Richard L. Garwin

            IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
                        P.O. Box 218
                 Yorktown Heights, NY 10598

                       (914) 945-2555

                Adjunct Professor of Physics
                    Columbia University)

                 Presented in Washington at
             Senate Foreign Relations Committee
            Hearings on Militarization of Space

                     September 20, 1982

264:MOS                  092082.MOS                 09/20/82

I am Richard Garwin.  I'm speaking for myself alone at the
invitation of the Committee but from a background of
thirty-two years of involvement in defense and intelligence
matters as a consultant to the United States government.  I
agree with, one hundred percent of Ambassador Buchheim's
presentation and 90-95% of the statement by Drs. Rostow and
DeLauer.  But I think my differences from them are
significant.  In global summary I agree that we are at an
important juncture as to whether space will be used for war
or whether war on earth will start in space; but the
evidence is not in the magnitude of the budget nor in the
formal plans, but in the urgings and expectations of
individuals or groups.

First, I personally support the military use of space for
military support activities.  My involvement began in 1958
when I was a member of the US delegation to the Surprise
Attack Conference in Geneva, for which I helped to devise
communications satellites specialized for the enforcement of
any possible treaty, deployment verification, prevention of
surprise attack, and so on.  All of these activities would
be dubbed "military space," although they do not involve the
deployment of arms in space, the attack on weapons, or
anything like that.  So that's why I say that it is not the
overall military space budget which has anything to do with
the arms race in space.

By now there are great civilian benefits from space-- from
communication satellites, weather satellites, navigation
satellites (such as Transit, which has been operational
probably for twenty years) some land observation satellites,
and the conduct of important scientific investigations in
space.  We have mature military satellites (COMSATs, weather
satellites, reconnaissance satellites for treaty
verification and for intelligence gathering); and the Soviet
Union of course has a full complex of these as well,
including some which we do not appear to have-- for
instance, the radar ocean reconnaissance satellite series
(one of which fell in Canada some years ago).

In the future, military (or so-called military) satellites
will include the Navstar global positioning system with its
30-foot accuracy in 3 dimensions anywhere in the world,
which will contribute to our capability to bomb, the ability
to launch missiles with high accuracy, but at the same time
to low-cost navigation of ships, aircraft, and even perhaps
to the surveillance cooperative surveillance of aircraft for
air traffic control.  That (Navstar) system, as has been
announced by the Administration, will carry the Integrated
Operational Nuclear Detection System, which will help in
fighting nuclear wars by determining the location of both
our nuclear weapon explosions and those of any other
country.  That will provide a feedback which will allow
fewer nuclear weapons to exert the same amount of damage.
In the future we will have durable, decoyed, duplicate
communication satellites for survivable command and control
communications; and Dr. DeLauer mentioned the MILLSTAR
system which will be the primary high-performance military
communication satellite system for all purposes in the

I feel in general that space should be used economically,
both for civilian and for military purposes; if it is better
and cheaper to do something via space then that's how it
ought to be done.  And parenthetically the shuttle is not in
this line of economic use; it costs more in the early years
and will probably cost more so far as I can see for a long
time than expendable boosters.  But it is a national
decision and we'll be using the shuttle to the degree that
it can be used in competition with foreign-provided
expendable launch.

Now what are the threats in space?  Well, going back to
ancient history in the 1960s, the United States had
operational an anti-satellite system which figured in the
annual reports of Secretary of Defense McNamara.  We had two
systems in fact, one of which was based on Johnson Island (I
believe was some Jupiter missiles with nuclear warheads).
Any minimal ABM system can be used as an anti-satellite
system.  And we have considered, at times, using what
remains of the Safeguard system for ABM purposes.  The
Soviet Union for many years has tested (with not very good
reliability indicated in the press) an orbital intercepter
mounted on a large ICBM-like missile which goes into orbit
and attacks, thus far, only Soviet test satellites, but
presumably that system (believed by many to be operational)
will not in its actual operation destroy Soviet satellites.

For the future one can imagine ground-based lasers for
damaging satellites; or could have space-based lasers; or
space mines can be placed in orbit next to particularly
valuable satellites and detonated by remote control-- the
space mines would follow the space battle stations around
just as Soviet intelligence-gathering ships follow our naval
task forces.  Once again, many of the US satellites most
important for SALT verification (in that role) have no real
utility in the actual conduct of war, so it is not at all
clear that they would be high priority targets at the
outbreak of war.

I agree with Ambassador Buchheim that in looking toward
policy determination we ought to consider alternative worlds
and ask what are the possibilities?  What would be the
likely results?  I, for one, in a homely example, would
rather drive around in civilian autos and rely on
specialized defense forces to keep the enemy away than to
have everyone drive all the time in armored tanks which have
less space, less performance, higher cost, require vastly
different roads, use more fuel, and so on.  And the same
thing is true of space.  I believe that we can, for a long
time, have satellites which are very fragile, which do their
job in the best way possible at the lowest cost, without
hardening them very much to allow them to participate in a
war in space.  At least that's what I prefer.

So we have to look ahead and judge the outcome of different
courses of action.  We have to decide whether we will
emphasize our ability to destroy and protect satellites in
space or whether we should emphasize programs which would
allow us and other nations (and international organizations
as well) to benefit from space.  I emphasize that space wars
are not an alternative to war on earth.  In my view they are
a prelude to war on earth.  And some of my friends who
suggest that space would be a dandy location for war because
the United States has much better capability, higher
technology than the Soviet Union, I think miss this point;
that war in space will not be decoupled from war on earth.

We cannot have it both ways.  We can't derive the maximum
civil and military benefits from space and at the same time
deny the Soviet Union the ability to attempt to derive those
same benefits including observing the locations of our ships
and so on.  But there are analogous questions on earth.  If
someone looks into the window of your house or office and
you would prefer that they didn't, you are allowed to pull
the shades, but not to blind him or her.
Ambassador Buchheim indicated that there are ways of hiding
your activities and those are perfectly legal except under
certain circumstances where a specific obligation is
undertaken not to hide those activities (as in the case of
the ABM treaty and the SALT I limited offensive agreement).

One can also minimize the temptation which would be felt by
the Soviet Union to destroy our military space assets which
would be supporting even theater non-nuclear war.  We can
reduce this temptation by providing low-investment,
high-expenditure theater backups.  Not more satellites to be
launched-- which would provide capability worldwide-- but
short duration rockets, balloons, aircraft, ground-based
systems which would use the same signal format in many cases
as the satellite system and which would fully-- in fact more
capably-- provide the same information or capability in the
theater, so there would be no benefit to the Soviet Union
for destruction of those satellites.  There's a cost imputed
to us for having these backups.

Now one can have cooperative measures and I will come to
some-- most importantly a treaty.  There are some other
things which can be done.  For instance, if one believes
that high-energy lasers are a possible threat to the
survival of space assets, one could arrange the development
of high energy lasers to be done jointly (or at least
openly) between the Soviet Union and the United States.
To further deter Soviet attacks on our satellites, I believe
we should develop (but not test in space) the direct ascent
F-15 aircraft-based anti-satellite weapon.  This is a
satellite killer; it's not a killer satellite simply because
it doesn't go into orbit.  It goes up and comes down
intercepting its quarry on a direct flight.

To demonstrate the futility of deployment by the Soviet
Union of large and costly weapon platforms such as space
based lasers or the like, the US should explore (but not
test in space) space mines-- small, cheap, slowly
maneuverable, satellites carrying small, conventional
shotgun-like warheads which can be fired by secure and
unjammable command.  These would of course, if deployed,
violate any anti-satellite treaty that we would want to
negotiate.  And we would, therefore, neither deploy nor test

But most importantly we should immediately enter
negotiations with the Soviet Union toward an early
achievement of a treaty banning the destruction or damaging
of satellites or the emplacement of weapons in space.  The
Soviet draft treaty of August 1981 banning weapons in space
seems a suitable beginning.  It bans deployment or test or
any weapons in space.  The response to an imperfect draft is
to re-draft; I think that we should provide (if not from the
government, at least from independent circles) a draft in
treaty language, so that this process can proceed.  The
negotiations should consider the interest of all nations so
that the resulting treaty could be thrown open to accession
by other states.

I think a problem was indicated by the previous witnesses in
the difficulty of arriving at a policy without knowing what
the technical future holds.  Or in knowing what the
technical future holds without having defense programs or
exploratory programs which are directed by a policy which
itself doesn't exist.  The solution to this is to be less
directive.  Years ago I joined with others (Alton Frye, in
particular) in urging an Institute of the Congress which
would (presented with such questions which require answers
at a certain time) independently, in language which can be
of use to the Congress for legislation or treaties, provide
not a single product but alternative products.

So I leave you with that.  We are on the verge of war in
space not because of the billions of dollars of investment
in communication satellites or navigation satellites or
reconnaissance or military support activities but because
the Soviet Union has tested and we have in the past deployed
anti-satellite weapons; because we see the prospect for
destroying their space assets and worry that they will
destroy ours; and because we are not taking sufficiently
seriously the prospect of limiting that threat by
negotiation and treaty while at the same time protecting our
national security by having deterrence against the violation
of a treaty which might be negotiated between the United
States and the Soviet Union.  Thank you.


VOICE:  ...5 lines of text)--

RLG:  I am located principally at the IBM Research Center.
However, I'm speaking for myself and not for any other

VOICE:  ...(5 lines of text)--

RLG:  Anybody else in the world who tries to do business or
live a life, they don't want war.  And they certainly don't
want the communications satellites or the broadcasting
satellites or the navigation satellites interfered with or
destroyed.  So I have no doubt that anybody involved in the
peaceful exploitation of space has those views.

VOICE:   ...(8 lines of text)--

RLG:  I believe we are at the beginning of a major arms
race.  It's not that the Pentagon wants it that way or plans
it that way, but the Administration (and the Congress, I
must say) don't have the courage or the competence to resist
the technological fantasies which are pushed by many in the
public and in the Congress itself.  And so when the Pentagon
comes in with a measured response-- a study of space-based
laser prospects-- they are chastised by important members of
the Congress for not having done their job, not being
sufficiently aggressive and not spending enough money to
protect the national security.  In a political system like
ours, one can fight such actions only so long and then the
better part of valor is to spend the money even if it is
regarded as useless simply because there are supporters out
there who want it.

Now I remind you in 1974 of an excess of candor by that
great Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, who came in
and asked for $5 billion more; he explained in his candor
that he didn't really need it.  He wouldn't be there asking
for $5 billion for the Defense budget if there weren't a
need for that amount of fiscal stimulus to the economy, and
the Defense Department was the only organization which had
that kind of contingency planning (essentially by edict of
OMB the others are not allowed to have it).

So defense spending is not entirely oriented toward national
security.  I think the Pentagon wishes it were and many of
the rest of us wish it were.  But many of us believe that
jobs for our districts or (if one could be pardoned for
mentioning it), reelection prospects, are as important in
the short term as national security.  So that's why I
believe we are at the beginning of an arms race and the
Soviet Union cannot stand idle when they see the arguments
here nor we when we see some publicity from them.  But I
should turn this over to my colleagues.

VOICE:  **Long interruption**

VOICE:  **Long response**

VOICE:  ...(6 lines of text)--

VOICE:  **long response**

RLG:  I think Dr. Steinbruner has explained what's going on
in the normal academic community.  At IBM I have to confess
it's just I alone.  I published a paper in the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists in May 1981, titled "Weapons in Space"
where I gave most of these same views.  Now, verification is
always somewhat of a problem, but not so much in my opinion,
as has been imagined.  The techniques of verification which
are suitable for counting the numbers of fixed large ICBMs
are not really those that would be used for verifying the
that a country is in fact fulfilling its undertaking in
regard to an ASAT activity.  The kind of verification that
would be required is perhaps an on-challenge explanation of
the utility or some features of things that have been
launched into space.  Unilateral capability in some cases
for inspecting space objects, because it is very difficult
to hide through thick shielding and so on the interior of
space objects.  So if we were very much interested in
protecting our own space resources we could in good time
develop a capability for inspecting what has been deployed
in orbit by others (or we could not).  That's an option we
would decide as to whether it was worth the cost.  few words
lost in change of tape).  we do not have to have the
ultimate in order to have the early agreement.  The
undertaking though should be firm and the verification
capabilities (if not what is written into the treaty) will
expand as each side finds it in its interest to have more
ability to verify.

VOICE:  Thank you very much.  **Long interruption**

RLG:  Well, I have looked at what is required to defend
satellites against intercepters and I think that the
advantage is all on the side of the person who wants to
destroy satellites.

VOICE:  **Short interjection**

RLG:  wants to destroy satellites.  So when you express your
willingness to fight a war in space, and by attacking Soviet
assets in space gain leverage in some other theater, you
have to confess that your own space assets are going to be
destroyed as well.  You may end up winning the war in space,
but there will be very little left in space to fight for.
"Winning" would have to be defined as when we send up an
intercepter they cannot destroy it as easily as we can
destroy theirs.  But all of the productive satellites,
military or civilian, are much more readily destroyed than
these single-day-lifetime anti-satellite weapons.  So I
disagree totally that we would have an exploitable advantage
in military activities (that is the actual use of weapons in
space).  We do have a very great advantage (which I want to
preserve) in the use of space to support military
activities, just as we have an advantage at present in the
civilian exploitation of space.

Several VOICES off and on:  **Long interruption**

CLOSE of meeting.