by the missile just before launch from its silo  or
       launch tube.  Buried inside the missile, such a system could
       not  readily  be disconnected by the operating crews, and it
       could be arranged so that an attempt to disconnect it  would
       irrevocably  disable  the  missile  (as is the case with the
       more modern U.S. PALs).  Any reluctance on the part  of  the
       launch  crew  or  the chain of command to provide the highly
       secret word would simply  mean  that  if  the  missile  were
       launched  without  authorization or by accident, it would be
       visibly destroyed immediately upon launch.

       There has been a general reluctance to consider active meas-
       ures for destruct after launch  which  would  involve  radio
       transmission  to the missiles, but this passive destruct af-
       ter launch system is much less  controversial,  evoking  the
       response,  "How does that differ from a PAL?"  Nevertheless,
       it can be added in parallel to existing control systems  and
       be made both user-friendly and secure.

       I emphasize in brief paper(4) which I ask be included in the
       record  as part of my testimony, that if a small ICBM threat
       should develop, an important element of the defensive
       system is the same infrared warning satellites ("DSP") that were
       revealed  by  the Administration during Desert Storm to have
       detected every single SCUD launched from Iraq at  Israel  or
       at  Saudi  Arabia.    An isolated ICBM reentry vehicle could
       then be intercepted in mid-course on its way to  the  conti-
       nental  United  States  by  one or two interceptors launched
       from the single site at Grand Forks, ND,  permitted  by  the
       1972  ABM Treaty.   This would be simpler and more effective
       than to use space-based interceptors,  "Brilliant  Pebbles",
       as  prescribed  by SDIO in their GPALS proposal.  Of course,
       if the problem of mid-course discrimination can't be solved,
       neither  the  Brilliant   Pebbles   nor   the   ground-based
       interceptors  can  do the job of mid-course intercept.  More
       effective, in any case, is pre-boost phase intercept,  which
       is  easier  against an ICBM than against a SCUD, because the
       ICBM is much larger and less readily concealed.

       As was emphasized also in previous testimony, even an effec-
       tive missile defense of the United States would not  signif-
       icantly reduce the overall nuclear threat, which is far more
       likely  to  arrive  in the form of smuggled or air-delivered
       nuclear weapons than via ICBM.   In a written  response  for
       the  record, Harold Brown explained that even a ground-based
       U.S.  missile-defense system could  prove  destabilizing  if
       the other side ("however misplaced the expectation") came to
       believe  that  with the reduced strategic offensive forces a
       potential for  expansion  ("breakout")  of  the  ABM  system
       "might be able to intercept all or almost all of a force de-
       graded  by a preemptive strike.  That is a recipe for insta-

       The  defense of deployed troops or friendly capitals against
       non-nuclear missiles of theater range, as analyzed in my pa-
       per, can better be done by ground-based interceptors, again,
       than by space-based.  This is even clearer for  the  theater
       ballistic missiles (TBM) because the boost phase is so brief
       that  space-based  weapons have no time to reach the target,
       which in any case remains in  the  dense  atmosphere  during
       rocket  motor  firing,  and  the  maximum  height of the arc
       (apogee) can be held below 100 km so that a Brilliant Pebble
       would have little capability to intercept.   A  ground-based
       missile  system based on Patriot, but modified to capitalize
       on the important cueing available from DSP could do a pretty
       good job against an attack that does not involve  decoys  or
       countermeasures,  even  as simple as those accidentally pro-
       vided by the breakup of  the  stretched  SCUDs  launched  by
       Iraq.    Other  interceptors  under  development by the U.S.
       Army, e.g., THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense), could
       cover a larger area.  However, we should be realistic in our
       expectations, since it is easy enough to improve the  effec-
       tiveness  of  the TBM as a terror weapon by dividing its ex-
       plosive, chemical, or even  biological  payload  into  10-40
       bomblets,  which  would  be  separated at the end of powered
       flight.  No active defense has been proposed that  would  in
       any  way effectively engage the bomblets; and bomblets would
       increase the effectiveness of CW and BW weapons and of
       antipersonnel explosives.

       space  satellites conduct vital navigation, observation, and
       communication tasks, the value of which was strikingly  dem-
       onstrated  in Desert Storm.  Some of this information can be
       made available to the United Nations and to the Commonwealth
       of Independent States to build confidence and security;  in-
       deed,  on  February 18 Secretary of State James R. Baker and
       Russian Foreign  Minister  Andrei  Kozyrev  announced  talks
       aimed  at  establishing  a joint Early-Warning Center.   The
       emerging Open Skies regime will allow nations or  groups  of
       nations without such satellite capabilities to obtain infor-
       mation  by  aircraft overflight, in many cases, which, espe-
       cially for limited areas,  can  provide  better  information
       than that available from satellites.

       Space-based sensors such as DSP also have an important role in
       defense, but the one capability that space-based weaponry
       would clearly have is to destroy satellites.   Our  valuable
       satellites  are few and vulnerable.  They would benefit from
       legal protection, which would  then  legitimize  enforcement
       action.  I believe that U.S. security would be enhanced by a
       ban on all space weapons (not sensors), and by a ban on test
       and  use  of  antisatellite weapons (ASAT), whether launched
       from land, sea, or air.  Nations that are denied  the  pros-
       pect of developing nuclear weapons could perfectly well rise
       to  the  technological challenge of perfecting ASAT, partic-
       ularly against satellites in low earth orbit.    The  United
       States does not need the spread of such capabilities.

       COOPERATIVE  SECURITY  MEASURES.  The  changes  in political
       structure and military capability have been so abrupt and so
       severe that we have been caught unprepared to  exploit  them
       for  our  mutual  benefit.   Of course, START itself and the
       reciprocated Presidential initiatives are examples of  coop-
       erative  security  measures,  but  so is targeted aid to the
       Commonwealth for the transportation and storage of  warheads
       slated  for destruction.   Installation of passive destruct-
       after-launch systems in Commonwealth strategic weapons would
       respond to U.S. security  concerns,  and,  even  after  some
       sharing of the cost, would save the U.S. time and much money
       in  resolving  our  concern about accidental or unauthorized

       A new opportunity for cooperative security would enhance the
       confidence of each side that the ICBMs of the other side re-
       main in their silos.   This could be  achieved  by  mounting
       small,  specialized  radio  transmitters on each silo cover,
       generating an unpredictable code that would be relayed by  a
       normal  communications  satellite to a command center of the
       other side or even to the United Nations.  Arranged so  that
       the  communication  would  cease if the transmitter (or silo
       cover) were moved, the system would give  continuing  assur-
       ance  that ICBMs were not on the way.  This would not be, in
       truth, a warning system but a  confidence-building  measure,
       since  the  transmitter  could readily be destroyed or disa-
       bled, thus denying  any  possibility  of  report  of  actual
       launch.    But  if  a signal stopped, and especially if many
       stopped at once, the ICBM owner would be highly motivated to
       explain how  this  had  happened,  in  order  to  avoid  the
       presumption of launch.

       Another  cooperative  measure would have the greatest impor-
       tance in achieving the goals of the Missile Defense Act of
       1991,namely  extending  to all nations the U.S.-Soviet INF
       Treaty.  This bans the possession, worldwide, by the U.S. or
       the Soviet Union (and now by any of the successor Republics)
       of ground-launched missiles of  range  500-5500 km,  whether
       cruise  or  ballistic, and whether nuclear or conventionally
       armed.  Obviously, U.S. and Commonwealth security  would  be
       enhanced  if this treaty were extended universally, and, un-
       like active defense, a treaty could eliminate  the  missile-
       delivered  bomblet  threat  as  readily  as  it could handle
       simple missiles.  It is truly a wonder that  the  U.S.,  the
       Soviet Union, and Iraq are the only nations in the world le-
       gally  barred  from  possessing land-based missiles of short
       and intermediate range (INF); if the ban could  be  extended
       to  almost  all  nations,  there  would again be a basis for
       sanctions against nations that refused to join or to comply.

       STILL ROOM FOR IMAGINATION AND GUTS. President  Bush's  Sep-
       tember  27  initiative seized the moment and set into motion
       an extremely significant process.  So in  this  "revolution-
       ary"  new  world of arms control, as ACDA Director Ronald F.
       Lehman,  II,  called  it in his testimony, new opportunities
       arise.  Some are old ideas whose time has come.    According
       to Mr. Lehman:

                 "Just  as the political changes that you mentioned
                 have opened up  what  some  of  us  have  jokingly
                 called  the  whistle  blower approach to verifica-
                 tion, that is to say, the access to people who may
                 want to reveal when their countries are  not  com-
                 plying with international obligations, so openness
                 measures  such as open skies have given us new op-

       Benefitting from  such  information  in  Iraq  (and  in  the
       enforcement  of  IRS regulations and various domestic laws),
       we have yet to maximize our benefit from verification  whis-
       tle  blowers.   Future treaties and agreements should have a
       clause requiring their wide  publication  in  summary  form,
       with a clear statement by the host government that it is the
       duty of each person having knowledge of any violation of the
       agreement by his or her government to communicate that know-
       ledge  to the relevant international organ.  Enabling legis-
       lation might be required, and thought given to mechanisms to
       minimize retaliation; but that is why we have  an  ACDA  and
       others  inside  and  outside  government  thinking of new or
       newly feasible approaches.

       The United Nations mechanism was very useful to the  nations
       of  the  world  in dealing with Iraq in 1991.  We will place
       more dependence on the UN and the IAEA in countering nuclear
       proliferation.  Serious thought should be given to a UN role
       in  providing  positive  security  guarantees   to   nations
       eschewing nuclear weaponry; perhaps with forces committed to
       UN use by the nuclear powers.


       START  should  be ratified and implemented as soon as possi-
       ble.  The post-START era is well under way with  the  initi-
       atives  set  in motion by President Bush September 27, 1991,
       and disablement and guarded storage of many thousands of nu-
       clear warheads  must  be  our  urgent  near-term  objective.
       Post-START  forces  should have an early goal of 3000 actual
       strategic warheads on  each  side,  plus  perhaps  400  air-
       delivered tactical weapons.  As soon as other nuclear powers
       see  merit  in  reductions, the U.S. and Commonwealth should
       move each to 1000 single-warhead weapons.  The threat of ac-
       cidental or unauthorized launch should be handled by instal-
       lation of a passive destruct-after-launch system rather than
       by active defenses, and  theater-range  missiles  should  be
       eliminated  by extending to all nations the INF Treaty which
       binds the U.S. and the successor states of the Soviet Union.

       1   Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Febru-
           ary  5,  1992, by Reginald Bartholomew and by Stephen J.
       2   Testimony  of  Robert  M. Gates to the Senate Government
           Affairs Committee, January 15, 1992.
       3   S. Frankel, Testimony to the Failsafe and Risk Reduction
           Committee  of  the  Department  of  Defense, November 5,
       4   "Space-Based  Defense  Against  Ballistic  Missiles," by
           R.L. Garwin, presented to the American  Association  for
           the Advancement of Science in Chicago February 8, 1992.